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Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt, 
eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt! 
Wie Himmelskräfte auf und nieder steigen 
Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen. 
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Introduction 
 
This text has originally been written as a master thesis in philosophy at the Faculty of 
Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. The thesis was written 
under the supervision of Prof.dr. Ger Groot and Prof.dr. Roel Kuiper, with support of 
Dr. Henri Krop. Because of size limitations some material was excluded in the 
original version. In the current version this material has been included. Also some 
grammatical corrections have been made. Although my thought on some points has 
developed since, the text still represents my thought at that moment. 
 
This text has been translated into Dutch, and is currently being edited and extended. It 
will be separately published as a book by Buijten & Schipperheijn publishers 
(Amsterdam) in the Verantwoording-series of the Association for Reformational 
Philosophy. The publication is scheduled in the end of 2011 or early 2012. Maybe an 
English version will follow. We will see. 
 
Special thanks to prof. Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame, U.S.), prof. 
Richard Mouw (Fuller Theological Seminary, U.S.), prof. Andries Raath (University 
of the Free State, South Africa), prof. Jaap Klapwijk (emeritus Free Universiy, 
Amsterdam), prof. René van Woudenberg (Free University, Amsterdam) and the 
Association for Reformational Philosophy (Soest) for kindly making available 
relevant materials. 
 
 
Rotterdam, 
 
April 2011 
 
 
Bas Hengstmengel 
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1 Introduction 
 
In his momentous book Christianity and Philosophy the French neo-Thomist 
philosopher Étienne Gilson (1884-1978) opposes Calvinism on the ground that it can 
have no philosophy.1 According to Gilson, the depraved reason of man as sketched by 
the Reformers cannot attain truth. Therefore no philosophy as a substantive discipline 
can exist in Calvinism, only theology. There are Calvinists who agree with Gilson: 
Calvinism and philosophy are natural enemies. Maybe fideism is the only alternative. 
The Calvinist doctrine of all-embracing sin – understood as total depravity of man – 
and absolute grace leaves a priori no space for philosophical exploration, let alone for 
the autonomy of reason. Likewise, Alisdair MacIntyre in After Virtue suggests that 
Calvinism is close to irrationalism. By discarding a rationally knowable human telos, 
as was widely accepted in medieval thought, and believing the power of reason to be 
destroyed by the fall of man, the Calvinist can do nothing more than just obey God’s 
directives. These directives may be arbitrary, but there is no other, philosophical basis 
for living. According to MacIntyre, Protestants at this point are close to Jansenist 
Catholics like Pascal.2 However, there are people who claim to be both philosophers 
and Calvinists. They are, as I will use the term, ‘Reformed philosophers’. 
 
1.1 Reformed philosophy 
Reformed philosophers are not only inspired by the sixteenth-century theologian and 
church-reformer John Calvin, but also by the fourth- and fifth-century church father 
Augustine. Besides, it is worth mentioning that they have warm feelings for the 
nineteenth-century Dutch theologian and politician Abraham Kuyper and his neo-
Calvinist movement. One of these Reformed philosophers is Alvin Plantinga (born 
1932), since 1982 a colleague of MacIntyre at the philosophy department of the 
catholic University of Notre Dame. 
 
In 1992 Plantinga wrote an article about Augustinian Christian Philosophy.3 An 
important element in Plantinga’s conception of Christian philosophy is philosophical 
criticism. Plantinga adopts the Augustinian distinction between two opposing forces 
in human history, namely the City of God (Civitas Dei) and the Earthly City or City of 
the World (Civitas Mundi). In the nineteenth century Abraham Kuyper, a follower of 
Augustine, called this distinction an antithesis between belief and unbelief. Plantinga 
writes: “Augustine and Kuyper are right; and the contemporary Western intellectual 
world, like the worlds of their times, is a battleground or arena in which rages a battle 
for men’s souls.”4 He distinguishes a couple of contestants the contemporary 
Christian philosophers have to battle against: naturalism, subjectivism, nihilism and 
relativism. 
 
A Reformed philosopher of an earlier generation is the Dutch thinker Herman 
Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). In his comprehensive work A New Critique of Theoretical 
Thought (1953-1985) he writes: “The great turning point in my thought was marked 
by the discovery of the religious root of thought itself, whereby a new light was shed 
on the failure of all attempts, including my own, to bring about an inner synthesis 
                                               
1 Étienne Gilson, Christianity and Philosophy. New York: Sheed and Ward 1939, p. 14, 18. 
2 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd Edition, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1984, p. 
53-54. 
3 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Augustinian Christian Philosophy’, The Monist 75:3 (1992), 291-320. 
4 Plantinga, ‘Augustinian Christian Philosophy’, p. 295. 
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between the Christian faith and a philosophy which is rooted in faith in the self-
sufficiency of human reason.”5 The elements of antithesis, the religious root of 
thought and the non-self-sufficiency of human reason to which Plantinga and 
Dooyeweerd refer are characteristic elements in the Reformed tradition in philosophy, 
as will be shown.  
 
When I use the expression ‘Reformed tradition’ in this book I mean the Calvinian 
branch of the sixteenth-century Reformation, including the nineteenth-century neo-
Calvinistic movement. This tradition, although originally a theological movement, has 
become a world view that includes political and philosophical engagement. The 
Reformed tradition in contemporary philosophy is a multicoloured, international 
tradition, claiming ancient roots. Well-known contemporary Reformed thinkers are 
Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. They represent the so-called North 
American movement of ‘Reformed epistemology’. There are close connections 
between these thinkers and Herman Dooyeweerd, because they can be regarded as 
representatives of the North-American and Dutch branches of the typical Dutch 
movement of neo-Calvinism. In order to understand these connections, the Dutch 
philosophical and theological influence in North-America needs to be investigated 
later in this book. The lines of influence in the Reformed tradition in philosophy are 
schematically represented in the appendix to this book. 
 
I choose not to give a preliminary definition of Reformed philosophy. Instead, I will 
present the philosophies of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga as prominent examples of the 
philosophies of thinkers who claim to stand in the Reformed tradition. In the 
concluding chapter a reflection will be given on the phenomenon of Reformed 
philosophy, using these examples. 
 
1.2 Objective, questions and limitations 
In this book I want to investigate the characteristics of the Reformed tradition in 
philosophy and its Augustinian-Calvinian roots. Interesting questions arise: How does 
the thought of Augustine and Calvin influence contemporary philosophers in this 
tradition? What are its central philosophical claims? What makes this multicoloured 
tradition one? This is of course a comprehensive theme. In order to limit this project I 
choose as my central question: What are the conceptions of philosophy and rationality 
in the Reformed tradition? This question will be leading, though in connection to the 
conceptions of philosophy and rationality some relevant and related themes – such as 
the possibility of metaphysics and natural theology – will be discussed where this 
seems enlightening. As previously stated, the philosophies of two prominent thinkers 
in this tradition will be used as examples: Herman Dooyeweerd and Alvin Plantinga. I 
present the main lines of their philosophies also as a clarification of the range and 
consequences of their own conceptions of philosophy and rationality. 
 
This book is a philosophical one, not a theological one. However, theological themes 
have to be discussed, because the Reformed tradition in philosophy cannot be 
understood without the Reformed theological tradition. The religious element in 
philosophy actually is one of the central claims of the Reformed philosophers. 
Nonetheless, when discussing theological themes I will focus as far as possible on the 
themes that are directly relevant for Reformed philosophy, especially when discussing 
                                               
5 Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theortical Thought, Vol. I, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 
Paris/Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company 1953-1958, p. V. 
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the thought of Augustine and Calvin. Some Augustinian and Calvinian elements that 
are most important for Reformational theology turn out to be of little or no importance 
in Reformed philosophy. Still, one has to remember that in the time of Augustine the 
contemporary division between philosophy and theology didn’t exist. 
 
Although his shadow will be present through the whole book, I will not offer an 
introduction to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, simply because I have to limit myself. 
For the same reason, I will mostly ignore the 1930s French debates about Christian 
philosophy, among philosophers such as Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Maurice 
Blondel, Gabriel Marcel, Fernand Van Steenberghen and Antonin Sertillanges. 
Although these debates are very interesting from the perspective of this book, I will 
only briefly refer to the thought of Gilson in the last chapter.6 
 
1.3 Structure of the book 
This book is structured as follows: In chapter 2 some main lines in the work of 
Augustine are discussed. This is not at all meant to be an extensive discussion of his 
thought. This introduction is only meant to make it easier to understand the elements 
that are picked up in the Reformation by Calvin, and in the neo-Calvinistic movement 
by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Plantinga. In chapter 3 the thought of Calvin is discussed 
into somewhat more detail, because his thought, more than Augustine’s, is the firm 
foundation for Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Plantinga. Large parts of their thought 
cannot be understood without it. In chapter 4 the cultural movement of neo-Calvinism 
in the Netherlands is discussed, being especially the influence of Abraham Kuyper’s 
thought. These chapters are the necessary preparation to understand the thought of 
Dooyeweerd and Plantinga, but also to have an understanding of the Reformed 
tradition in philosophy as such. Then, in chapter 5 the thought of Herman 
Dooyeweerd will be introduced as a philosophical elaboration of neo-Calvinism. In 
chapter 6 the influence of neo-Calvinism and Dooyeweerd’s philosophy in North-
America will be discussed first. After that special attention will be given to the work 
of Alvin Plantinga, one of the leading thinkers in the contemporary philosophy in the 
Reformed tradition. In chapter 7 a comparison will be made of central elements in the 
philosophies of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga. Doing so, the main lines of the 
conceptions of philosophy and rationality in the reformed tradition will be sketched. 
Finally, in chapter 8 I summarize and conclude the book. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 See Greg Sadler, ‘Christian Philosophy: The 1930s French Debates’, in: James Fieser & Bradley 
Dowden (Eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>, visited November 6, 
2009. 
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2 Augustine 
 
 
The fourth- and fifth-century church father Augustine (354-430) is often regarded by 
the sixteenth-century Reformers and their followers as their forerunner on important 
issues. In this chapter I will first sketch some of Augustine’s thoughts, focusing on 
those elements that are important in the Reformed tradition. 
 
2.1 Christianity and philosophy 
In the early history of Christianity a struggle took place within the awakening 
Christian consciousness regarding the relationship between the developing Christian 
doctrine and the influences of Greek philosophy.7 Two lines of thought can be 
distinguished, already in the writings of Paul. One line of thought emphasizes the 
affinity between Christianity and Greek philosophy. Representatives of this line, like 
Justin Maryr (100-165), Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) and Origen (c. 185-254), 
considered Greek philosophy as a preparatio evangelica and Socrates even as a 
Christian philosopher. Another line of thought emphasizes the radical difference 
between the Gospel and Greek philosophy. The main representative of this line is 
Tertullian (c. 155-220). Tertullian rejects “that worldly wisdom which the Lord called 
foolishness, choosing the foolish things of the world to put philosophy to shame”, 
because “worldly wisdom culminates in philosophy with its rash interpretation of 
God’s nature and purpose. It is philosophy that supplies the heresies with their 
equipment. (…) From philosophy come those fables and endless genealogies and 
fruitless questionings, those “words that creep like a doth a cancer.””8 According to 
Tertullian, we should beware of philosophy, the human wisdom “which attacks and 
perverts truth”. He asks: “What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the 
Academy, the Christian with the heretic?” The Lord has to be sought in simplicity of 
heart. Therefore, Tertullian writes: “I have no use for a Stoic or a Platonic or a 
dialectic Christianity. After Jesus Christ we have no need of speculation, after the 
Gospel no need of research. When we come to believe, we have no desire to believe 
anything else; for we begin by believing that there is nothing else which we have to 
believe.”9 
 
This second line of thought however, never became the main stream of the Christian 
relationship to philosophy, although it always remained a part of the Christian 
consciousness throughout the ages. It was not until the philosophical mind of 
Augustine (354-430) that a synthesis took place between Christian doctrine and Greek 
(neo-Platonic) philosophy, in which Greek philosophy became an integral part of a 
Christian theological framework. 
 
 
                                               
7 See for example: Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, Vol. 2, Boston: Little, Brown & Company 
1899, especially Ch. IV; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of 
Doctrine, Vol. 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1971, especially Ch. 1; Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1962. 
8 Tertullian, ‘The Prescriptions against the Heretics’, in: S.L. Greenslade (Ed.), Early Latin Theology. 
Selections from Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, and Jerome, Louisville: Westminster John Knox 2006, 
31-64: p. 35. 
9 Tertullian, ‘The Prescriptions against the Heretics’, p. 36. 
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2.2 Circles of thought 
The church historian Adolf von Harnack recognized three ‘circles of thought’ in 
Augustine’s work, being a “union of three great circles of thought, which he 
reconstructed and connected absolutely”.10 The first circle consists of Neo-Platonist 
and monastic Christian elements like the soul, alienation from and hunger for God, 
unrest in the world and rest in God. Human reason and spiritual aspiration (also of 
non-Christians) play a central role. The second circle consists of Pauline elements like 
sin, faith, love, hope, predestination, the need for grace, and the bondage of the will. 
The Pelagian emphasis on freedom and merit are battled here. The third circle consists 
of the authority of the church, its role as a dispenser of grace and as an administrator 
of the sacraments, and revelation. Especially the Pauline, more individualistic 
elements of the second circle, like predestination and grace, are picked up in the 
protestant Reformation. The first circle took the interest of the humanists of the 
northern Renaissance, while the third circle was especially relevant for the Roman-
Catholic church.11 Because of the emphasis the Reformers put on the doctrine of 
grace, unlike the main line of thought of the Roman-Catholic church, one can truly 
say that “the Reformation, inwardly considered, was just the ultimate triumph of 
Augustine’s doctrine of grace over Augustine’s doctrine of the Church.”12 
 
2.3 Augustine’s conception of philosophy 
In Augustine’s work we do not find the Thomistic and contemporary distinction 
between philosophy and theology. His ’philosophical’ thought can only be presented 
when it is unravelled from its ‘theological’ context.13 The term ‘philosophy’ in his 
times was not reserved for a separate discipline, but had the general connotation of 
‘wisdom’ Likewise, ‘Christian philosophy’ was the wisdom that could be found in 
and through the Christian faith. Augustine speaks of “our Christian Philosophy” in his 
Against Julian: “I beg you, do not let the philosophy of Gentiles be more honest than 
our Christian philosophy, which is the one true philosophy, for its name means the 
quest or love of wisdom.”14 Christian doctrine, true philosophy and wisdom are in 
harmony, or more precisely: they are one and the same.  
 
Augustine did not simply reject the non-Christian philosophy of his time. He wanted 
to preserve what was true in it and use it, after a ‘transformation’, to preach the 
gospel. “Any statements by those who are called philosophers, especially the 
Platonists, which happen to be true and consistent with our faith should not cause 
alarm, but be claimed for our own use, as it were from owners who have no right to 
them.” He uses the Biblical theme of the spoliatio Aegyptiorum, the robbery of the 
Egyptians.15 The non-Christian philosophy has to be ‘robbed’ from the pagans and 
transformed. Augustine compares the intellectual treasures with “the treasures of the 
ancient Egyptians, who possessed not only idols and heavy burdens, which the people 
of Israel hated and shunned, but also vessels and ornaments of silver and gold, and 
clothes, which on leaving Egypt the people of Israel, in order to make better use of 
                                               
10 Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, volume 5, Boston: Little, Brown & Company 1899, p. 4-5. 
11 Eugene Teselle, ‘Augustine and Augustinianism’, in: Donald K. McKim (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the 
Reformed Faith, Louisville: Westminster John Knox 1992, 17-18. 
12 Benjamin B. Warfield, Calvin and Augustine, Edited by Samuel G. Craig, Philadelphia: Presbyterian 
and Reformed Publishing Co. 1980, 322. 
13 Copleston, A History of Philosophy 2, p. 49 
14 Augustine, Against Julian, New York: Fathers of the Church 1957, IV.xiv.72 
15 Saint Augustine, On Christian Teaching, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, Book II, par. 144-
147. 
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them, surreptitiously claimed for themselves (they did this not on their own authority, 
but at God’s command, and the Egyptians in their ignorance actually gave them the 
things of which they had made poor use) [Exod. 3: 21-22, 12: 35-36].” The same 
should be done with “all the branches of pagan learning”, because they “contain not 
only false and superstitious fantasies and burdensome studies that involve 
unnecessary effort, which each of us must loathe and avoid as under Christ’s guidance 
we abandon the company of pagans, but also studies for liberated minds which are 
more appropriate to the service of the truth, and some very useful moral instruction, as 
well as the various truths about monotheism to be found in their writers.” Actually the 
intellectual treasures were not the property of the pagans and where misused by them. 
After conversion they should be used for their right purpose. “These treasures like the 
silver and gold, which they did not create but dug, as it were, from the mines of 
providence, which is everywhere which were used wickedly and harmfully in the 
service of demons must be removed by Christians, as they separate themselves in 
spirit from the wretched company of pagans, and applied to their true function, that of 
preaching the gospel.” Some of the treasures are more essential than others. “As for 
their clothing which corresponds to human institutions, but those appropriate to 
human society, which in this life we cannot do without this may be accepted and kept 
for conversion to Christian purposes. This is exactly what many good and faithful 
Christians have done.” Christians should even be trained in the converted wisdom op 
the pagans, because, Augustine writes, “[i]sn’t this what had been done earlier by 
Moses himself, that most faithful servant of God, of whom it is written that he was 
trained in all the wisdom of the Egyptians [Acts 7: 22]?”16 This theme of 
transformation returns in the thought of John Calvin (par. 3.4), but also in Herman 
Dooyeweerd’s conception of a reformation of philosophy (par. 5.13). 
 
According to Augustine there is a battle going on in history between two opposing 
spiritual and moral forces or principles: the City of God (Civitas Dei) and the Earthly 
City or City of the World (Civitas Mundi). The cities – primarily thought 
theologically, not politically – are guided by two different loves: “the earthly by the 
love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to 
the contempt of self.”17 They live by the “standard of the flesh”, that is man’s 
standard, or the “standard of the spirit”, that is turned toward God’s will.18 The 
citizenship cannot be reduced to external characteristics, but is essentially a matter of 
the heart. Just like the historical struggle between the two cities there is the inner 
struggle of man about salvation and sin. The theme of the two cities returns in 
Abraham Kuyper’s thought of the antithesis (par. 4.7), but also in Alvin Plantinga 
conception of ‘Augustinian Christian philosophy’ (par. 6.10). 
 
2.4 Augustine’s inward turn 
Augustine, building on the (neo-)Platonists, ‘invented’ the inner self.19 He wrote the 
first ‘autobiography’ ever: the Confessions. The self is never completely transparent 
to man, he is never in complete control.20 Augustine’s search for the self was at the 
                                               
16 Augustine, On Christian Teaching, Book II, par. 144-147 
17 Augustine, City of God, XIV, 28 
18 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Augustine’, in: Peter Scott & William T. Cavanaugh (Eds.), The Blackwell 
Companion to Political Theology, Malden: Blackwell 2004, 35-47: p. 42 
19 Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self. The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2000. 
20 Elshtain, ‘Augustine’, p. 37. 
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same time a search for God (noverim me, noverim te). In the Soliloquies Augustine 
has an exchange with his interlocutor, Reason: “Reason: What then do you want to 
know? Augustine: All these things I have prayed for. Reason: Summarize them 
briefly. Augustine: I whish I could know God and the soul. Reason: Nothing more? 
Augustine: Nothing at all.”21 The whole of philosophy is about two kinds of 
knowledge: knowledge of God and knowledge of the soul (Deum et animam scire). 
Therefore Augustine can state: “truth lives in the inner man” (in interiore homine 
habitat veritas).22 The knowledge of God and the knowledge of the self are the source 
of true happiness. We can have an internal union with God, a “universal, immediate, 
noninferential knowledge of God”, though ultimately not through our reason.23 This is 
the most certain form of knowledge.  
 
According to Augustine, man has a religious core: the heart, i.e. the inner self. He also 
often uses the Platonic term soul (anima) and seems to use the terms interchangeably, 
although in the Confessions he most often uses the Biblical term heart (cor). The term 
soul has a more technical-philosophical connotation, while the term heart has a more 
religious one, although these meanings cannot be sharply separated in Augustine’s 
thought. 
 
Man is created ‘unto God’. He reaches toward something that is greater than himself. 
In his Confessions Augustine writes: “For thou hast created us for thyself, and our 
heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in thee.”24 At another place he writes: 
“Thy words had stuck fast even to the very roots of my heart, and I was hedged round 
about by thee.”25 There is a direct connection between the hearth and philosophical 
wisdom. Augustine writes about his own heart that had become “the temple of its own 
idol”.26 Likewise, when speaking about pagans, he writes about “their foolish heart” 
that is darkened. “[They] changed the glory of thy incorruptible nature into idols, and 
divers shapes, into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and birds, and beasts, 
and serpents; yea verily, into that Egyptian food, for which Esau sold his birthright ; 
for that people, which was thy firstborn, worshipped the head of a four-footed beast 
instead of thee, turning in their heart back towards Egypt; and bowing thy image (their 
own soul) before the image of a calf that eateth hay.”27 
 
2.5 Augustine’s conception of knowledge and rationality 
Part of Augustine’s search for God was a struggle with scepticism. He has a very 
‘modern’ solution to the problem of doubt. We can doubt because we can deceive 
ourselves, but we cannot doubt our own doubt. When we doubt, we exist (Si fallor, 
sum). This knowledge can be regarded as assured knowledge. Because certain 
knowledge can exist, scepticism must be rejected. This ‘Cartesian’ argument should 
not be interpreted in the sense that this certain knowledge is the basis for other 
knowledge. Augustine only uses it in order to reject scepticism. The question of the 
                                               
21 Augustine, ‘The Soliloquies’, in: Earlier Writings, Edited by J.H.S. Burleigh, Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press 1953, 17-63: I.2.7. 
22 Augustine, De vera religione, XXIX.72 
23 Skirbekk & Gilje, A History of Western Thought, p. 119; Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to 
Plantinga, p. 175 
24 Augustine, Confessions, London: William Heinemann 1912 (Loeb Classical Library), I.1 (tu excitas, 
ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.). 
25 Augustine, Confessions, VIII.1 
26 Augustine, Confessions, VII.14 
27 Augustine, Confessions, VII.9 
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mature Augustine was not “Can we attain certainty?”, but “How is it that we can 
attain certainty?”28 Besides knowledge about my doubts I can also have knowledge 
about my internal mental states (wanting, loving, thinking, feeling). This is another 
rejection of scepticism. Mathematics and logic can also deliver certain knowledge, i.e. 
necessary and unchangeable truths.29  
 
The most reliable knowledge is produced by introspection, i.e. inner experience.30 
There is also much of what we belief about this world that must rest on trust and 
authority. We also have to believe many things we can never understand.31 Besides, 
belief can be necessary in order to understand, because some things can only be 
understood as soon as they are believed, such as human reasonings. Other things, 
namely theological topics, are first believed and afterwards understood.32 Faith takes 
an epistemological precedence over understanding, but also enlightens understanding 
(credo ut intelligam). Faith is the necessary starting point for theological knowledge.33 
Here faith precedes understanding and reason.  
 
There can be no final conflict between faith and reason when reason is correctly 
understood.34 The relationship between faith and reason in Augustine’s thought can be 
characterised as fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding). Anselmus 
of Cantebury coined the Augustinian words credo, ut intelligam (I believe so that I 
may understand).35 To believe is to think with assent (credere est assensione 
cogitare). There can however be no true philosophy without the grace of God. 
Augustine writes: “the grace of God is necessary for the acquisition, not, indeed, of 
any philosophy, but of the true philosophy”.36 Without the aid of God, there can be no 
true knowledge of him. 
 
In the next chapter it will be shown how some of these elements are absorbed in 
Calvin’s sixteenth-century theology, especially the elements of the precedence of 
faith, the knowledge of God and the self, God as creator and lawgiver, and the 
transformation of philosophy. In chapters 3, 4 and 5 it will be shown how other 
Augustinian elements, like the Augustinian realism and the doctrine of the struggle 
between the two cities are absorbed that get less or no emphasis in Calvin’s thought. 
 
2.6 Augustinian realism 
Augustine’s conception of epistemology and ontology are important in order to 
understand Platinga’s (chapter 6). Augustine’s thought, in turn, cannot be understood 
apart from Plato’s. Characteristic of Plato’s thought is a dualism between appearance 
and reality, opinion and knowledge. It is the task of philosophy to distinguish between 
changing opinion (doxa) and unchanging knowledge (episteme). Plato’s ontology and 
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metaphysics can be characterized as realism. The Ideas or Forms – not the 
appearances – exist independently of us. In other words: ‘universals’ exist 
independently from ‘particulars’. The realm of Ideas or Forms is the realm of Beauty, 
Goodness and Truth.37 Plato’s theory of truth can be called a correspondence theory 
of truth, because a proposition is regarded as true when something is in fact the case.  
 
According to Augustine (‘the Christian Plato’), the sensible world is temporal and 
transitory, while the intelligible, eternal realm is atemporal and contains abiding 
realities.38 The wisdom of God is a world of Forms or Ideas, i.e. formae or rationes 
rerum that are eternal and invariable and exist in God’s mind. Thus, truths are ideas in 
the mind of God. This ontological and metaphysical theory of Augustine can be called 
Augustinian realism. This can be regarded an adapted version of Platonic realism.  
 
The divine truth is invariable and transcends human reason, like pure mathematical 
concepts or the highest good. This truth is truth and wisdom itself of which we can 
only have vision and which gives us happiness.39 This is the eudaimonistic element in 
Augustine’s ontology and epistemology. God is called by Augustine aeterne Veritas. 
This eternal Truth is the highest Being and Goodness, God (Plotinus’ ‘One’), the 
source of light. Man can be illuminated by God in order to view the eternal truths 
(rationes aeternae).  
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3 John Calvin 
 
 
One of the key figures of the sixteenth-century Reformation was the French church-
Reformer John Calvin (1509-1564). The Reformed tradition in philosophy developed 
from the Calvinian branch of the Reformation. I will sketch some of the important 
themes in Calvin’s thought, focusing on those aspects that significantly influenced his 
philosophical legacy in the Reformed tradition. Special attention will be given to 
Calvin’s conception of philosophy and rationality.  
 
3.1 The Augustinian Reformation 
The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century can be regarded as an 
Augustinian movement.40 Augustine has been called the ‘church father of the 
Reformation’. Strongly stated: “[I]t was Augustine who gave us the Reformation.”41 
According to Calvin his theology was not an innovation, but a return to the church 
fathers, especially to Augustine.42 He wrote: “Augustine is so completely of our 
persuasion, that if I should have to make written profession, it would be quite enough 
to present a composition made up entirely of excerpts from his writings.”43 The 
conformity was however especially in thinking about grace, sin and predestination, 
not in hermeneutical questions. “Augustine is in matters of dogma unquestionably 
superior to all others. But in seeking first and foremost the religious meaning of 
Scripture he becomes overly subtle and commensurately less solid and reliable.” 
Augustine’s allegorical and numerological interpretations of Scripture couldn’t please 
Calvin. He preferred Chrysostom’s more literal reading. However, in main lines one 
can say: “The system of doctrine taught by Calvin is just the Augustinianism common 
to the whole body of the Reformers – for the Reformation was, as from the spiritual 
point of view a great revival of religion, so from the theological point of view a great 
revival of Augustinianism.”44 
 
3.2 Reformation and philosophy 
John Calvin was a humanistic legal scholar by education, a practical teacher and 
pastor by profession and a theologian by legacy. He certainly was no systematic 
philosopher, although his thought has philosophical significance. In Reformational 
thought philosophy as such did not have a central place. Theological questions were 
dominant, philosophical questions only when they were important for theology, for 
example regarding free will. That doesn’t mean that the Reformation didn’t have an 
important meaning for philosophy. Especially the individuality of faith, without the 
mediation of the church, and the isolated individual’s relation to God can be regarded 
as important factors in the development of philosophical individualism. There are 
important connections between Reformational thought and humanism. “Humanism 
was the ally of the Reformation in so far as it, too, worked for the emancipation of the 
                                               
40 Richard A. Muller, ‘Augustinianism in the Reformation’, in: Allan D. Fitzgerald (Ed.), Augustine 
Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999, 705-707: p. 705. 
41 Benjamin B. Warfield, Calvin and Augustine, Edited by Samuel G. Craig, Philadelphia: Presbyterian 
and Reformed Publishing Co. 1980, p. 322. 
42 David J. Marshall, ‘John Calvin’, in: Allan D. Fitzgerald (Ed.), Augustine Through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999, 116-120: p. 116. 
43 John Calvin, ‘Aeterna Dei praedestinatione’ (1552), in: Corpus Reformatorum 8:266, as cited in 
Marshall, ‘John Calvin’, p. 116. 
44 Warfield, Calvin and Augustine, p. 22. 
 22 
human spirit; and, wherever it was religious, it became the seed-plot of the 
Reformation.” 45 There is also an important influence of the Reformation on what Max 
Weber called the ‘demystification’ or ‘disenchantment’ (Entzauberung) of the world. 
 
Calvin agreed with Luther in main lines, but also significantly developed 
Reformational thought on some points. The former Augustinian monk Luther rejects 
natural theology’s knowledge of God. He gives faith a central place (sola fide) and 
stresses the importance of individual faith. He also rejects the institutional remission 
of sins; instead he emphasizes God’s grace and forgiving love (sola gratia). Calvin 
agrees on this points, but Luther goes further. It has to be said that Luther’s apparently 
radical and fierce statements and character easily lead to misunderstanding concerning 
his conception of reason and philosophy. He called human natural reason “the whore 
reason” (die Hure Vernunft) and philosophy “the devil’s whore” and detests Aristotle, 
calling him “that buffoon who has misled the church”. Based on words like these it is 
an easy mistake to think that Luther rejected reason and philosophy as such. This is 
certainly not the case. Reason only has to know its proper place. It easily guides man 
in the wrong direction and asks the wrong questions.46 When faith is concerned, 
reason has to be supplanted by faith.47 In these matters the Word of God is the only 
guide (sola scriptura). On the other side, reason guided by faith can be theology’s 
handmaid. Reason can clarify and organize, but it stands in the second position, 
although when government is concerned, reason takes the first place.48 After all 
however, Luther’s hard-to-grasp conception of philosophy and reason seems more 
negative than positive.  
 
Like Augustine, Calvin had a more positive view of Plato then of Aristotle, but was 
not as negative about Aristotle as Luther was. Calvin’s use of philosophy can be 
regarded as historical. Like the Christian humanists of the sixteenth century, he looks 
for illustrations of the truth in the history of philosophy, but does not systematically 
use philosophy as a guide to truth.49 The Platonic-Augustinian realism is not explicitly 
accepted by Calvin, but his thought goes very well together with realism, although he 
rejects metaphysical ‘speculation’ as will be shown below. Calvin is no systematic 
philosopher, but on the other side, he does not reject a systematic use of philosophy at 
all. He leaves room for reason, although corrupted. “Since reason (…), by which man 
distinguishes between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a 
natural gift, it could not be completely wiped out; but it was partly weakened and 
partly corrupted, so that its misshapen ruins appear.”50 In general Calvin’s work 
shows a distinct familiarity with philosophy, although at times he is very critical about 
philosophers who do not know their proper place. But again, his conception of 
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philosophy is not a negative one. Calvin, a humanist by education, for example 
introduced logic in the curriculum of the Academy in Geneva teaching the pastors and 
doctors of the church.51 Before inquiring Calvin’s opinion on philosophy somewhat 
further, his doctrine of corruptio totalis needs clarification, because this doctrine is 
sometimes regarded as a blockade for all philosophy. 
 
3.3 Corruptio totalis 
Calvin (and the other Reformers) rediscovered the Paulinian notion of sin, being a 
totalitarian force. There is a total corruption of human nature (corruptio totalis). Sin is 
not only a defect, but also a rebellion against God, a corruption of the heart, which has 
its effect in the whole of life.52 Sin overturns the whole man. According to Calvin, “all 
parts of the soul were possessed by sin after Adam deserted the fountain of 
righteousness. For not only did a lower appetite seduce him, but unspeakable impiety 
occupied the very citadel of his mind, and pride penetrated to the depths of his 
heart.”53 The corruption is more than impulses of the senses. “Paul removes all doubt 
when he teaches that corruption subsists not in one part only, but that none of the soul 
remains pure or untouched by that mortal disease. For in his discussion of a corrupt 
nature Paul not only condemns the inordinate impulses of the appetites that are seen, 
but especially contends the mind is given over to blindness and the heart to 
depravity.”54 Not only parts of the soul, but its entire nature is opposed to supernatural 
grace. “[S]in occupies both mind and heart. (…) [T]he whole man is overwhelmed – 
as by a deluge – from head to foot, so that no part is immune from sin and all that 
proceeds from him is to be imputed to sin. As Paul says, all turnings of the thoughts to 
the flesh are enmities against God [Rom. 8:7], and are therefore death [Rom. 8:6].”55  
 
It is very important to notice that the total corruption of human nature does not mean 
that man can do no good on earth or that reason is completely useless. This would be 
contradictory to what Calvin writes about the excellence of the natural gifts of man 
(see below). Instead, total corruption means there is no part of life that is not affected 
by sin. Likewise, there is no ‘nature’ as distinguished from ‘grace’. Further, the 
doctrine of corruptio totalis stays one-sided when it is not preached in combination 
with the doctrines of common grace and redemption sola gratia.56  
 
3.4 Transformation 
Like sin overthrows the whole man, grace reforms the whole man, including the mind. 
Calvin writes: “[T]he Spirit, who is opposed to the old man and to the flesh, not only 
marks the grace whereby the lower or sensual part of the soul is corrected, but 
embraces the full reformation of all the parts. Consequently, Paul not only enjoins that 
brute appetites be brought to nought but bids us “be renewed in the spirit of our mind” 
[Eph. 4:23]; in another passage he similarly urges us to “be transformed in newness of 
mind” [Rom. 12:2].” What can be concluded from this? “[T]hat part in which the 
excellence and nobility of the soul especially shine has not only been wounded, but so 
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corrupted that it needs to be healed and to put on a new nature as well.”57 This 
doctrine of transformation plays an important role in the neo-Calvinistic thought of 
Abraham Kuyper, as will be explained below. The transformation is also important in 
Calvin’s vision on philosophy. 
 
According to Calvin, following Paul, Christians are “not their own”, but “the Lord’s”. 
They have to live their lives to the glory of God. “From this is derived the basis of the 
exhortation that “they be not conformed to the fashion of this world, but be 
transformed by the renewal of their minds, so that they may prove what is the will of 
God” [Rom. 12:2].”58 Therefore Calvin writes: “We are not our own: let not our 
reason nor our will, therefore, sway our plans and deeds. We are not our own: let us 
therefore not set it as our goal to seek what is expedient for us according to the flesh. 
We are not our own: in so far as we can, let us therefore forget ourselves and all that 
is ours.” What then is the transformation aimed at? “Conversely, we are God’s: let us 
therefore live for him and die for him. We are God’s: let his wisdom and will 
therefore rule all our actions. We are God’s: let all the parts of our life accordingly 
strive toward him as our only lawful goal [Rom. 14:8; cf. I Cor. 6:19].”59 Christians 
have to live in the service of the Lord. Therefore they have to ‘empty their mind’ and 
direct it to God’s Spirit. Christian philosophy is renewing, converting, or 
transformational philosophy.60 
 
Concerning the transformationist (or conversionist) motive in Calvin’s thought the 
theologian Richard Niebuhr writes in his Christ and Culture (1951): “Calvin is very 
much like Augustine. The conversionist idea is prominent in his thought and 
practice.” Niebuhr emphasizes the difference between Luther and Calvin on this point. 
More than Luther Calvin “looks for the present permeation of all life by the gospel.” 
Calvin has a “more dynamic conception of the vocations of men as activities in which 
they may express their faith and love and may glorify God in their calling”, a more 
humanistic view of the gifts of human nature, even after the fall, an emphasis on “the 
resurrection of the flesh” and, above all, on “the actuality of God’s sovereignty”. 
Niebuhr concludes that all this leads to “the thought that what the gospel promises and 
makes possible, as divine (not human) possibility, is the transformation of mankind in 
all its nature and culture into a kingdom of God in which the laws of the kingdom 
have been written upon the inward parts.”61 
 
3.5 Christian philosophy 
Calvin often uses the humanistic term philosophia christiana (Christian philosophy) 
in the Institutes. This term was used by the Greek and Latin Church fathers, and 
medieval and renaissance writers, most significantly by Erasmus. Most of the time 
Calvin just refers to ‘the sound Christian teaching’ with it. On some places however, 
he seems to refer more specifically to philosophy in a technical sense. Calvin 
distinguishes very sharply between general philosophy (‘the philosophers’) and 
Christian philosophy.62 Philosophers-in-general – who do not belong to God but are 
their own masters – have not submitted and subjected their reason to the Holy Spirit 
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and Christ is not living and reigning within them. Their thought has to be transformed. 
How can this be done? Man has to “depart from himself” in order to “apply the whole 
force of his ability in the service of the Lord”. ‘Service’ is more than obedience to 
God’s word; it is emptying the mind of its “carnal sense” and making place for God’s 
Spirit.63 Philosophers-in-general did not understand this. “While it is the first entrance 
to life, all philosophers were ignorant of this transformation, which Paul calls 
“renewal of the mind” [Eph. 4:23]. For they set up reason alone as the ruling principle 
in man, and think that it alone should be listened to; to it alone, in short, they entrust 
the conduct of life.” This is different in Christian philosophy: “the Christian 
philosophy bids reason give way to, submit and subject itself to, the Holy Spirit so 
that the man himself may no longer live but hear Christ living and reigning within him 
[Gal. 2:20].”64 Reason is not the final foundation of knowledge, not a true guide and 
not self-sufficient. Christian philosophy is obedient philosophy.65 
 
Calvin does not reject philosophy. He only emphasizes that philosophy is of little help 
when faith is concerned. “The true conviction which believers have of the Word of 
God, of their own salvation, and of all religion, does not spring from the feeling of the 
flesh, or from human and philosophical arguments, but from the sealing of the Spirit, 
who makes their consciences more certain and removes all doubt. The foundation of 
faith would be frail and unsteady if it rested on human wisdom (…).”66 This theme 
returns in the thought of Plantinga (chapter 6). 
 
The best source of wisdom is Scripture. It has much more power than any philosophy. 
“Now this power which is peculiar to Scripture is clear from the fact that of human 
writings, however artfully polished, there is none capable of affecting us at all 
comparably.” To state it sharply: philosophy is good, but Scripture is better. 
Therefore, Scripture is the best starting point for a philosopher. Christian philosophy 
is also ‘Scriptural philosophy’. Human understanding “is an unstable and transitory 
thing in God’s sight, when a solid foundation of truth does not underlie it.”67 Thus, 
Scripture is the best source of truth concerning what is most important in live, but 
given this framework of truth, there is certainly a place for philosophy. This doesn’t 
make Scriptural philosophy theology. 
 
3.6 Faith and reason 
The relationship between faith and reason in Calvin’s thought can be summarized as 
follows: faith is beyond reason, not against it. However, reason without faith – 
autonomous reason – is incomplete and rudderless, because it does not know its limits 
and can easily be aimed in the wrong direction. Likewise, “The prophets and apostles 
do not boast either of their keenness or of anything that obtains credit for them as they 
speak; nor do they dwell upon rational proofs. Rather, they bring forward God’s holy 
name, that by it the whole world may be brought into obedience to him.”68  
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When we want certainty in matters of religion, human reason is not a good guide. 
When we follow reason, we will be “perpetually beset by the instability of doubt or 
vacillation” and we will “boggle at the smallest quibbles”. Therefore, according to 
Calvin, “we ought to seek our conviction in a higher place than human reasons, 
judgments, or conjectures, that is, in the secret testimony of the Spirit”.69 Believing in 
God, like believing in the truth of Scripture, is not based on rational proof, but on the 
‘testimony of the Spirit’ in our hearts. Unbelieving men think that religion is nothing 
but ‘opinion’. They don’t want to believe “anything foolishly or lightly”. Therefore 
they want rational proof (cf. Plantinga, par. 6.4). But, according to Calvin, “the 
testimony of the Spirit is more excellent than all reason”.70 
 
3.7 Two regiments  
In order to understand Calvin’s sometimes seemingly contradictory statements about 
the human potential to understand and to act, it is essential to make a distinction 
between two regiments.71 Man is a citizen of two kingdoms or regiments: a spiritual 
regiment (regnum spirituale), which regards conscience and the inner religion, and a 
civil or political regiment (regnum politicum), which regards societal life. In this 
context, regarding the knowing and acting of sinful people, a sharp distinction has to 
be made – following Augustine – between earthly things (res terrenas) and heavenly 
things (res caelestes).72 In earthly matters, such as public administration (politia), the 
management of the household (oeconomia), mechanical skills (artes omnes 
mechanicae) and the liberal arts (disciplinae liberales), including ethics and 
philosophy, sinful people with their natural gifts can excel thanks to the ‘natural light’ 
of reason.73 Because the Spirit of God is the only source of truth, we would give him 
too little honor, according to Calvin, when the truth in this area that can be found by 
pagan philosophers and writers, would be denied.74 In heavenly matters, however, like 
knowledge of God and his will, even the most sensible people are “blinder than 
moles” without the biblical revelation.75 Concerning the second table of the 
Decalogue, people can have a lot of knowledge, thanks to the natural light of reason, 
outside the Biblical revelation. As the first table is concerned, they can not.  
 
Regarding earthly matters, Calvin can be regarded a natural law thinker, although he 
never worked out a detailed theory.76 In the spiritual regiment, natural law only has 
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the negative role of pointing to sin.77 With regard to earthly life in civil regiment 
however natural law plays an important, positive role. It is first of all ‘God’s bridle’ 
with which He holds disbelievers tight, be it for reasons of shame, fear, calculation or 
self-preservation.78 In addition, it is a culture-making tool. Created reality in itself is 
not evil or alien to the believer. God maintains the ‘work of His hands’ by His 
providence.79 Likewise, science is for Calvin a gift of God.80 
 
3.8 Creation and common grace 
Calvin places an emphasis on the created world. In the first five chapters of the 
Institutes a great appreciation for created order can be discovered.81 God sustains and 
governs his creation. The Creator “supports us by his power, governs us by his 
providence, nourishes us by his goodness, and attends us with all sorts of blessings”.82 
God also created an order of nature (including a moral order) that directs the 
creatures. After a transformation of the heart man can understand and embrace the 
moral order. This moral order can ultimately be known through both tables of the 
Decalogue. The first table can only be known through revelation, the second also by 
human reason.83 Through Christ, man’s calling of dominion over creation, though 
limited by sin, has been restored. This is called man’s creational or cultural mandate.84  
 
Part of God’s providence is that he, although man has fallen into sin, has left many 
good things to mankind and constrains the effects of sin.85 These include the gifts of 
science and philosophy. Calvin writes: “Whenever we come upon these matters in 
secular writers, let that admirable light of truth shining in them teach us that the mind 
of man, though fallen and perverted from its wholeness, is nevertheless clothed and 
ornamented with God's excellent gifts. If we regard the Spirit of God as the sole 
fountain of truth, we shall neither reject the truth itself, nor despise it wherever it shall 
appear, unless we wish to dishonor the Spirit of God.”86 Therefore, we shall not deny 
the truth of the ancient arts and sciences. “Shall we deny that the truth shone upon the 
ancient jurists who established civic order and discipline with such great equity? Shall 
we say that the philosophers were blind in their fine observation and artful description 
of nature? Shall we say that those men were devoid of understanding who conceived 
the art of disputation and taught us to speak reasonably? Shall we say that they are 
insane who developed medicine, devoting their labor to our benefit? What shall we 
say of all the mathematical sciences? Shall we consider them the ravings of madmen? 
No, we cannot read the writings of the ancients on these subjects without great 
admiration.”87 Even the pagan poets “confessed that the gods had invented 
philosophy, laws, and all useful arts.” If the ‘natural men’ were so sharp and 
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penetrating, we should acknowledge “how many gifts the Lord left to human nature 
even after it was despoiled of its true good.”88 Calvin’s speaks about “common 
grace”, God’s “kindness”, “mercy” and “gentleness” or generally about his 
providence.89 In the neo-Calvinistic reception of Calvin, especially by Abraham 
Kuyper as we will see (par. 4.7), the concept of common grace is emphasized. In 
Calvin’s work this concept doesn’t have the technical meaning is has in Kuyper’s 
work.90 Neither does it demarcate a scholastic domain of ‘nature’ distinguished from 
‘grace’.91 
 
3.9 Speculation 
Creation is also a boundary between God and man. According to Calvin we cannot 
and should not go behind God’s act of creation in our “wicked and hurtful 
speculations”.92 This will only lead us into idolatry and superstition. “What is God? 
Men who pose this question are merely toying with idle speculations.”93 Only 
Scripture teaches us who and what God is. Calvin cites an example already given by 
Augustine: “When a certain shameless fellow mockingly asked a pious old man what 
God had done before the creation of the world, the latter aptly countered that he had 
been building hell for the curious.”94 Man is not capable of seeing God. Therefore, 
“let us remember that that invisible God, whose wisdom, power, and righteousness are 
incomprehensible, sets before us Moses’ history as a mirror in which his living 
likeness glows. For just as eyes, when dimmed with age or weakness or by some other 
defect, unless aided by spectacles, discern nothing distinctly; so, such is our 
feebleness, unless Scripture guides us in seeking God, we are immediately 
confused.”95 Calvin stresses to have Augustine on his side: “Augustine rightly 
complains that wrong is done to God when a higher cause of things than his will is 
demanded. Elsewhere the same man wisely warns that it is no less wrong to raise 
questions concerning immeasurable stretches of time than of space.”96 Therefore 
Calvin concludes, “let us willingly remain enclosed within these bounds to which God 
has willed to confine us, and as it were, to pen up our minds that they may not, 
through their very freedom to wander, go astray.”97 There is still another form of 
knowledge than the knowledge of reason or the knowledge through Scripture; it is the 
knowledge of the heart. 
 
No man can reach to God’s essence, the essentia Dei. Calvin writes that “his essence 
is incomprehensible; hence, his divineness far escapes all human perception. But upon 
his individual works he has engraved unmistakable marks of his glory, so clear and so 
prominent that even unlettered and stupid folk cannot plead the excuse of 
ignorance.”98 Although we cannot know God’s essence, we still can know his nature 
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as it is revealed to us (Cf. Plantinga, par. 6.12). God is immeasurable, spiritual, simple 
(divine simplicity), immutable, undivided. “Thereupon his powers are mentioned, by 
which he is shown to us not as he is in himself, but as he is toward us: so that this 
recognition of him consists more in living experience than in vain and high-flown 
speculation.”99 Calvin however does not hesitate to use deductive reasoning. For 
example, when God has become known as the creator of everything, he has to be 
eternal, “for he whom all things draw their origin must be eternal and have beginning 
from himself.”100 He also has to be good “if the cause is sought by which he was led 
once to create all these things, and is now moved to preserve them, we shall find that 
it is his goodness alone.”101 Reason here is complementary to revelation, not 
antithetical, though revelation comes first.102 
 
We cannot know God as he is in se (in himself), but we can know him as he is quoad 
nos (toward us), in revelation. Therefore Calvin writes: “Here, indeed, if anywhere in 
the secret mysteries of Scripture, we ought to play the philosopher soberly and with 
great moderation; let us use great caution that neither our thoughts nor our speech go 
beyond the limits to which the Word of God itself extends. (…) [H]ow can the mind 
by its own leading come to search out God’s essence when it cannot even get to its 
own? Let us then willingly leave to God the knowledge of himself.”103 Scripture 
accommodates the knowledge of God to “our slight capacity”.104 This theme of divine 
accommodation is central in Calvin’s thought.105 The discussion remains however 
whether Calvin thinks that language about God is metaphorical or merely ‘literal’, 
though it is not probable that Calvin regards God as a Kantian unknowable noumenon, 
like some post-Kantian Protestant theology.106 
 
Speculation about God outside his revelation is unwarranted, irreligious, distracting 
and impious.107 Therefore, “the pious mind does not dream up for itself any god it 
pleases, but contemplates the one and only true God. And it does not attach to him 
whatever it pleases, but is content to hold him to be as he manifests himself”.108 There 
are however topics that do not concern God as such, like the soul. These topics can be 
studied by philosophers. Calvin writes: “I leave it to the philosophers to discuss these 
faculties in their subtle way. (…) I, indeed, agree that the things they teach are true, 
not only enjoyable, but also profitable to learn, and skillfully assembled by them. And 
I do not forbid those who are desirous of learning to study them.” It seems that Calvin 
accepts here a medieval distinction between theology and philosophy or the Faculty of 
Theology and the Faculty of Arts.109 
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3.10 Knowledge of God 
We cannot know God’s essence, but still: what can be known about God?110 This 
theme can be regarded as the central motif in Calvin’s theology.111 Calvin writes: 
“[W]e are called to a knowledge of God: not that knowledge which, content with 
empty speculation, merely flits in the brain [cerebrum], but that which will be sound 
and fruitful if we duly perceive it, and if it takes root in the heart [cor].”112 Man can 
experience God within himself, which is the best form of knowledge. Therefore, the 
best and most suitable way of seeking God “is not for us to attempt with bold 
curiosity to penetrate to the investigation of his essence, which we ought more to 
adore than meticulously to search out, but for us to contemplate him in his works 
whereby he renders himself near and familiar to us, and in some manner 
communicates himself.”113 The recognition of God “consists more in living 
experience than in vain and high-flown speculation.”114 Man should not and cannot 
intrude upon the essentiae Dei, but should listen to the revelation in the Word of God. 
There is no place for a metaphysics that goes beyond Scripture.115 
 
The biblical revelation about God is a clarification of what is in principle known by 
nature. Calvin writes: “[The] conviction (…) that there is some God, is naturally 
inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow. (…) It is not a 
doctrine that must be learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from his 
mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no one to forget, although many strive 
with every nerve to this end.”116 From nature is known that there is a God and that he 
should be honored, but only from Scripture is known who this God is and how he 
should be honored.117 Calvin speaks of two ways to know God (duplex cognitio Dei): 
as Creator (known from nature) and Redeemer (known from Scripture). There is an 
awareness of God in every person, because every person has an ‘awareness of 
divinity’ (sensus divinitatis) and a ‘seed of religion’ (semen religionis) engraved or 
planted in the heart.118 “There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural 
instinct, an awareness of divinity [divinitatis sensum]. This we take to be beyond 
controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God 
himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty. Ever 
renewing its memory, he repeatedly sheds fresh drops.”119 Also, every man has the 
possibility of thinking about and experiencing the order in the universe. Calvin uses 
the image of the order of the world as ‘theater’ or ‘mirror’ in which it is shown that 
there is a God and in which an impression of his wisdom and justice can be obtained 
by whom is thought about it.120 The knowledge of God that is displayed in the 
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organization of the world and its creatures is even clearer and more reliable explained 
in Biblical revelation.121  
 
3.11 The sensus divinitatis 
The sensus divinitatis plays an important role in Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed 
epistemology, as will be explained below. It is however important to remember that 
Calvin does not seem to want to proof the existence of God, nor does he seem to be 
interested in the rationality of religious belief or in religious epistemology.122 Let 
alone that Calvin anticipated the debate on evidentialism and foundationalism about 
theistic belief.123 Of course it would be an anachronism to ascribe to this sixteenth-
century thinker any (post-)Enlightenment motives. He does not seem to have a proof 
of God’s existence in the Thomistic sense either. Calvin’s thoughts are about 
knowledge of God, not about the rationality of believing in God.124 Actually they are 
“first-order observations”, no theoretical reflections.125 Calvin does however discuss 
proofs when he writes about the trustworthiness of Scripture. He distinguishes 
between ‘external proofs’, being arguments and empirical evidence, and ‘internal 
proofs’, being the testimony of the Holy Spirit and the self-authentication of 
Scripture.126 
 
The possibility to knowledge of God and the actual knowledge of God are taken 
together in Calvin’s writing.127 He is not entirely clear about whether the sensus 
divinitatis is thought of as an innate belief in the existence of God or a disposition for 
such a belief.128 Calvin specifically wants to emphasize that no one has an excuse not 
to honour God. However, instead of honoring God, man is more interested in himself 
or in other idolatry. “We know how man does not willingly humble himself so as to 
place other creatures over himself. Since, then, he prefers to worship wood and stone 
rather than to be thought of as having no God, clearly this is a most vivid impression 
of a divine being.”129 
 
3.12 Natural revelation 
There is no place in Calvin’s thought for a natural theology, i.e. a theology based on 
natural reason distinguished from revelation. There is however place for a natural 
theology existing of “innate, properly functioning capacities common (i.e., natural) to 
all people”, though not “based upon discursive proofs”.130 It may be better to speak 
about ‘natural revelation’.131 Calvin writes: “[T]hat common opinion which they have 
taken from Augustine pleases me: that the natural gifts were corrupted in man through 
sin, but that his supernatural gifts were stripped from him.”132 Man’s natural gifts, like 
reason, are corrupt, but do still exist, while no supernatural gifts exist in him anymore. 
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Calvin rejects the scholastic dualism between the natural and the supernatural which 
claimed that sin wasted supernatural grace, but has left natural reason intact. Instead, 
man’s natural reason is corrupt and his supernatural gifts disappeared. Nonetheless, 
man is able to discover the existence of a god by and through nature, while learning 
more specifically about who he is through Scripture. Calvin however is very 
pessimistic about man’s actual knowledge of God through the sensus divinitatis and 
through God’s works.133 This is not due to God, but due to man’s stupidity.134 Man 
cannot be excused. The semen religionis sometimes functions as a “factory of idols”. 
 
3.13 Self-knowledge 
Calvin, like Augustine, stresses the importance of self-knowledge. He writes: “With 
good reason the ancient proverb strongly recommended knowledge of self to man. For 
if it is considered disgraceful for us not to know all that pertains to the business of 
human life, even more detestable is our ignorance of ourselves, by which, when 
making decisions in necessary matters, we miserably deceive and even blind 
ourselves!”135 Calvin opens the Institutes with Augustinian words: “Nearly all the 
wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the 
knowledge of God and of ourselves” and “it is certain that man never achieves a clear 
knowledge of himself unless he has first looked upon God’s face, and then descends 
from contemplating him to scrutinize himself.”136 Self-knowledge however can take a 
right or a wrong form. It can be applied perversely. This happened to ‘certain 
philosophers’, who “while urging man to know himself, propose the goal of 
recognizing his own worth and excellence. And they would have him contemplate in 
himself nothing but what swells him with empty assurance and puffs him up with 
pride [Gen. 1:27].”137 But what then is a good form of self-knowledge? In the first 
place: “knowledge of ourselves lies (…) in considering what we were given at 
creation and how generously God continues his favor toward us, in order to know how 
great our natural excellence would be if only it had remained unblemished; yet at the 
same time to bear in mind that there is in us nothing of our own, but that we hold on 
sufferance whatever God has bestowed upon us. Hence we are ever dependent on 
him.”  
 
Calvin regularly praises man’s nature in its un-fallen state. In the second place a good 
form of self-knowledge is “to call to mind our miserable condition after Adam’s fall; 
the awareness of which, when all our boasting and self-assurance are laid low, should 
truly humble us and overwhelm us with shame. In the beginning God fashioned us 
after his image [Gen. 1:27] that he might arouse our minds both to zeal for virtue and 
to meditation upon eternal life.” Again Calvin praises man’s creational nobility and 
reason. These is however a sharp contrast between man in his fallen and his un-fallen 
state: “[T]hat primal worthiness cannot come to mind without the sorry spectacle of 
our foulness and dishonor presenting itself by way of contrast, since in the person of 
the first man we have fallen from our original condition. From this source arise 
abhorrence and displeasure with ourselves, as well as true humility; and thence is 
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kindled a new zeal to seek God, in whom each of us may recover those good things 
which we have utterly and completely lost.”138 Humility and self-knowledge come 
together. If a person has no humility, his self-knowledge can only serve his pride and 
hence lead to error in his philosophy. Christian philosophy is humble philosophy. 
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4 Neo-Calvinism 
 
 
The thought of the Reformed philosophers Dooyeweerd and Plantinga cannot be fully 
understood when no attention is paid to a specific branch of the Calvinian legacy, 
namely neo-Calvinism. In this chapter I will sketch the main lines of neo-Calvinistic 
thought, focusing on those aspects that structured the Reformed tradition in 
philosophy. Special attention will be paid to the neo-Calvinistic conception of 
philosophy and rationality. 
 
4.1 The struggle for Calvin’s legacy 
The main lines of the ideas of Calvin were commonplace in the Netherlands after the 
Reformation, but under the influence of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought 
they were ousted. In the beginning of the nineteenth century however there was a 
resurgence in the movement of the Réveil (Willem Bilderdijk, Isaäc da Costa) and the 
anti-revolutionary political movement of Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876) 
and Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). The anti-revolutionaries opposed the principles of 
‘modernity’. Kuyper writes: “[I]n deadly opposition to [the] Christian element, 
against the very Christian name, and against its salutiferous influence in every sphere 
of life, the storm of Modernism has now arisen with violent intensity.” A central point 
is the French Revolution (1789). “In 1789 the turning point was reached. Voltaire's 
mad cry, “Down with the scoundrel,” was aimed at Christ himself, but this cry was 
merely the expression of the most hidden thought from which the French Revolution 
sprang. The fanatic outcry of another philosopher, “We no more need a God,” and the 
odious shibboleth, “No God, no Master,” of the Convention; – these were the 
sacrilegious watchwords which at that time heralded the liberation of man as an 
emancipation from all Divine Authority.”139 Neo-Calvinism can also be regarded as a 
religious and social reform movement in this anti-revolutionary line, which opposed 
the influence of liberal thought, in the first place in theology. Under the influence of 
Kuyper there was a revival of the comprehensive Calvinist world view which, in 
addition to theology did apply in areas such as science, politics and art. Neo-
Calvinism aimed at the full re-Christianizing of the Dutch culture and society. The 
neo-Calvinists however did not want to simply copy Calvin’s sixteenth-century 
thoughts, they rather wanted to actualize them and make them in accordance with the 
actual time. New elements were added. 
 
4.2 Philosophical Calvinism 
In neo-Calvinism some thoughts of Calvin get emphasized: first, the biblical words 
creation, sin and salvation. Creation means that God, in his creation of the world, has 
made a clear order and has given laws, both to nature as to humans (laws of nature 
and laws of culture). Sin (the Fall) is a distortion of God’s order and is essentially 
opposition to God. Sin works through the heart of man, the center of human existence, 
into all of life, including in reason. Salvation is restoration of the disturbed 
relationship with God, but also a re-direction of all things onto him. Important is also 
God’s sovereignty over all areas of life and God’s revelation, both in the Bible and in 
nature.  
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Neo-Calvinism can to a certain extent be regarded as a philosophical translation of 
Calvin’s thought. Three emphases can specifically be mentioned. The first is divine 
sovereignty. Neo-Calvinists more than other Reformed groups emphasize the 
intellectual elaboration of God’s sovereignty. Every thought should be brought into 
captivity to God.140 The second emphasis is human sin. In Calvin’s thought there is a 
certain tension between on the one side his high regard of ancient pagan writers and 
on the other side his emphasis on the depravity of the unredeemed human mind.141 
Some Reformed groups reject ‘worldly wisdom’ as such, but neo-Calvinists have a 
more nuanced view. Neo-Calvinists have a negative assessment of the human mind 
and the noetic effects of sin in man’s unredeemed state. They do however have a 
rather optimistic conception of the redeemed mind. The relationship between these 
two ‘states of mind’ has led to an interest in epistemological questions.142 The third 
emphasis is the importance of divine law. God’s law is not only a moral law, but also 
a law through which God creates and sustains the cosmos.143 This leads to a 
philosophical interest in the law-like structures of reality. These philosophical 
interests will return in diverse forms in the thought of the thinkers that will be 
discussed in this and in the next chapters. 
 
4.3 Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper 
One of the intellectual fathers of neo-Calvinism is the Dutch politician, jurist and 
historian Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876). According to Groen van 
Prinsterer the French Revolution was an expression of a religion of ‘unbelief’. He 
regarded the rationalism of the Enlightenment as a system of belief rejecting 
Christianity.144 It destroys the Christian spiritual foundation of Europe. Here the 
Augustinian theme of the struggle between the two cities can be recognized. Groen 
van Prinsterer was aiming at a re-Christianization of Europe. Two themes in Groen 
van Prinsterer’s thought are especially relevant. The first is the religious motive 
behind every thought, whether it is Enlightenment rationality and revolutionary 
unbelief or Christianity. The second thought is what came to be known as 
soevereiniteit in eigen kring (‘sphere sovereignty’). This concept, originating from the 
Calvinist legal philosopher Althusius (1557-1638), was further developed by Groen 
van Prinsterer regarding the separation of church and state, although it was given its 
full expression in the thought of Groen’s political successor, Kuyper. Abraham 
Kuyper (1837-1920) worked for Christian organization in all areas: the creation of the 
Anti-Revolutionary Party (1878), Christian schools and the Free University (1880) in 
Amsterdam, newspapers (De Heraut and De Standaard), trade unions and social care. 
Kuyper was mainly a theologian, politician and organizer, not a philosopher. He did 
however deliver philosophical building-blocks that were taken up by Dooyeweerd and 
others. Kuyper was a romantic mind, influenced by Augustine and Calvin, but also by 
romantic idealism. For example, Kuyper’s view of history is clearly Augustinian, but 
was also influenced by the romantic idealism of Willem Bilderdijk. Elements of 
historical growth and cultural evolution can be recognized, very explicitly in the 
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Lectures on Calvinism.145 An important ally of Kuyper was the theologian and 
pedagogue Herman Bavinck (1854-1921).146 Kuyper also had an international 
influence, mainly in the United States and South Africa. In the United States he 
lectured the famous Stone Lectures (Lectures on Calvinism, 1898) and had much 
influence at Princeton Theological Seminary, especially on the theologian B.B. 
Warfield (1851-1921), and on the philosopher W.H. Jellema (1893-1982), who, in 
turn, had an essential influence on Alvin Plantinga, as will be explained in chapter 6. 
In South Africa he influenced the philosopher H.G. Stoker (1899-1993), who became 
an ally of Herman Dooyeweerd. The neo-Calvinism as it will be presented below, can 
roughly be regarded as Kuyper’s thought as it influenced Dooyeweerd. Others, like 
Bavinck, on some point laid other emphases. 
 
4.4 World view 
The term ‘neo-Calvinism’ “refers not so much to a theological system, but to an all-
embracing world view (levens- en wereldbeschouwing) or Weltanschauung which has 
a bearing on the whole of human life.”147 Therefore, when Kuyper speaks of 
‘Calvinism’ (meaning neo-Calvinism) he does not mean an ecclesiastical or 
denominational position, but a general world view, a ‘life principle’. In his Lectures 
on Calvinism he writes: “[B]eyond [the] sectarian, confessional, and denominational 
use of the name “Calvinist”, it serves moreover, (…) as a scientific name, either in a 
historical, philosophical or political sense. Only in this last-named, strictly scientific 
sense do I desire to speak to you on Calvinism as an independent general tendency, 
which from a mother-principle of its own, has developed an independent form both 
for our life and for our thought among the nations of Western Europe and North 
America, and at present even in South Africa.” Calvinism is far broader than a narrow 
confessional domain. There need not only be a Calvinistic theology, but also (among 
others) a philosophy, which apparently has not been developed yet. Of course Kuyper 
does not deny the theological roots of Calvinism. “Calvinism is rooted in a form of 
religion which was peculiarly its own, and from this specific religious consciousness 
there was developed first a peculiar theology, then a special church-order, and then a 
given form for political and social life, for the interpretation of the moral world-order, 
for the relation between nature and grace, between Christianity and the world, 
between church and state, and finally for art and science ; and amid all these life-
utterances it remained always the self-same Calvinism, in so far as simultaneously and 
spontaneously all these developments sprang from its deepest life-principle.”148 When 
all of life is guided by a religious principle, there is no ‘neutral’ domain that is not 
influenced by the world view a person has. Likewise, there can be a Calvinist 
philosophy, because when philosophy is not Calvinist it will be influenced (‘directed’) 
by another world view. A ‘neutral’ philosophy does not exist. Pre-theoretical world 
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view and theoretical philosophy are “like the two foci of an ellipse comprising all the 
giants of the philosophical tradition”.149 
 
This has an interesting implication. Unlike large parts of the natural sciences, 
theology, philosophy and the human sciences are unavoidably ‘perspectival’, 
according to Kuyper. We simply have to acknowledge that fact and let the different 
perspectives (Christians, humanists, naturalists etc.) have their own place. Kuyper 
pleaded for a pluralistic academy, thereby anticipating contemporary ‘postmodern’ 
conceptions of the academy.150 
 
4.5 General characterization 
The neo-Calvinistic world view can be clarified in a few distinctions.151 There is a 
distinction between God and creation. ‘Creation’ is what is not God. God and creation 
cannot be reduced to each other. Closely connected to this is the distinction between 
‘heaven’ and ‘earth’. The earth, broadly understood as “the horizon of normal human 
experience”, is the domain, but also the limit, of human knowledge, scientific 
investigation and analysis. There is also a distinction between God’s creational 
ordinances and what is subject to these ordinances. Creation is defined in terms of 
law. The relationship between God and creation is one of law and subject, both in the 
natural and cultural realm. In the natural realm natural laws simply exist, while in the 
cultural and societal realm the law needs implementation. Because of its law-like 
character creation is a cosmos, an ordered whole. Kuyper speaks of ‘ordinances’ of 
creation. Within the earthly cosmos there is a developmental potential. Man has a 
‘cultural mandate’ to ‘subdue’ the earth and develop the cultural potential that is in it. 
This ‘opening process’ is to God’s glory. An important aspect of this is that a 
philosophical investigation of creation is possible. Kuyper, like Calvin, regards 
science as a gift of God that should be accepted in gratitude.152 Finally, there is a 
distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘direction’. ‘Structure’ is the world as it is with all 
its potential, while ‘direction’ is how the world can be developed, e.g. the world’s 
creational possibilities. Man can be misdirected by sin or redirected by Christ. Sin and 
redemption have a cosmic scope (not only an individual one), including nature, 
culture and society.153 Salvation is re-creation, therefore grace does not destroy or 
supplement nature, but restores it.154 Regarding ‘direction’ there is the Augustinian 
battle between two opposing forces: the City of God and the Earthly City, or the 
antithesis between belief and unbelief. This is also an antithesis between regenerate 
and unregenerate science.155 
 
Neo-Calvinism differs from parts of Jansenist Catholicism, Puritanism and 
‘experiential’ (bevindelijk) Calvinism in not seeing God as a more or less arbitrary, 
sovereign elector and grace-giver, but as having a law-like relationship with 
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creation.156 Accordingly, “[w]here God is viewed as committing himself to the lawful 
ordering of his creation, there is usually a high regard for rational inquiry on the part 
of Christians.”157 Therefore it is interesting to note that “[t]he two confessional 
communities in which Christian philosophy has flourished are both very law-oriented 
in their perspectives on creation and redemption: Roman Catholicism and 
Calvinism.”158 
 
4.6 Antithesis 
An important feature of the neo-Calvinist thought is the doctrine of antithesis. This is 
Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities supplemented by the Biblical idea of ‘enmity’ 
between the offspring of the snake and the offspring of the woman (Genesis 3:15). 
There is a radical contradiction between the power of sin and of Christ. There is no 
such thing as a profane and a sacred atmosphere in the world, everything belongs to 
God. Kuypers typical statement is: “There is no area of life of which Christ does not 
say it’s mine!” From this thought, Kuyper (‘Abraham the Great’) has worked on the 
formation of Christian organizations in all areas and has ensured the empowerment of 
the so-called ‘kleine luyden’ (‘small people’), the Reformed population of humble 
origin.  
 
Kuyper distinguishes three main world views in his time: modernism, Romanism and 
Calvinism.159 Modernism was the secular thought of the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution, the unbelief of every system of thought based on something 
outside faith and revelation. It was the ‘unbelief and revolution’ of which Groen van 
Prinsterer spoke. Kuyper referred to world views as religious perspectives. Against 
modernism and the ‘principle of the Revolution’ he states: “[T]he principle of [the] 
Revolution remains thoroughly anti-Christian, and has since spread like a cancer, 
dissolving and undermining all that stood firm and consistent before our Christian 
faith. There is no doubt then that Christianity is imperilled by great and serious 
dangers. Two life systems are wrestling with one another, in mortal combat.” The 
hearth of modernism is the autonomous man. “Modernism is bound to build a world 
of its own from the data of the natural man, and to construct man himself from the 
data of nature; while, on the other hand, all those who reverently bend the knee to 
Christ and worship Him as the Son of the living God, and God himself, are bent upon 
saving the “Christian Heritage.” This is the struggle in Europe, this is the struggle in 
America, and this also, is the struggle for principles in which my own country is 
engaged (…).”160 
 
The second world view according to Kuyper was Romanism, the scholastic thought of 
Roman Catholicism, based on a synthesis between Christianity and pagan philosophy. 
Scholastic thought followed Aristotle’s doctrine of the eidos (essential form) of man 
as reason. Reason is regarded as an autonomous faculty. In Aquinas’s philosophy two 
spheres are recognized: the natural and the supernatural, or nature and grace. The 
natural is the place of the natural light of reason, as understood in Aristotle’s 
philosophy. It is the place of philosophy. The supernatural is the sphere of revelation, 
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of church and theology. Nature is perfected by grace. Natural reason as such is not 
destructed by sin; it only lost the perfecting grace. In scholastic thought there is not a 
Christianization of philosophy. Philosophy keeps its independent position in its own 
sphere, relatively untouched by sin. In the order of nature and grace, philosophy (the 
natural) is regarded as the servant of theology (the supernatural), or ancilla 
theologiae. Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical letter Aeterni Patris (1879) strengthened the 
position of Aquinas’ doctrine.161  
 
The different world views are not alternatives, but opposites, or in Kuyper’s 
terminology ‘principle against principle’. “If the battle is to be fought with honor and 
with a hope of victory, then principle must be arrayed against principle; then it must 
be felt that in Modernism the vast energy of an all-embracing life-system assails us, 
then also it must be understood that we have to take our stand in a life-system of 
equally comprehensive and far-reaching power. And this powerful life-system is not 
to be invented nor formulated by ourselves, but is to be taken and applied as it 
presents itself in history.” What then is this life-system? “When thus taken, I found 
and confessed, and I still hold, that this manifestation of the Christian principle is 
given us in Calvinism.” Kuyper uses Augustinian words when he states: “In 
Calvinism my heart has found rest. From Calvinism have I drawn the inspiration 
firmly and resolutely to take my stand in the thick of this great conflict of 
principles.”162 
 
4.7 Commong grace 
Kuyper’s doctrine of common grace (gemene gratie, algemene genade) is clearly a 
Calvinian legacy.163 Kuyper however uses the concept in a much more fixed and 
technical sense than Calvin does.164 In his voluminous work De gemeene gratie 
(1902-1905) he sketches both the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ goals of common grace.165 
The negative goal is restraining from sin and maintaining creation, although affected 
by sin. The positive goal, which plays an important role in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, 
is the ‘opening-process’ or ‘disclosure’ of the creational potential.166 Elements of 
scholastic thought can be recognized in Kuyper’s thought, especially in the potential 
dualism between particular grace (particuliere genade) and common grace. The 
relationship between the doctrines of the common grace and the antithesis is not 
clear.167 
 
4.8 The heart 
The Augustinian notion of the heart also plays a central role in Kuyper’s thought. 
Kuyper speaks of “that point in our consciousness in which our life is still undivided 
and lies comprehended in its unity,– not in the spreading vines but in the root from 
which the vines spring. This point, of course, lies in the antithesis between all that is 
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finite in our human life and the infinite that lies beyond it.” The heart is a religious 
point in man. In the heart is the ‘unity of life‘, so the whole of life is religious. “Here 
alone we find the common source from which the different streams of our human life 
spring and separate themselves. Personally it is our repeated experience that in the 
depths of our hearts, at the point where we disclose ourselves to the Eternal One, all 
the rays of our life converge as in one focus, and there alone regain that harmony 
which we so often and so painfully lose in the stress of daily duty.” The heart is the 
contact point between God and man. It is the point of unity, that is the unity of man 
and God in prayer, but also the unity of man’s personal life. Because of the central 
function of the heart, Kuyper states that “[m]ovements in history (…) which do not 
spring from this deepest source are always partial and transient, and only those 
historical acts which arose from these lowest depths of man's personal existence 
embrace the whole of life and possess the required permanence.”168 The terminology 
of the heart is taken over by Dooyeweerd in a specific philosophical way, as will be 
shown in the next chapter.  
 
4.9 Sphere sovereignty 
In 1880 Kuyper opened the Free University with the speech Soevereiniteit in eigen 
kring (Sphere sovereignty).169 The title of the speech deals with the sociological view 
that society has a diversity of spheres, which have their own nature and structure, 
based on God’s creational order. Kuyper distinguished, among others, between 
marriage, family, company, state, church, school and university. Each of these social 
spheres has its own role, nature and internal authority structure. The spheres have no 
control over each other and are responsible only to God about the way they exercise 
their internal authority. The Free University Kuyper established was called free, 
because of its separation from church and from state. Each sphere has its own 
standard, its own ‘law of life’ (levenswet). For the state it is justice, for a company the 
economic standard, for the family it is love. A family can not be managed as a 
company, while the state can not love. Only when there is a major disorganization in a 
sphere, the state has to intervene in order to restore sphere sovereignty. Kuyper has 
not made clear what exactly are the limits of this doctrine. He has not systematically 
developed it.  
 
The doctrine of sphere sovereignty has great practical resemblance with the principle 
of subsidiarity as developed in Catholic social thought, especially in the encyclical 
letter Quadragesimo Anno (1931). One theoretical difference is that Catholic thought 
is based on a hierarchical relationship between the different communities, while 
Calvinist thought assumes a horizontal relationship. In both views there is a 
conservative, anti-revolutionary resistance to government intervention in the non-state 
relationships and a stress on the capacity for self-organizing and self-legislation of 
these spheres.  
 
Dooyeweerd copied the idea of sphere sovereignty, but has worked it out not only in a 
social, but also in a philosophical direction. The work of Dooyeweerd as a whole can 
be regarded as the philosophical elaboration and completion of the neo-Calvinistic 
thinking. In that sense, it might also be regarded as the completion of the 
emancipation of the kleine luyden.  
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4.10 Rationality and philosophy 
What is the neo-Calvinistic conception of rationality? A central notion is that 
rationality is created. This implies two things. First, because it is created it is good as 
such, while it is wanted by God. Rationality should not be disparaged. Second, 
because it is created it is subject to the boundary between God and his creation. There 
is no continuity between God and man on the basis of rationality. Therefore, there is 
no place for a natural theology. God is not irrational, but rationality is creature.170 
Rationality should not be deified. Still, rationality is not neutral from a religious 
perspective. The categories of ‘structure’ and ‘direction’ can also be applied to it.171 
Rationality has to be governed by ‘principles’ (axioms, presuppositions) underlying it. 
These principles are of a philosophical nature. The Calvinist philosophy that had to be 
developed would play a very important role as “the “categorical” discipline par 
excellence”.172 Philosophical principles would be the ‘link’ between religion and 
science. “The reformation of scholarship in accordance with reformed principles 
would depend very largely on the development of a distinctly Calvinistic 
philosophy.”173 
 
Neo-Calvinism can be regarded as a brand of Reformed Christianity with a strong 
interest in philosophical thought. Kuyper has always stressed the importance of a 
Calvinist philosophy. As has been said, when philosophy is not Calvinist it will be 
influenced (‘directed’) by another world view. A ‘neutral’ philosophy does not exist. 
That does not mean that a Calvinist philosophy is subjected to a Calvinist theology. 
Both philosophy and theology need ‘Calvinistic treatment’, according to Kuyper. The 
Calvinist Reformation in the Netherlands of course had its own theology, but a 
Reformed Christian philosophy didn’t exist.174 In his Lectures on Calvinism Kuyper 
writes: “Theology is only one of the many sciences that demand Calvinistic treatment. 
Philosophy, psychology, aesthetics, jurisprudence, the social sciences, literature, and 
even the medical and natural sciences, each and all of these, when philosophically 
conceived, go back to principles, and of necessity even the question must be put with 
much more penetrating seriousness than hitherto, whether the ontological and 
anthropological principles that reign supreme in the present method of these sciences 
are in agreement with the principles of Calvinism, or at variance with their very 
essence.”175 This language about ‘principles’ is characteristic for Kuyper.  
 
4.11 Calvinistic Philosophy 
According to the neo-Calvinists an integral Calvinistic philosophy had not been 
developed until then. There had only been ‘synthesis philosophy’, i.e. a (superficial) 
combination of Calvinistic thought with pagan and humanistic philosophical 
elements. For example, there had been the humanistic-Calvinistic Ramist movement 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.176 In the Netherlands in the seventeenth 
century there had been mixtures of Calvinism with Aristotelism, humanism, 
Cartesianism, empiricism and even Spinozism in the thought of Antonius Walaeus, 
Willem Ames, Paulus Voet and Lambertus van Velthuysen. There also was the 
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Calvinist Scholasticism of Gisbertus Voetius. At the Synod of Dordt (1618/1619), a 
turning-point in the history of Calvinism, no specific philosophy was privileged. 
Calvinism in early modernity thus could be combined with completely different 
philosophical systems, although the Calvinistic confession of Dordt functioned as a 
“norm and touchstone” for philosophy.177 The neo-Calvinists however felt the 
pressing need to develop a fully Calvinistic philosophy. There have been some partly 
attempts by Kuyper and Bavinck, but also by J. Woltjer (1849-1917) and W. Geesink 
(1854-1929).178 There were still many neo-Platonic elements in their philosophical 
thought, including the ideas of the ‘great chain of being’ and God as the summum ens 
or absolute logos, and the concepts of ‘essence’ and ‘substance’.179 The challenge to 
develop an ‘integral’ or ‘intrinsic’ Calvinistic philosophy instead of “logos 
speculation” was taken up in the work of Herman Dooyeweerd and his brother-in-law 
Dirk Vollenhoven.180 
 
4.12 Natural theology 
The Reformed tradition in theology and philosophy generally has no place for a 
natural theology. ‘Generally’, because some nuances need to be made. There were 
Reformed Princeton theologians in the nineteenth century who left some place for a 
natural theology. These theologians, like Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge, A.A. 
Hodge and B.B. Warfield, were inspired by the Scottish common sense philosophy 
(especially Thomas Reid). On the other ‘extreme’ there was the influential twentieth-
century Reformed theologian Karl Barth who did not only reject natural theology but 
even insisted that there is no ‘point of contact’ (Anknüpfungspunkt) between God and 
man. Barth regarded philosophical theology as idolatry.181 Neo-Calvinists like Kuyper 
and Bavinck also reject natural theology, although they accept common grace. 
Plantinga has a special position in this debate, as will be shown later. 
 
Philosophical theology, understood as philosophical speaking about God, only 
flourished in the American branch of neo-Calvinism, not in the Dutch and South 
African one. This can be regarded as a consequence of Dooyeweerd’s neo-Kantian 
approach to philosophy in which there is no room for an application of human 
concepts outside our ‘temporal horizon’, as will be shown in the next chapter. 
Jellema, the ‘father’ of the American branch of neo-Calvinism, had quite another 
philosophical orientation, namely the philosophy and theology of the Middle Ages. 
Philosophical theology was of course an important part of it, although it necessarily 
should have a perspectival character in the Kuyperian sense.182 
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5 Herman Dooyeweerd 
 
 
According to the neo-Calvinists an integral Calvinistic philosophy had not been 
developed until then. I think they were right. The challenge to develop an ‘integral’ or 
‘intrinsic’ Calvinistic philosophy was taken up in the work of Herman Dooyeweerd 
that will be discussed in this chapter. Special attention will be paid to Dooyeweerd’s 
conception of philosophy and rationality. 
 
5.1 Towards a Reformed philosophy 
Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) was educated at Kuyper’s Free University as a 
jurist, but developed as a philosopher. He became the systematical philosopher of 
neo-Calvinism. The voluminous work in which his thoughts were systematically 
worked out in their full width for the first time was De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (3 
volumes, 1935-1936). Through this work Dooyeweerd’s philosophy has become 
known as the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea. The philosopher and theologian 
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978) was Dooyeweerd’s brother-in-law and fellow 
thinker and one of the organizers of the Calvinistic philosophy movement in the 
Netherlands. Two other collaborators are worth mentioning who were influenced by 
Dooyeweerd’s thought (and vice versa). In the first place the South-African 
philosopher H.G. Stoker (1899-1993) at Potchefstroom University. In the second 
place the Dutch-American theologian and philosopher Cornelius van Til (1895-1987) 
at Westminster Theological Seminary. 
 
From 1954 on, an English translation and expansion of  De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee 
was published under the title A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (4 volumes, 
1953-1958).183 The change of title is influenced by the fact that Dooyeweerd in the 
course of time took some distance from the term ‘Law Idea’ (or ‘Cosmonomic Idea’) 
and has put other accents is his work. The New Critique of Theoretical Thought can 
be regarded as the ultimate magnum opus. As a consequence of this translation and his 
many lectures abroad Dooyeweerd was internationally known. He held talks and 
lectures in South Africa, France – where he was introduced by philosophers like Paul 
Ricoeur and Gabriel Marcel – and many times in the United States (at Harvard and 
Princeton, among others) and in Canada. He also debated with – than –  leading 
Roman Catholic philosophers like the professors H. Robbers and M.F.J. Marlet.184  
 
Outside the Netherlands, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy was especially influential in 
Canada, the United States and South Africa but also in France, Scandinavia, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan and Korea.  
 
5.2 Intellectual influences  
An important intellectual influence upon Dooyeweerd is of course the legacy of 
Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper’s legacy in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy consists of the 
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following points: the conception of the sovereignty of God in all spheres of life, the 
doctrine of the heart as the central unity of human existence, the doctrine of sphere 
sovereignty, the doctrine of the antithesis, and the doctrine of the common grace.185 
Besides the anti-revolutionary and Neo-Calvinistic thought of Groen van Prinsterer 
and Kuyper, there is a more direct influence of Calvin, and in particular of the church 
father Augustine on Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the Reformer Calvin, 
for example in his criticism of the Roman Catholic Church, is building on Augustine. 
When Dooyeweerd opposes the alleged autonomy of human thought, he joins 
Augustine’s idea that knowledge of the cosmos depends on self-knowledge and self-
knowledge depends on God.  
 
As has been said, Dooyeweerd was educated as a jurist at the Free University in 
Amsterdam. Here he was introduced to the neo-Calvinistic thought, although this 
influence started already in his family and at the Gereformeerd Gymnasium in 
Amsterdam he attended. Besides the general introduction to philosophy that was 
offered every student at the Free University, Dooyeweerd was never educated as a 
philosopher. His philosophical knowledge was mainly gained through self-study. He 
also learned a lot by discussing philosophy with his brother-in-law Vollenhoven. 
 
In addition to Augustine, Calvin and neo-Calvinism there is influence of modern 
philosophy on Dooyeweerd.186 Initially he was very impressed by neo-Kantianism and 
later by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, but eventually he opposes both currents. 
However, neo-Kantianism remained his main interlocutor, especially the so-called 
Marburg school in neo-Kantianism (Herman Cohen, Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann). 
Dooyeweerd’s epistemology is a direct criticism of Kantian rationalism, while under 
Neo-Kantian influence, epistemology became the ‘gateway’ to Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy. Dooyeweerd’s epistemology is a critical reflection upon the possibility 
and foundation of theoretical thought, neo-Kantian style. The terminology that 
Dooyeweerd used is partly taken from neo-Kantian philosophy. From the neo-
Kantians legal philosophers he is arguing with, Stammler, Radbruch and Kelsen are 
important to mention. Dooyeweerd himself states: “Originally I was strongly under 
the influence first of the neo-Kantian philosophy, later on of Husserl’s 
phenomenology. The great turning point in my thought was marked by the discovery 
of the religious root of thought itself, whereby a new light was shed on the failure of 
all attempts, including my own, to bring about an inner synthesis between the 
Christian faith and a philosophy which is rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of 
human reason.”187 
 
Finally, the philosophy of Dooyeweerd can be understood as a response to the 
spiritual climate in the twenties and thirties of the twentieth century. After the horrors 
of the First World War a climate of cultural pessimism arose. Oswald Spengler’s Der 
                                               
185 E.L. Hebden Taylor, The Christian Philosophy of Law, Politics and the State, Nutley: The Craig 
Press 1969, p. 43, 61. See also Herman Dooyeweerd, ‘Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer’, Philosophia 
Reformata 4 (1939), pp. 193-232. 
186 A hypothesis of the Dooyeweerd scholar J. Glenn Friessen is that Dooyeweerd was also 
substantially influenced by the catholic philosopher Franz Xaver von Baader (1765-1841). See J. Glenn 
Friessen, ‘The Mystical Dooyeweerd: The relation of his thought to Franz von Baader’, Ars Disputandi 
3 (2003); J. Glenn Friessen, ‘Dooyeweerd, Spann, and the Philosophy of Totality’, Philosophia 
Reformata 70 (2005), 2-22; Daniël F. M. Strauss: “Intellectual influences upon the reformational 
philosophy of Dooyeweerd,” Philosophia Reformata 69 (2004), 151-181. 
187 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought I, p. V. 
 47 
Untergang des Abendlandes (1918/1922) and José Ortega y Gasset’s La rebelión de 
las masas (1930) are typical for that time, as well as Heidegger’s thoughts about the 
limits of reason. Intellectuals were searching for new foundations for science and 
culture. Dooyeweerd intended to contribute to the re-launch of philosophical 
discussion in the Occident. 
 
5.3 Basic ideas 
The words Dooyeweerd opens his magnum opus with, immediately give a first 
introduction to several basic ideas in his philosophy.  He writes: “If I consider reality 
as it is given in the naïve pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a 
theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal 
aspects then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation 
among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the 
theoretical attitude of mind.”188 The key ideas that are introduced are: (1) the 
distinction between ‘naïve’, pre-scientific experience of reality versus a scientific 
attitude, (2) the different aspects (modalities, functions) that can be distinguished in 
reality and (3) the relationship that exists between all aspects of reality – Dooyeweerd 
speaks of a ‘cosmos’ (ordered whole). He distinguishes fifteen of these aspects: “An 
indissoluble inner coherence binds the numerical to the spatial aspect, the latter to the 
aspect of mathematical movement, the aspect of movement to that of physical energy, 
which itself is the necessary basis of the aspect of organic life. The aspect of organic 
life has an inner connection with that of physical feeling, the latter refers in its logical 
anticipation (the feeling of logical correctness or incorrectness) to the analytical-
logical aspect. This in turn is connected with the historical, the linguistic, the aspect of 
social intercourse, the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the moral aspect and that of 
faith. In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; every-one 
refers within and beyond itself to all the others.”189 Reality is not a chaos, but an 
ordered and coherent whole, a cosmic order in which the different aspects of reality 
refer to each other in an indissoluble interrelation. 
 
5.4 Modal aspects 
Dooyeweerd’s doctrine of the so-called ‘modalities’ or ‘modal aspects’ has been 
mentioned the ‘jewel’ of his philosophy. This is an original working-out of Kuypers 
doctrine of sphere sovereignty. For Kuyper it was a social principle, but for 
Dooyeweerd it became a philosophical starting point. Just like Kuyper distinguished 
different social spheres and their own sovereign laws, Dooyeweerd distinguishes 
various modal aspects of reality that cannot be reduced to each other. These aspects 
are ways of experience of reality, ways of being, also called ‘modalities’ or ‘modal 
aspects’. The sphere sovereignty becomes a ‘cosmological principle’, i.e. the 
structuring principle for the order in reality. In philosophical terms, Dooyeweerd 
cosmology can be called an ontology and the aspects ontic modes. 
  
Dooyeweerd distinguishes fifteen modal aspects that are not reducible to each other 
and have their own structures and laws. The aspects are no invisible metaphysical 
essences, but a temporal order, law-like ‘frameworks’. The aspects are the ways in 
which things in the world exist (modes of being), and in which we can experience 
them (experiential modes). There is coherence between our channels of knowledge 
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(the human functions) and the structure of the world. Man ‘functions’ in all the 
aspects. 
 
Dooyeweerd’s theory of modal aspects outlines the characterization and definition of 
the aspects, their order and the references. Each aspect has a so-called ‘meaning 
kernel’ (zinkern) that characterizes the specific nature of the aspect. This specific 
nature of an aspect has as a consequence that the meaning kernel cannot be defined in 
terms of another aspect. A meaning kernel can only be approached intuitively. For 
example, the legal aspect of reality cannot be reduced to the linguistic, social, 
economic or moral aspect. Simply put: in reality there is something we call ‘law’ or 
‘right’ or ‘justice’, which has something to do with language, social order and the like, 
but does not coincide with these aspects and cannot be reduced to them. The legal 
aspect is a unique aspect with its own meaning kernel which we do not exactly 
understand but intuitively know about. So it is with the other aspects.  
 
The aspects (and meaning kernels) are: (1) the quantitative aspect (amount), (2) the 
spatial aspect (space or extent), (3) the kinematic aspect (movement), (4) the physical 
aspect (cause and effect), (5) the biotic/organic aspect (life processes), (6) the 
sensitive/psychical aspect (feeling, the sensitive), (7) the logical-analytical aspect 
(analytical distinction), (8) the cultural-historical/formative aspect (history, 
development, culture) (9) the lingual aspect (symbolic meaning), (10) the social 
aspect (social interaction), (11) the economic aspect (scarcity, savings), (12) the 
aesthetic aspect (harmony, form) (13) the legal/juridical aspect (rights, retaliation), 
(14) the ethical/moral aspect (moral love) and (15) faith/pistic aspect (belief). As has 
been said, man functions in all the aspects, unlike a stone, a flower or an animal. 
 
5.5 Modal references  
The modal aspects have their own modal laws (spheres of law). The aspects until the 
logical-analytical aspect are called the natural side and are independent of human 
design. The laws of nature simply work. Think about the laws of physics and 
chemical processes. The aspects from the logical-analytical aspect upward however 
are standards, an ‘ought’. Thus, there are rules of logic, language standards, aesthetic 
laws, but also moral standards. These laws are not a matter of taste and personal 
preference, but are created normative structures in the world. These laws require 
actualization, which means they must be recognized and realized by man. They can be 
violated, but their effect is not eliminated by that. This second category of laws is 
called the culture side.  
 
The modal aspects are in a certain order, in the sense that every aspect presupposes 
the preceding aspect, while it is presupposed by the subsequent aspects. There is no 
feeling without life, but there is life without feeling and no economy without social 
interaction, but there is social interaction without economy. Dooyeweerd speaks of 
earlier and later aspects, because in his view time is not regarded as a modal aspect, 
but cosmic time penetrates all modal aspects. The time-factor is reflected in every 
aspect in its own way.190 The sequence in modal aspects is not a hierarchy with 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ modal aspects. The sequence only indicates that later modal 
aspects presuppose earlier ones. 
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The modal aspects thus refer to each other. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between 
anticipations (reference to subsequent aspects) and retrocipations (references to 
previous aspects). Thus, the term ‘legal scope’ retrocipates from the legal to the 
(previous) spatial aspect. ‘Legal guilt’ is an anticipation to the (subsequent) moral 
aspect. The latter doctrine is only found in developed legal systems, in which the legal 
aspect has ‘opened up’ to the moral aspect. The opening process (disclosure, 
unlocking) is the developing of a modal aspect into a normative direction. It is the 
dynamic factor in Dooyeweerd’s theory of modal aspects. Previous aspects found 
later ones, while later aspects disclose earlier ones. For example, there is no love (the 
moral aspect) without law (the legal aspect), but love brings law to a higher level, 
without abolishing it. Together, the anticipations and retrocipations are called the 
‘analogies’ or ‘analogical structure moments’ or ‘references‘.  
 
5.6 Meaning 
Reality is not sufficient to itself, i.e. it does not exist in isolation. The whole of reality, 
in all its modal aspects, refers to and is an expression of its origin. Dooyeweerd 
writes: “This universal character of referring and expressing, which is proper to our 
entire created cosmos, stamps created reality as meaning, in accordance with its 
dependent non-self-sufficient nature. Meaning is the being of all that has been created 
and the nature even of our selfhood. It has a religious root and a divine origin.”191 In 
this sense we can say that reality does not have a meaning (zin), but is meaning (i.e. 
referring). Reality is referral and expression. It is a meaningful whole. It is noteworthy 
that according to Dooyeweerd creation actually does not have being itself, but only 
meaning, that is: non-self-sufficient referring and expressing. At this point Plantinga 
criticizes Dooyeweerd’s somewhat fuzzy distinction, as will extensively be discussed 
in par. 7.3.192 
 
Dooyeweerd does not present his theory of modal aspects as a closed system. He 
wants to remain consistent with current scientific knowledge and does not exclude the 
discovery of new modal aspects or the reduction of one aspect to the other. Neither 
does he exclude a different sequence of the aspects. As has been sketched, the modal 
aspects concern the ways of being, the ‘how’ of things. Besides that Dooyeweerd has 
developed a theory of individuality structures (typical structures, entities), i.e. things, 
processes, events and social relations, the ‘what’ of things. On the basis of this theory 
Dooyeweerd developed a social and legal philosophy.193 I will leave this theory aside, 
because it is not essential to understand Dooyeweerd’s conception of philosophy. 
 
5.7 Anti-reductionism  
An important distinction Dooyeweerd makes is between, on the one side, the ‘naïve’ 
pre-scientific thought and experience, and, on the other side, scientific or theoretical 
thought. Theoretical (scientific) thought is, according to Dooyeweerd, placing the 
logical-analytical function (reason) against a different aspect of reality (a 
Gegenstand). This aspect is analyzed (cut into pieces, laid apart) and abstracted. 
Biologists analyze the biotic aspect, psychologists the sensitive aspect and economists 
the economic aspect. The logical-analytical aspect however is itself an aspect of 
reality. People can argue (logical-analytic function), but also feel (sensitive function), 
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have an aesthetic experience (aesthetic function), have a legal opinion (legal 
function), have a moral consideration (moral function) and have a religions 
experience (belief function). Being human therefore takes place in all these aspects. In 
other words: human beings have different functions. The logical-analytic function is 
not the highest one, because the sequence in modal aspects is not a hierarchy. Human 
reason is not predominant.  
 
Dooyeweerd opposes the autonomous self-complacency of human reason, as he finds 
it among many modern philosophers. He also disputes the idea that one science would 
be the most fundamental. This would be making one aspect of reality absolute, at the 
expense of other aspects. Such absolutism leads to an ‘ism’ as psychologism, 
fysicalism, historicism or economism. For example, there are more aspects of reality 
than the aspects that are ‘measurable’ in a (quasi-)scientific method. Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy is anti-reductionist.  
 
5.8 Ground motives 
Like Groen van Prinsterer pointed at the religious motive behind every thought and 
Kuyper referred to world views as religious perspectives, Dooyeweerd coined the 
term ‘ground motive’ (grondmotief) or ‘cosmonomic idea’ (wetsidee).194 People do 
not only live in a social community with others, but also in a thinking community. 
According to Dooyeweerd four so-called ground motives or ground themes can be 
found in Western thought through the centuries. The ground motives answer the 
questions of consistency, unity and origin of reality. First there is the Greek motive of 
form (idea) and matter. Then the scholastic, medieval ground motive of nature and 
grace (super nature), based on a synthesis between Greek and Christian thought. 
Furthermore, the humanistic ground motive of nature (control) and freedom, i.e. the 
ideals of science and personality. This is the thought of modern times (from Hobbes 
and Descartes). In these three ground motives a constant tension exists between the 
two poles. For example, in the humanistic ground motive a tension exists between on 
the one side freedom and autonomy and on the other side the deterministic laws of 
nature and control. According to Dooyeweerd, such a tension is not present in the 
fourth ground motive, the Christian ground motive of creation, sin and salvation.  
 
5.9 The religious root of thought  
Every thought has its roots in a conception of coherence, unity and origin of reality 
and human experience. Dooyeweerd wants to reveal the religious ‘prejudice’ in every 
thought. In his early work Dooyeweerd called this religious principle the ‘idea of law’ 
(or cosmonomic idea). Later on he speaks of a ‘transcendental ground idea’. All 
thought is aimed at a ‘totality of meaning’ (zintotaliteit), associated with the origin of 
reality. All thought therefore has a religious core. Besides, what is split up by science 
(analysis) should also be merged (synthesis). In synthesis ideas about cohesion, unity 
and origin of reality necessarily play a role. The question of the origin of reality for 
Dooyeweerd is a deeply religious question.  
 
Initially the main focus in Dooyeweerd thought was on an analysis of reality with the 
help of his theories of modal aspects and entities. His conception of philosophy was 
based on the necessary religious ground-motive behind and under every philosophy, 
answering the question of the origin of the cosmos. Through the years a shift in 
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emphasis has taken place. This becomes clear in the title of the translation of his 
magnum opus. Instead of a reference to the cosmonomic idea the title is A New 
Critique of Theoretical Thought. The title deliberately recalls the work of Immanuel 
Kant. In his later work Dooyeweerd emphasized the necessary religious nature of 
theoretical thought as such. The theory that has a central place in the later work is the 
so-called transcendental critique of theoretical thought. There is also a beginning of a 
theory about the human person, but Dooyeweerd has not developed it any further, so I 
will leave it aside. 
 
5.10 Transcendental critique 
Dooyeweerd practices a transcendental critique of theoretical thought, i.e. a study of 
the possibility conditions of human thought, particularly of scientific knowledge.195 
He wants to make a “critical inquiry into the universally valid conditions which alone 
make theoretical thought possible, and which are required by the immanent structure 
of this thought itself.”196 With his transcendental critique Dooyeweerd want to reveal 
the religious starting point of any philosophy. From this openness a philosophical 
discussion can take place on the basis of shared beliefs. Of course one can oppose 
Dooyeweerd’s thought from the idea that philosophy can not have a religious basis, 
because in that case it will not be neutral anymore. This alleged neutrality of thought 
is however one of the dogmas of much Enlightenment Philosophy. Dooyeweerd in 
turn suggests that all philosophical thought is based on a religious prejudice, because 
it regards thought as either self-sufficient or non self-sufficient and in need of a 
‘transcendent’ starting point. In both cases a religious choice is involved, as will be 
discussed below. ‘Religious’ must be understood in a broad sense and includes atheist 
and agnostic positions.  
 
How does man relate to the aspects of reality? Man participates (‘functions’) in all 
aspects of reality and (potentially) in all societal relationships, but he can not be 
identified with one of them. “The coherence of all the modal aspects of our cosmos 
finds its expression in each of them, and also points beyond its own limits toward a 
central totality, which in its turn is expressed in this coherence. Our ego expresses 
itself as a totality in the coherence of all its functions within all the modal aspects of 
cosmic reality.”197 This ‘I’ (ego) of man makes it possible to practice science, namely 
by focusing the logical-analytical function on a modal aspect, thus forming an 
antithetical Gegenstand-relation. This ‘I’ however is not reducible to logical analysis. 
It is also called the heart by Dooyeweerd, the center of human existence, the religious 
core. Through the hearth man reflects on himself. The heart is the Archimedean point 
from which the diversity of the world of experience is brought to a unity. Dooyeweerd 
states: “The great turning point in my thought was marked by the discovery of the 
religious root of thought itself, whereby a new light was shed on the failure of all 
attempts, including my own, to bring about an inner synthesis between the Christian 
faith and a philosophy which is rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of human reason. 
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I came to understand the central significance of the “heart”, repeatedly proclaimed by 
Holy Scripture to be the religious root of human existence.”198 
 
Because of its direction at the origin of meaning the thinking ego of the philosopher 
(the ‘I’ that thinks) cannot stay untouched. A philosopher cannot do without self-
reflection. The ‘know thyself’ (gnôthi seauthon) is a portal to philosophy.199 How is 
this self-knowledge possible? Not through the logical-analytical function of man, 
because the ‘I’ transcends the logical-analytical modal function. Therefore self-
knowledge cannot be theoretical. Only through knowledge of God man can have a 
real understanding of himself. This is where the thought of Augustine and Calvin is 
brought to mind. Dooyeweerd: “In an unsurpassed manner Calvin expounded in his 
Institutio the authentic Christian conception of Augustine which made all knowledge 
of the cosmos dependent upon self-knowledge, and made our self-knowledge 
dependent upon our knowledge of God.”200 Theoretical truth (i.e. philosophy and 
science) is limited and relativized by the temporal horizon. It is “in every respect 
dependent on the full super-temporal Truth”, therefore “[w]e cannot truthfully know 
the cosmos outside of the true knowledge of God.”201  
 
The Kantian elements in the transcendental critique will be discussed below. Through 
his transcendental critique Dooyeweerd criticized the Enlightenment for its ‘prejudice 
against prejudice’.202 Dooyeweerd’s thought can is some way also be regarded as an 
anticipation of late-twentieth-century postmodern critiques of the concept of 
rationalism in Enlightenment-philosophy.203 
 
5.11 Philosophy 
It is the task of philosophy to study the totality of meaning. According to Dooyeweerd 
“philosophy should furnish us with a theoretical insight into the inter-modal 
coherence of all the aspects of the temporal world. Philosophy should make us aware, 
that this coherence is a coherence of meaning that refers to a totality.” This coherence 
of meaning gives man his place in the totality: “We have been fitted into this 
coherence of meaning with all our modal functions, which include both the so-called 
“natural” and the so-called “spiritual”. Philosophy must direct the theoretical view of 
totality over our cosmos and, within the limits of its possibility, answer the question, 
“Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt”. Philosophical thought (…) is theoretical thought 
directed to the totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos.”204 Christian philosophy 
differs from a Christian world view because its view of totality is theoretical instead 
of pre-theoretical, although in the root they are united.205 
 
Meaning cannot be self-sufficient, but has to be directed at an origin (ârchè), therefore 
“all genuine philosophical thought has (…) started as thought that was directed 
toward the origin of our cosmos.”206 All philosophical thought has this tendency 
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towards the origin. This tendency is a restless seeking toward meaning.207 This 
restless seeking recalls Augustine’s words that have been cited before: “[O]ur heart 
cannot be quieted till it may find repose in thee.” 
 
Because philosophy is directed at the totality of meaning, it needs a transcendent 
starting point, i.e. a platform (‘watchtower’ or ‘helicopter-view’) outside of the 
diversity of reality that is studied. This point cannot be found in reality or in 
philosophy itself. It has to stand above the modalities of reality. Dooyeweerd calls this 
point the ‘Archimedean point’ of philosophy after Archimedes who thought he could 
lift the earth if he could only have a fixed point in the universe. The relation to the 
Archimedean point is the distinguishing feature of every philosophy. Dooyeweerd 
calls a philosophy that wants to explain the origin and meaning of reality only by 
thought itself an immanence-philosophy. “[I]t rejects every support that is found in 
something which transcends the immanent boundaries of theoretic thought, as 
such.”208 
 
An important distinction in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is between transcendent and 
transcendental elements He writes: “The religious pre-supposition of philosophy, 
toward which the ground-Idea as transcendental foundation of philosophy is directed 
in its contents, toward which as Idea it points, is of a transcendent nature, whereas 
philosophic thought is itself of a transcendental character.”209 The transcendent and 
transcendental conditions of philosophy are no ‘either-or’. Philosophy pre-supposes 
the transcendent condition as a starting-point for its transcendental direction. It cannot 
find this starting-point in itself.210 
 
5.12 The boundary between God and cosmos 
Philosophy, although it has a transcendent religious pre-supposition (the Archimedean 
point), is limited to our temporal horizon. “The choice of the Archimedean point 
necessarily crosses the boundary line of the temporal coherence of our world. 
Philosophy itself, though directed by its ground-Idea, remains within this boundary 
line, because it is possible only by virtue of the temporal order of the world.”211 
Philosophy is made possible by and bound to the temporal order. It also has to limit 
itself to this temporal order, otherwise it necessarily falls into speculative metaphysics 
that “[i]n all its varieties (…) characteristically seeks the absolute and supra-temporal 
within the cosmic time-order through the absolutizing of special modes of 
meaning.”212 The most common form of absolutizing perhaps, especially in 
philosophy, is the absolutizing of the theoretical-logical function of thought. “A 
speculative metaphysical character also belongs to the position that the laws of special 
modal aspects of our cosmos (e.g. laws of number, space, logic, morality, aesthetics) 
possess absolute universal validity, even for God.”213 God can never be the ultimate 
cause in a modal series – such as a logic, moral or mechanical one – of cause, effect 
and necessity, because he is on the other side of the boundary between Creator and 
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creation.214 Besides, man cannot reach beyond his modal horizon. “The horizon of the 
full actual reality overarches every modal horizon. For this very reason actual reality 
cannot be a synthetical category. It cannot be grasped in a concept at all; it can only 
be approached in an Idea.” Categories like ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ can only 
function as limiting concepts, i.e. as transcendental Ideas. According to Dooyeweerd 
“[t]hese Ideas become speculative-metaphysical as soon as they absolutize the horizon 
of human experience into an eternal rational order founded in the Divine essence, and 
to which the sovereign God is supposed to be bound.”215 The transcendental Ideas like 
‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ are bound to the human horizon, thus they are meaning 
(i.e. creation), not Divine Being.216 In the next chapter we will see that Plantinga 
thinks very different about this. 
 
The speculative theories, whether Platonic, phenomenological, traditional 
metaphysical – the immortal soul – or otherwise, are consequently uncritical 
according to Dooyeweerd, because they do not “appreciate the immanent limits of 
philosophical thought.”217 They absolutize modal aspects “abstracted by theoretical 
thought from the temporal coherence of meaning”, thereby disturbing the absolutized 
‘realm of meaning’.218 God has set limits to human reason in His temporal world-
order, therefore philosophy can only point beyond and above the boundary between 
God and cosmos to what it pre-supposes. “Its task, worthy of God’s human creation, 
is great; yet it is modest and does not elevate human reason to the throne of God.” 
 
There is no place for metaphysics in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, because there can be 
no transgression of the boundary between God and cosmos from the created cosmos. 
“As sovereign Origin, God is not subjected to the law. On the contrary this 
subjectedness is the very characteristic of all that which has been created, the 
existence of which is limited and determined by the law.”219 In other words: the law is 
the universal boundary of the Being of God and the meaning – the non-self-sufficient 
referring and expressing – of his creation.220 Because God is not subjected to the law, 
we should not speculate about his characteristics, insofar they have not been revealed 
to us in Scripture. Man as a creature is not capable of rising to God through thinking. 
Philosophy and theology are limited to the created reality. Man should not and cannot 
intrude upon the essentiae Dei, but should listen to the revelation in the Word of 
God.221 God’s majesty is a “deep mystery”. Here Dooyeweerd follows Calvin very 
closely, warning against vacua et meteorica speculatio.222 
 
Dooyeweerd’s position regarding God’s laws for the cosmos seems to be a 
voluntaristic one. The modal laws, including the laws of logic, apply to the created 
reality, but not to the Creator. God is not arbitrary however. Dooyeweerd quotes 
Calvin, writing: Deus legibus solutus est, sed non exlex. According to Dooyeweerd 
Calvin intended “to refute any notion that God’s sovereignty is despotic 
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arbitrariness.”223 Still, Dooyeweerd’s position on this point remains somewhat 
unclear.224 Perhaps it can even be regarded as problematic, as we will see when 
comparing Dooyeweerd and Plantinga in chapter 7.225 
 
Dooyeweerd wants to stay close to Augustine and Calvin when natural theology is 
concerned. “Nature is in its root corrupted by the fall, and is only restored or (as 
Calvin more pregnantly states) “renewed” by God’s grace in Jesus Christ. This was 
also Augustine’s conception. The Bible does not permit any view of nature, in 
distinction to grace, in which human reason in its apostasy from God, becomes the 
main stay of a “philosophia et theologia naturalis”.”226 Dooyeweerd stresses that 
Calvin rejected the “speculative natural theology”. Instead of reason Dooyeweerd 
states that the heart, the religious root of our entire existence, is the place of truth. 
Only through grace reason can function properly. 
 
5.13 Philosophy and theology 
Dooyeweerd develops a Christian philosophy, not a theology. Neither does his 
philosophy imply Biblicism. Although philosophy has a religious root – whatever this 
root is – it is philosophy. Theology is a science, thus theoretical knowledge. Theology 
can not be equated with the religious roots of all knowledge, because self-knowledge 
and true knowledge of God are non-theoretical, i.e. pre-scientific. Philosophy, as the 
study of the cosmos, aimed at totality, and theology, as the scholarship of the faith-
aspect of temporal reality however have the same religious roots as all the sciences 
have.227 Dooyeweerd sharply distinguishes between faith and religion. Faith is 
concerned in the modal aspect of faith and is studied in theology; religion is the root 
of all thought. The religious origin of reality works through all modal aspects and 
therefore in all scientific and scholarly fields, not only in theology. Interestingly, 
Dooyeweerd’s conception of philosophy and theology suggests that theology is in a 
certain way subordinate to philosophy, because it is philosophy that shows theology 
its proper place by demarcating the modal aspect of faith. Theology more or less 
becomes the discipline of religious studies, using the methodology of the social 
sciences to study the phenomenon of religion. One can wonder however, whether 
faith and religion can be distinguished the way Dooyeweerd tries to do. 
 
Dooyeweerd opposes a so-called ‘immanence philosophy’, that is a philosophy that 
explains the origin and meaning of reality only by thinking itself. “In regard to the 
Archimedean point of philosophy, it must cling tightly to the immanence-standpoint. 
Consequently it rejects every support that is found in something which transcends the 
immanent boundaries of theoretic thought, as such.”228 As has been explained, 
according to Dooyeweerd all philosophical thought starts from a religious basis, 
because it always in some manner refers to the totality of meaning. For the Christian 
philosopher Dooyeweerd, philosophy cannot be anything else but Christian 
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philosophy, that is a radical reformation (Christianization) of philosophical thought, 
reformation of philosophy in its roots. Here the meaning of ‘reformational 
philosophy’ becomes clear. Dooyeweerd himself in the course of time preferred to 
characterize his philosophy as ‘ecumenical-Christian’ or ‘reformational’ instead of' 
‘Calvinistic’. 
 
5.14 Rationality 
Concerning rationality, Dooyeweerd basically stays close to Calvin and neo-
Calvinism. Rationality is limited to creation, i.e. the earthly cosmos. It is not 
religiously neutral. Reason should not be depreciated, but put in its right place.229 
There are however some original new elements in Dooyeweerd’s thought. In the first 
place, rationality is regarded as a modal aspect, the logical-analytical one. As 
previously stated, the logical-analytical function of man is only one function, not the 
highest one. Rational analysis is not higher than feeling, aesthetic experience or 
religious belief. Human reason is not predominant. Another new element in 
Dooyeweerd’s conception of rationality is the idea of the opening process, which is 
also applied to human rationality. Cultural development discloses possibilities that are 
latent and inherent in man’s rational function. An example is the development of non-
Aristotelian logic.230 
 
What are the effects of sin? Dooyeweerd uses the example of logic, stating that the 
“logical laws of thought or the modal structural law of the logical aspect are not 
affected by sin.”231 It is only in the subjective activity of thought that apostasy comes 
clear. For example, man wants to set apart the logical aspect from its coherent order 
with the other modal aspects, thereby not appreciating the boundaries of the modal 
aspects.232 The meaning (i.e. creation) is absolutized to the level of God’s Being.233 At 
this point it is relevant to note that Dooyeweerd adopts Kuyper’s view of common 
grace, but warns against a misconception of it that perhaps Kuyper himself was not 
free from: common grace according to Dooyeweerd is God’s conservation of the 
fallen cosmos, but it does not create an autonomous sphere for human thought.234 
 
Dooyeweerd quite easily rejects the existence of a cleft between faith and reason, faith 
and science. According to him the supposed problem between philosophy and the 
Christian faith only arose when Christianity came under the influence of Greek 
philosophical metaphysics. When reason became the ‘concentration-point’ of human 
existence, “it blocked the way to an intrinsic penetration of philosophy by the Biblical 
ground-motive.”235 Alleged problems as primacy of the will or intellect in the 
essential Dei or the individual immortality of the soul can be regarded as pseudo-
problems. The real problem is the conflict between the different religious 
presuppositions in the ground-motives. 
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5.15 Dooyeweerd and Kant 
Dooyeweerd’s transcendental criticism can be regarded as a “radicalization of Kant’s 
transcendental approach to epistemology”.236 Dooyeweerd criticizes Kant’s 
immanence-philosophy in showing that the theoretical philosophical thought is not 
autonomous but determined by religious prejudices. Although Dooyeweerd tries to 
shift attention from the epistemological subject-object relationship to the ontological 
(‘cosmological’) law-subject relationship – this ontological turn is quit un-Kantian – 
his philosophy is still fundamentally influenced by Kant’s. Furthermore, 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophical discussion partners are to a large extent modern and 
contemporary German philosophers as Kant, Fichte, Rickert, Dilthey, Husserl, 
Scheler and Cassirer. 
 
According to Dooyeweerd, there must be some truth in both the classical ontological 
view of reality (Plato, Aristotle) as well as in the modern epistemological view (Kant, 
Husserl, Scheler).237 Dooyeweerd writes (using of lot of italic): “There is an a priori 
complex in the cosmological sense of the structural horizon of human experience. 
This a priori as such has the character of a law. And there is also a merely subjective a 
priori complex in the epistemological sense of the subjective a priori insight into that 
horizon.” These ontological and epistemological elements can be called the structural 
and the subjective a priori. They are related as the law-side and the subject-side of a 
priori human knowledge. At the epistemological, subjective side the categories of 
‘true’ and ‘false’ apply, but only in the horizon of human experience. The subjective a 
priori can never be an autonomous, self-sufficient foundation for truth.238 
 
According to Dooyeweerd, “all human experience is bound to some horizon which 
makes this experience possible”, but this horizon of experience “is not a subjective 
cadre within which reality appears to us only in a phenomenal shape (determined by a 
supposedly creative synthesis) and behind which the fundamentally inexperienceable 
dimensions of some “thing in itself” (“Ding an sich”) are situated.”239 Dooyeweerd 
warns explicitly against a transcendental idealistic interpretation of his epistemology. 
“It is rather the a priori meaning-structure of our cosmos itself in its dependence on 
the central religious sphere of the creation, and in subjection to the Divine Origin of 
all things. The horizon of human experience is that of our ‘earthly’ cosmos as it is 
given in the Divine order of creation.” Because the world is created and is in a 
concentric relation to the religious root of human existence, there cannot exist 
something like a “world in itself” that is not structured by the modal aspects of reality 
and the corresponding human modal functions.240 The horizon of human experience is 
“a truly super-individual and law-conformable cadre which is constant, in contrast 
with all change in actual subjective experience.”241 Experience is not formed by a 
Kantian transcendental subject, but by an interaction between the modal structure of 
reality and the corresponding human modal functions. The horizon of experience is 
not created by the subject himself. It is not the sovereign “transcendental subject” that 
structures the experience himself. Instead, according to Dooyeweerd, “[t]he modal 
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structure of the law-spheres abstracted in the theoretical synthesis of meaning must be 
carefully read from the horizon of the full temporal reality created by God.”242 
 
5.16 Religion and truth 
Our horizon of experience “is not a priori in the Kantian sense of non-empirical.”243 
We intuitively have to know about this horizon in order to be able to philosophically 
reflect on it. “It belongs implicitly to human experience in so far as it constitutes its a 
priori determining element. This implicit experience is only made explicit in the 
transcendental and in the radical religious self-reflection, of which the former is based 
upon the intuitive insight into the cosmic order of time.”244 In Dooyeweerd’s 
transcendental analysis of human experience the religious element plays a central role. 
“In a transcendent sense the horizon enclosing all human experience is formed by the 
communal structure of the religious root of human existence. Our selfhood which 
experiences, is under the law, is a subject, limited and determined by the law in its 
central religious sense.” Because we are creature we cannot detach our selfhood from 
our religious root. “According to the cosmic order of the creation all human 
experience is at bottom religiously determined, in either its direction to God or in 
apostate direction. In this sense we can speak of the necessary religious a priori of all 
human experience”. 
 
From this analysis Dooyeweerd develops a unique conception of truth. The classical 
and Thomistic definition of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei according to 
Dooyeweerd is not meaningless, but it is limited to the horizon of human experience. 
The fullness of meaning of truth “cannot be understood from the absolutized (and 
therefore misinterpreted) theoretical-synthetical horizon.” Instead, the religious 
fullness of Truth liberates the human horizon. “The transcendent, religious fullness of 
Truth, which alone makes all truth within the temporal horizon possible, does not 
concern an abstract theoretical function of thought. It is concerned with our full 
selfhood, with the hearth of the whole of human existence, consequently also the 
centre of our theoretical thought.”245 On this basis Dooyeweerd gives a definition of 
truth according to its transcendental a priori dimension: truth is “the accordance 
between the subjective a priori knowledge enclosed by the temporal horizon, as 
expressed in a priori judgements, and the a priori structural laws of human 
experience within this temporal horizon.”246 Human experience is open to the 
transcendent fullness of Truth. Therefore, the guarantee for truth is not subjective, nor 
is it self-sufficient. As previously stated, theoretical truth (i.e. philosophy and science) 
according to Dooyeweerd is limited and relativized by the temporal horizon, but also 
“in every respect dependent on the full super-temporal Truth”, because “[w]e cannot 
truthfully know the cosmos outside of the true knowledge of God.”247 Nevertheless, 
our subjective epistemological insight is fallible, because we can misinterpret the a 
priori horizon of experience.248  
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5.17 Dialogue and antithesis 
In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy there is both an element of dialogue and antithesis.249 As 
the general structure of the theoretical attitude is the same for everyone a 
philosophical dialogue is possible. However, there is also an antithesis between 
thinkers that start from a different ground-motive. In order to let a real philosophical 
dialogue take place, Dooyeweerd’s looks for clarity about the pre-theoretical 
prejudices of every philosophy. 
 
According to Dooyeweerd an “intrinsically re-formed Christian philosophy” should 
not break off contact with immanence-philosophy. It is precisely because of its 
“radical-critical standpoint” that Christian philosophy is “enabled to enter into the 
most inward contact with immanence-philosophy.”250 The community of thought is 
endangered by religious pre-suppositions that are regarded as ‘axioms’ that need to be 
accepted before being enabled to enter philosophical discussion. This is philosophical 
dogmatism.251 
 
One can argue that the proposition “2 x 2 = 4” is true for both Christian and non-
Christian. According to Dooyeweerd however, this proposition is a “partial truth” that 
is not “true in itself”, but only in the context of logical laws and laws of thought that 
can only exist in the order of a totality of meaning. Immanence philosophy of course 
can discover temporal laws and structural states of affairs that should not be denied, 
but a theoretical interpretation always needs to take place regarding the totality of 
meaning.252 “Philosophical discussion about the theoretical judgments is to be based 
on the undeniable states of affairs in the structures of theoretical thought and of 
empirical reality which precede all theoretical interpretation (…). They are to be 
confronted with the different philosophical views in order to investigate whether these 
views, each from their own super-theoretical starting-point, are able to account for 
them in a satisfactory way.”253 Dooyeweerd thus suggest a kind of philosophical 
competition concerning the explanatory power of different philosophical systems, 
based on the same empirical data. The theoretical judgments have to be distinguished 
from the pre-theoretical prejudices. “Philosophical discussion is possible between 
schools which do not have the same starting-point, if, and only if, a sharp distinction 
is made between authentic theoretical judgments (concerning which philosophic 
discussion is possible) and the necessary pre-theoretical prejudices which lie at the 
foundation of such theoretical judgements.”254 
 
Finally, a Christian philosophy is characterized by humility and modesty. This cannot 
go without self-knowledge, as has been sketched above. Dooyeweerd writes in the 
foreword to his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought: “I wish to repudiate any self-
satisfied scientific attitude in confronting immanence-philosophy. The detailed 
criticism of the Humanistic immanence-philosophy in [this work], must be understood 
as self-criticism, as a case which the Christian thinker pleads with himself. Unless this 
fact is understood, the intention of this philosophy has not been comprehended.”255 
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The radical antithesis between Christian philosophy and immanence philosophy runs 
through the hearth of the philosopher. The antithesis is not a “line of personal 
classification”; it is “a division according to fundamental principles in the world, a 
line of division which passes transversely through the existence of every Christian 
personality.”256 This is what Kuyper meant with it. Dooyeweerd writes: “I should not 
judge immanence-philosophy so sharply were it not that I myself have gone through 
it, and have personally experienced its problems. I should not pass such a sharp 
judgment on the attempts at antithesis between non-Christian philosophy and the 
Christian truths of faith, had I not lived through the inner tension between the two and 
personally wrestled through the attempts at synthesis.”257 A radical self-critique is 
needed for everyone who engages in philosophical inquiry.258 
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6 Alvin Plantinga 
 
 
The most well-known contemporary philosopher in the Reformed tradition is Alvin 
Plantinga. In this chapter some main lines of his philosophy will be sketched. Special 
attention will be paid to Plantinga’s conception of philosophy and rationality. 
However, first a short introduction to the philosophical legacy of neo-Calvinism in 
North-America will be given. 
 
6.1 Neo-Calvinistic philosophical influences in North-America 
In order to understand the historical philosophical connection between Herman 
Dooyeweerd and Alvin Plantinga, it is necessary to give a short introduction to the 
neo-Calvinistic influence in North-America and to American (church) history. Neo-
Calvinism originally was a Dutch movement, but it spread across the world. It 
specifically flourished in North America.259 Two main lines of influence can be 
distinguished. The first is the influence of Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck. 
The second line of influence is through the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd. 
 
In 1857, Dutch immigrants founded the Christian Reformed Church (CRC) in 
Michigan, a church with a Kuyperian spirit. The CRC is the American counterpart of 
the Reformed Churches (Gereformeerde Kerken) in the Netherlands, founded by 
Kuyper.260 The CRC has developed from the Dutch immigrants that left Holland after 
the Succession (Afscheiding) of 1834. Another wave of immigrants arrived after 
WWII.261 Among these immigrants were the (Frisian) parents of Alvin Plantinga 
(born 1932). In 1876, the CRC founded Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan. 
This college originally was a theological school, but in 1894 it also became a liberal 
arts college. There were and are many Kuyperians and Dooyeweerdians among the 
faculty. For some Dooyeweerd’s philosophy has got a more or less ‘canonical’ status, 
but there are also other ‘schools’ that are very critical about the Dooyeweerdians. 
 
Another bastion of Kuyperian thought in the United States was Princeton Theological 
Seminary, with theologians like B.B. Warfield (1851-1921) and Geerhardus Vos 
(1862-1949). In 1898, Kuyper presented his famous Stone Lectures at Princeton. A 
student of Warfield was the Dutch-American theologian and philosopher Cornelius 
van Til (1895-1987), who was also influenced by Kuyper and an ally of Dooyeweerd. 
Conservative Kuyperian theologians left Princeton in 1929 and founded Westminster 
Theological Seminary. 
 
Besides Kuyper’s influence in philosophy through Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven and 
Stoker, there was a line of influence through W.H. Jellema, who significantly 
influenced Plantinga. The philosopher William Harry Jellema (1893-1982) was the 
founder of Calvin College’s philosophy department. He was profoundly influenced by 
Kuyper. Calvin college developed to an important centre for philosophy. Four of its 
alumni became president of the American Philosophical Association, which is very 
much an honour for a philosopher in the United States: Oets K. Bouwsma (1898-
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1978), William K. Frankena (1908-1994), Nicholas Wolterstorff and Alvin 
Plantinga.262 Other influential philosophers at Calvin College were Henry Stob (1908-
1996) and H. Evan Runner (1916-2002). Stob was a student of Jellema. Runner was a 
student of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven.263 His characteristic Kuyperian statement 
was “Life is religion”, i.e. there is no ‘neutral’ terrain. Plantinga and Wolterstorff 
were students of Jellema, Stob and Runner. 
 
Other important Reformed colleges were founded, that are centres for the study of the 
neo-Calvinistic philosophical legacy: Dordt College (Iowa, 1955) and Trinity 
Christian College (Illinois, 1959) in the United States and The King’s University 
College (Edmonton, 1979) and Redeemer University College (Ontario, 1982) in 
Canada. 
 
In 1956, the Association for Reformed Scientific Studies (ARSS) was founded by 
Dutch immigrants in Ontario, Canada. In 1967, the ARSS changed its name in 
Association for the Advancement of Christian Scholarship (AACS) and founded the 
Institute for Christian Studies (ICS) in Toronto, Canada. Runner was one of the 
driving forces. The ICS became a centre for the study of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. 
There are close connection with the Free University in Amsterdam and a lot of ICS’s 
faculty have earned their PhD’s in Amsterdam. 
 
The contemporary ‘Dutch’ Reformed philosophy in North America can be 
distinguished in three varieties.264 The first variety consists of (mainly) philosophers 
and theologians working in the legacy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, the neo-
Calvinistic philosophy of the cosmonomic idea. The main lines of this philosophy 
have been set out in the previous chapter of this book. Representatives of this line are, 
among others: Bernard Zylstra (philosopher, 1934-1986), Calvin S. Seerveld 
(aesthete), Peter J. Steen (theologian, 1935-1984), Gordon Spykman (theologian, 
1926-1993), Hendrik Hart (philosopher), Arnold de Graaff (psychologist), Roy 
Clouser (philosopher), James H. Olthuis (philosopher/psychotherapist), Lambert P. 
Zuidervaart (philosopher) and Albert M. Wolters (philosopher/classicist).265 Most of 
these men earned their PhD’s at the Free University of Amsterdam. 
 
The second variety is the ‘presuppositionalism’ or ‘(Reformed) transcendentalism’ of 
Cornelius van Til (1895-1987) and his students. Van Til was heavily influenced by 
Herman Dooyeweerd, Dirk Vollenhoven, Abraham Kuyper and, especially, Herman 
Bavinck.266 He was an editor (1936-1977) of the journal Philosophia Reformata. 
Presuppositionalism claims, shortly stated, that (knowledge of) the existence of God is 
the transcendental condition of any knowledge, but also of any communication. If we 
take Kant – the key Western epistemologist – seriously, we cannot know anything or 
                                               
262 Richard J. Mouw, ‘Dutch Calvinist Philosophical Influences in North America’, Calvin Theological 
Journal 24 (1989), No. 1, 93-120: p. 95. 
263 Henry Vander Goot, Life is Religion. Essays in Honor of H. Evan Runner, St. Catharines: Paideia 
Press 1981. 
264 Thomas K. Johnson, ‘Dutch Reformed Philosophy in North America: Three Varieties in the Late 
Twentieth Century’, MBS Texte 81 (2007).  
265 Peter Steen, The Structure of Dooyeweerd’s Thought, Toronto: Wedge Publication Foundation 
1983; Roy Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of Religious 
Beliefs, University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame 1991; Roy Clouser, Knowing with the Heart: 
Religious  Experience and Belief in God, Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press 1999. 
266 Cf. Herman Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation, Grand Rapids: Baker 1979, Ch. 3. 
 63 
communicate about it, according to Van Til. Instead, Van Til claims that the human 
noetic structure and the structure of the world (creation) are correlated. Knowledge is 
not a construction of the human mind, but analogical thinking (i.e. thinking after 
God), even for atheists.267 Students of Van Til are the philosophers and theologians 
Francis Schaeffer (1912-1984), Rousas J. Rushdoony (1916-2001), Greg L. Bahnsen 
(1948-1995), K. Scott Oliphant and John M. Frame. I will not explore this variety any 
further, in the first place because I have to limit myself, but also because Van Til’s 
thought, although of philosophical significance, is more theological than philosophical 
in nature. 
 
The third variety is the (New) Reformed Epistemology, with Alvin Plantinga and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff as its main representatives. Other representatives are Ronald H. 
Nash (1936-2006), Dewey J. Hoitenga and William P. Alston. This perspective will 
be discussed below on the basis of the work of Alvin Plantinga. 
 
6.2 God’s philosopher 
In the spring of 1980, Time magazine reported: “In a quiet revolution in thought and 
arguments that hardly anyone could have foreseen only two decades ago, God is 
making a comeback. Most intriguingly, this is happening not among theologians or 
ordinary believers (…) but in the crisp, intellectual circles of academic philosophers, 
where the consensus had long banished the Almighty from fruitful discourse. Now it 
is more respectable among philosophers than it has been for a generation to talk about 
the possibility of God’s existence.”268 The most prominent of the ‘revolutionaries’ are 
philosophers like William Alston, Richard Swinburne, George Mavrodes and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff. The leader of this revolution however is the metaphysician, 
epistemologist and philosopher of religion Alvin Plantinga.269 Plantinga was labelled 
by Time magazine “the world’s leading Protestant philosopher of God”. An important 
event in this ‘revolution’ was the formation of the Society of Christian Philosophers 
(1978). The Society, with its journal Faith and Philosophy, has about 1000 members 
(being 10% of the North-American professional philosophers). Plantinga’s work to a 
certain extent changed the intellectual climate in the United States by making theistic 
belief a serious position in philosophical debate again. The interesting thing is that 
Plantinga succeeds in restating thoughts of Augustine and Calvin in the language of 
contemporary philosophy.270 He also knows the work of Dooyeweerd very well. His 
first serious article was about Dooyeweerd.271 
 
Plantinga has the honour to occupy two entrances (‘alvinize’ and ‘planting’) in Daniel 
Dennett’s Philosophical Lexicon, a humorous dictionary coined from the names of 
philosophers:  
 
alvinize, v. To stimulate protracted discussion by making a bizarre claim. “His contention 
that natural evil is due to Satanic agency alvinized his listeners.”  
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planting, v. To use twentieth-century fertilizer to encourage new shoots from eleventh-
century ideas which everyone thought had gone to seed; hence plantinger, n. one who 
plantings.272 
 
Plantinga has written about a wide range of topics in the Anglo-American analytical 
tradition in philosophy. In discussing his work I will have to substantially limit 
myself, not only because of the limited amount of space in this book, but especially 
because some of these topics go far beyond my competence, such as those requiring 
advanced knowledge about the metaphysics of modality and modal logic, introducing 
the categories of possibility and necessity.273 I will discuss the topics that are most 
relevant in reformed epistemology, namely properly basic and warranted belief, 
properly functioning cognitive faculties and natural theology. I will not extensively 
discuss Plantinga’s thoughts about possible worlds, the nature of necessity, the free 
will defense, the evolutionary argument against naturalism, Quine/Duhem-issues and 
– last but not least – the problem of evil. I am convinced however that the issues I do 
discuss are sufficient for the objectives of this book. 
 
6.3 Intellectual influences 
No need to say that Plantinga, through his environment and teachers, was influenced 
by Augustine, Calvin, Kuyper and Dooyeweerd. Two other interesting sources for 
Plantinga’s thought can be mentioned here: the American Calvinist and puritan 
theologian and revivalist Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) and the Scottish puritan and 
‘common sense’ philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796).  
 
Leaving the general intellectual influences now, I want to investigate into more detail 
what Plantinga – following his own words – learned from his teachers and colleague’s 
during the philosophical journey that lead him from the philosophy department of 
Harvard (1950) to that of Calvin College (1951), Michigan (1954), Yale (1955), 
Wayne (1958), again to Calvin College (1963) and finally to the University of Notre 
Dame (1982), where he will ‘retire’ in may 2010 and be followed up by Robert Audi 
as the John E. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy. He gives a clear insight in his 
intellectual development in a ‘self-profile’ he has written for a book that is devoted to 
his work.274 This insight is important, because it shows, in my opinion, what 
according to Plantinga is at stake when philosophizing and what his philosophical 
intentions are. 
 
Plantinga started his philosophy studies at Harvard. Among others, he followed 
classes in logic from W.V.O. Quine. However, in the second semester, after following 
some classes at Calvin College during Harvard’s spring recess, he moved to the small 
college in Michigan. There was one special reason for this rather unusual move: the 
philosophy professor William Harry Jellema. Jellema was, according to Plantinga, “by 
all odds, I think, the most gifted teacher of philosophy I have ever encountered.” He 
“lectured in magisterial style, with the entire history of Western philosophy obviously 
at his fingerips.” Plantinga writes: “I found Jellema so impressive that I decided then 
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and there to leave Harvard, return to Calvin, and study philosophy with him. That was 
a decision I have never regretted; and Calvin College has been perhaps the major 
intellectual influence in my life.”275 Besides Jellema there was Henry Stob, “a gifted 
and powerful teacher in philosophy in his own right”.276 
 
What did Plantinga learn from Jellema and Stob? The most important thing is that 
“serious intellectual work and religious allegiance (…) are inevitably intertwined.”277 
Philosophy is not a neutral area, but “an arena for the articulation and interplay of 
commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in nature.”278 Religiously 
neutral intellectual endeavour does not exist, or rather “there is no such thing as 
serious substantial and relatively complete intellectual endeavour that is religiously 
neutral.” Plantinga endorses this claim, although he admits “it isn’t easy to see how to 
establish it, or how to develop and articulate it in detail.”279 For Jellema and Stob “the 
history of philosophy was at bottom an arena in which conflicting religious visions 
compete for human allegiance.”280 Plantinga learned from Jellema and Stob that 
philosophy was “a matter of the greatest moment”, because it was “both a struggle for 
man’s souls and a fundamental expression of basic religious motives.”281 
 
One of Stob’s characteristic statements is: “Let it be said that I share with Kuyper, 
Herman Dooyeweerd, Van Til, and many other Christian thinkers the view that all 
knowledge is embraced at its edges by an all-encompassing Weltanschauung. This 
means that all apprehension and reflection takes place within a global perspective in 
terms of which the data of experience are thought-molded and fitted into a frame.”282 
The second sentence is a noteworthy Kantian-Dooyeweerdian line of thought. It is this 
philosophical camp that Plantinga explicitly left. Instead of Kantian idealism he 
became a philosopher in the line of Platonic realism. Instead of the human subject his 
starting point is the real-existing and objectively knowable reality outside us. Stob 
continues: “I also agree that the shape of the philosophical perspective or totality-view 
is determined by what one regards or evaluates as crucially significant or most real. I 
further agree that this judgement and evaluation is made before the cognitive process 
properly begins. The point of view from which the world is surveyed is not 
theoretically determined: it is chosen. And, what is more, the choice reflects a 
religious decision. It is an echo of faith.”283 From this philosophical position with both 
Kuyperian and Kantian-Dooyeweerdian elements Plantinga only accepts the element 
of the fundamentally religious starting point. 
 
After Calvin College Plantinga moved to the University of Michigan were he studied 
with William P. Alston, Richard Cartwright and William K. Frankena. While studying 
at Yale’s philosophy department Plantinga noticed that in studying philosophy “it is 
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crucially important to remember that the philosopher in question was aiming to get at 
the truth about the matter”.284 Different philosophies are not just ‘interesting options’; 
one has to follow a thinker in his enterprise and examine the truth of what he says.  
 
After Michigan Plantinga went to Yale to earn his PhD. He discovered two problems 
there. The first was that “no one seemed prepared to show a neophyte philosopher 
how to go about the subject – what to do, how to think about a problem to some 
effect.” There was too much generality and too little attention to “the level of 
particularity at which most important philosophical work takes place.”285 The second 
problem, according to Plantinga, was that if anyone raised a philosophical question 
“the typical response would be to catalogue some of the various different answers the 
world has seen: there is the Aristotelian answer, the existentialist answer, the 
Cartesian answer, Heidegger’s answer, and so on; perhaps there would be a codicil as 
to what the Mahayana Buddhists thought about the matter.” Just like at Michigan, 
Plantinga however wanted to ask the most important question – in his opinion – 
namely: “What is the truth about this matter?” That question was often answered with 
disdain as “unduly naïve”. The philosophical answers that had been given were only 
regarded as “intellectual tidbits – glorified cocktail conversation”. According to 
Plantinga however, the great philosophers were not “trying to say something 
interesting or provocative or titillating; they were trying to tell the sober metaphysical 
truth.”286 
 
After Yale, Plantinga went to Wayne State University. There he learned “the 
importance of genuine clarity and rigor in the subject, and something about how to 
achieve them.” He learned about philosophical criticism: “Finding counterexamples, 
refuting arguments, detecting unacknowledged assumptions, discovering 
ambiguities”.287 One could say that Plantinga here learned how to do philosophy, i.e. 
how to do analytical philosophy. “Of course there is more to philosophy than 
counterexamples and criticism”, but “searching and powerful criticism, high standards 
for clarity, rigor, and argumentative cogency – these form a necessary condition of 
high philosophical endeavour and an excellent first step towards it.”288  
 
There was however another influence at Wayne regarding theism. Plantinga states: “I 
was never able to get beyond a sort of defensive posture. I concentrated at arguing 
(contrary to my colleague’s claims) that theism was not wholly irrational (…). I often 
felt beleaguered and, with respect to my Christianity, alone, isolated, non-standard, a 
bit peculiar or weird, a somewhat strange specimen in which my colleagues displayed 
an interest that was friendly, and for the most part uncensorious, but also incredulous 
and uncomprehending.” There was a heavily influence of logical positivism at 
American universities in those years. One can argue that this had a significant impact 
on Plantinga’s way of philosophizing. For example, the need for a negative 
apologetics – arguing that theism was not wholly irrational – tempered Plantinga’s 
clear interest in natural theology.289 Only later in his career he picked up this interest 
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again. “It wasn’t that this atmosphere induced doubt about the central elements of 
Christianity; it was more that my philosophical horizons where heavily formed by my 
colleagues and friends at Wayne.”290 
 
In 1963 Plantinga became Jellema’s successor at Calvin College. It was there that he 
published his first two important books: God and Other Minds (1967) and The Nature 
of Necessity (1974). 
 
6.4 Reformed epistemology 
The term ‘Reformed epistemology’ was first used by Plantinga in a paper read for the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1980.291 It is called so “because its 
advocates are self-consciously working in the Reformed tradition stemming from 
John Calvin.”292 Sometimes Plantinga simply speaks about ‘Calvinist 
epistemology’.293 The central Calvinian basis of this movement can be found in the 
following words of Calvin: “[The] conviction (…) that there is some God, is naturally 
inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow. (…) It is not a 
doctrine that must be learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from his 
mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no one to forget, although many strive 
with every nerve to this end.”294 The immediacy of our knowledge of God can be 
regarded as the central claim of the Reformed epistemologists. This theological 
doctrine has become a philosophical claim.295 
 
According to William P. Alston Reformed epistemology is the most prominent 
position in contemporary philosophy of religion.296 It has caused a whole library of 
literature.297 Reformed epistemologist could for the first time clearly be identified as a 
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group of philosophers when the book Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God 
(1983) appeared, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff.298  
 
Plantinga himself gives an excellent summary of his central article Reason and Belief 
in God that can also be regarded as a summary of his recent work in general. He 
writes: “I have argued that the evidentialist objection to theistic belief is rooted in 
classical foundationalism; the same can be said for the Thomistic conception of faith 
and reason. Classical foundationalism is attractive and seductive; in the final analyses, 
however, it turns out to be both false and self-referentially incoherent.” Evidentialism 
is the epistemological doctrine stating that a person who claims that God exists needs 
to deliver evidence for this thesis (which has not been done so far). Evidentialism is 
an application of classical foundationalism on religious beliefs. Classical 
foundationalism, dating back to Descartes and Locke, is the doctrine stating that a 
belief can only be knowledge when it is either ‘properly basic’, i.e. a starting point for 
thought, a fundamental proposition that doesn’t need any further argumentation 
(evident for the senses, self-evident or incorrigible), or when it is a proposition that is 
correctly based on basic beliefs. Thus, knowledge has a vertical structure: a 
foundation and a building based on it. Classical foundationalism however is regarded 
as ‘self-referentially inconsistent’ by Plantinga, because it demands evidence and 
argumentation for any belief, although it does not demand this for the foundation of 
this doctrine itself. Plantinga himself actually accepts foundationalism, but in a 
version that is focusing on what is a rational noetic structure. This version includes 
religious beliefs as properly basic (see par. 6.6 and 6.7).  
 
In God and Other Minds (1967) Plantinga shows that several standard proofs for the 
existence of God are not conclusive. He argues however that it is not irrational to 
belief in God, even without such proofs. His argument is quite simple – though 
formulated in advanced modal logic. No one can proof the existence of other minds 
(other people’s minds, other consciousnesses), but still no one thinks it is irrational to 
believe in their existence. The same is true for memory’s, testimony of others and 
moral principles. Therefore, Plantinga concludes: “If my belief in other minds is 
rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is 
the latter.”299 Belief in God and belief in other minds are “in the same epistemological 
boat”. There is no epistemological duty to prove the existence of God. 
 
Plantinga continues his summary of his article as follows: “Furthermore, the 
Reformed objection to natural theology, unformed and inchoate as it is, may best be 
seen as a rejection of classical foundationalism.” According to Plantinga, the 
Reformed theologians that rejected natural theology implicitly also rejected 
evidentialism concerning theistic belief.300 “As the Reformed thinker sees things, 
being self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses is not a necessary condition 
of proper basicality. He goes on to add that belief in God is properly basic.” As has 
been said, Plantinga includes religious beliefs in the domain of ‘proper basicality’. 
When belief in God is ‘properly basic’, the believer uses it as a starting point for his 
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thought. However, this does not mean that any belief, whatever irrational it may be, is 
properly basic. A Reformed thinker “is not thereby committed to the idea that just any 
or nearly any belief is properly basic, even if he lacks a criterion for proper basicality. 
Nor is he committed to the view that argument is irrelevant to belief in God if such 
belief is properly basic.” Plantinga has labeled the standard objection to this approach 
in epistemology the ‘Great Pumpkin Objection’, i.e. the vision that because of the 
possibility to leave religious basic beliefs unargued he also has to accept absurd 
beliefs like “the Great Pumpkin will return to the pumpkin patch tonight”.301 The 
proper basicality of a religious belief however is not an excuse to leave it unargued, 
according to Plantinga. It only means that religious belief cannot be rejected as 
properly basic in advance. “Furthermore, belief in God, like other properly basic 
beliefs, is not groundless or arbitrary; it is grounded in justification-conferring 
conditions. Finally, the Reformed view that belief in God is properly basic is not 
felicitously thought of as a version of fideism.”302 This summary is the program of 
Reformed epistemology in a nutshell. 
 
Plantinga distinguishes between the de jure and the de facto question about theistic 
belief. The first question is aimed at the warrant to accept theistic belief; the second 
question is aimed at the truth of theistic belief. The first question is an epistemological 
one, the second a metaphysical one.303 It is noteworthy, that Plantinga mostly 
discusses de jure questions, hardly the de facto one. For example, in his book 
Warranted Christian Belief he argues that, specifically, the Christian belief has 
warrant (de jure), however he does not discuss whether the Christian belief actually is 
true (de facto). 
 
6.5 Warrant 
Reformed epistemologists go beyond questions of justification, that take a central 
position in classical foundationalism and evidentialism. They turn toward (other) 
questions of “positive epistemic status”, like internal rationality and warrant.304 A 
doxatic response to evidence – i.e. experience, including moral experience, memory, 
self-knowledge etc. – is appropriate or right when the response you make is rational, 
i.e. healthy, sane, produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties.305 Plantinga 
has also extensively written about warrant, for example in his epistemological trilogy 
Warrant: The Current Debate (1993), Warrant and Proper Function (1993), and 
Warranted Christian Belief (2000).306 Warrant is “what separates knowledge from 
mere true belief.” A belief has warrant only “when it is produced by cognitive 
faculties that are functioning properly (…), in the sort of cognitive environment for 
which they have been designed.”307 Warrant has to be “produced by cognitive 
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faculties or believe-producing processes that are aimed at the production of true 
belief.”308 Finally, these faculties must be successfully aimed at that production, i.e. 
function properly, in the right environment. A belief that fulfils these conditions has 
warrant and can be called knowledge.309 The general discussion about warrant can 
especially be found in Warrant and Proper Function. According to Plantinga, his 
concept of warrant is naturalistic, i.e. it doesn’t presume any normativity that can’t 
also be found in the natural sciences. Furthermore, “naturalism in epistemology can 
flourish only in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics”, and there cannot be a 
good theory of warrant that is not “set in the context of a broadly theistic view of the 
nature of human beings.”310 Proper function cannot be explained by naturalistic means 
only.  
 
6.6 Warranted Christian Belief 
In his book Warranted Christian Belief, often regarded as Plantinga’s magnum opus, 
he restates orthodox Reformed theology into the language of contemporary 
epistemology. Different from the other volumes of his trilogy this book is specifically 
aimed at the warrant of Christian theism. According to Plantinga, “a belief has 
warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties 
functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is 
appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is 
successfully aimed at truth.”311 From this general statement Plantinga makes an 
interesting move, claiming that “here we see the ontological or metaphysical or 
ultimately religious roots of the question as to the rationality or warrant or lack 
thereof for belief in God. What you properly take to be rational, at least in the sense of 
warranted, depends of what sort of metaphysical and religious stance you adopt.” 
Plantinga specifies this claim as follows: “It depends on what kind of beings you think 
human beings are, what sorts of beliefs you think their noetic faculties produce when 
they are functioning properly, and which of their faculties or cognitive mechanisms 
are aimed at truth.” The conclusion is that “the dispute as to whether theistic belief is 
rational (warranted) can’t be settled just by attending to epistemological 
considerations; it is at bottom not merely an epistemological dispute, but an 
ontological or theological dispute.”312 
 
Plantinga constructs an “Aquinas-Calvin model” of theistic belief formation. He 
describes the model as follows: “[T]here is a kind of faculty or a cognitive 
mechanism, what Calvin calls a sensus divinitatis or sense of divinity, which in a wide 
variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God. These circumstances, we 
might say, trigger the disposition to form beliefs in question; they form the occasion 
on which those beliefs arise.” Is seems that Plantinga understands the sensus 
divinitatis not so much as an actual perception of God, but as a faculty or disposition 
to know God, i.e. to have the belief that God exists. Plantinga shows himself a good 
student of Calvin when he continues: “Under these circumstances we develop or form 
theistic beliefs – or rather, these beliefs are formed in us; in the typical case we don’t 
consciously choose to have those beliefs. Instead, we find ourselves with them, just as 
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we find ourselves with perceptual and memory beliefs.”313 An essential part of this 
model is the divine design and creation of the cognitive faculties: “[T]he design plan 
(…) is a design plan in the literal and paradigmatic sense. It is a blueprint or plan for 
our ways of functioning, and it has been developed and instituted by a conscious, 
intelligent agent.” Then Plantinga connects his notion of the design plan with the 
Calvinian concept of the sensus divinitatis: “The purpose of the sensus divinitatis is to 
enable us to have true beliefs about God; when it functions properly, it ordinarily does 
produce true beliefs about God. These beliefs therefore meet the conditions for 
warrant; if the beliefs produced are strong enough, then they constitute knowledge.”314 
A noteworthy account of proper functioning in Plantinga’s epistemology is that our 
cognitive faculties function properly when they function according to God’s design 
plan. 
 
On this basis Plantinga then develops an “extended Aquinas-Calvin model”. This 
model is extended to cover not only theistic belief in general, but specifically 
Christian belief.315 It includes both the noetic effects of sin – both affective and 
cognitive – and salvation. The model “adds that we human beings have fallen into sin, 
a calamitous condition from which we require salvation – a salvation we are unable to 
accomplish by our own efforts (…). Our fall into sin has had cataclysmic 
consequences, both affective and cognitive.” First the affective consequences: “our 
affections are skewed and our hearts now harbor deep and radical evil: we love 
ourselves above all, rather than God.” Regarding the cognitive consequences 
Plantinga writes: “Our original knowledge of God and of his marvelous beauty, glory, 
and loveliness has been severely compromised (…). In particular, the sensus 
divinitatis has been damaged and deformed (…). Still further, sin induces in us a 
resistance to the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis, muted as they are by the first 
factor; we don’t want to pay attention to its deliverances.” After this sketch of the 
affective and cognitive consequences of sin Plantinga shows a way out: “We are 
unable by our own efforts to extricate ourselves from this quagmire; God himself, 
however, has provided a remedy for sin and its ruinous effects (…). This remedy is 
made available in the life, atoning, suffering and death, and resurrection of his divine 
Son, Jesus Christ. Salvation involves among other things rebirth and regeneration, a 
process (beginning in the present life and reaching fruition in the next) that involves a 
restoration and repair of the image of God in us.”316 It is interesting to note how 
Plantinga connects the religious act of faith with the proper functioning of men’s 
cognitive faculties and a repair of our cognitive disfunctioning through sin.  
 
According to Plantinga the possibility of salvation is communicated in two ways: 
through God-inspired Scripture and through the Holy Spirit. “A principal work of the 
Holy Spirit with respect to us human beings is the gift of faith (…). By virtue of the 
internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, we come to see the truth of the central Christian 
affirmations. Now faith is not just a cognitive affair (…). [I]t is a repair of the 
madness of the will that is at the heart of sin. Still, it is at least a cognitive matter. In 
giving us faith, the Holy Spirit enables us to see the truth of the main lines of the 
Christian gospel as set forth in Scripture (…).” Finally Plantinga connects these 
thoughts with his prior thoughts about warranted beliefs, stating that “the beliefs thus 
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produced in us meet the conditions necessary and sufficient for warrant; they are 
produced by cognitive processes functioning properly (in accord with their design 
plan) in an appropriate epistemic environment (…) according to a design plan 
successfully aimed at truth; if they are held with sufficient firmness, these beliefs 
quality as knowledge (…).”317According to this extended Aquinas-Calvin model the 
“central truths of the Gospel are self-authenticating”, i.e. no other propositions are 
needed as evidence or warrant in order to belief these truths.318 Possible defeaters of 
our belief can be defeated themselves through the power of the warrant produced by 
the sensus divinitatis and the testimony of the Holy Spirit. 
 
6.7 Philosophy 
Compared to Dooyeweerd Plantinga has written not much about philosophy as a 
discipline. In the foreword to God, Nature and Evil he loosely speaks about 
“[p]hilosophical reflection (which is not much different from just thinking hard)”. As 
far as I have discovered, this is the only place in his books. The most explicit 
discussion about philosophy can be found in two of his articles: Augustinian Christian 
Philosophy (1992) and Advice to Christian Philosophers (1984), in a response to an 
article about his philosophy and in a couple of interviews.319  
 
In Advice to Christian Philosophers, delivered as the author’s inaugural address as a 
professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame (1983), Plantinga gives a 
first description of his conception of philosophy. He writes: ““Philosophy,” as Hegel 
once exclaimed in a rare fit of lucidity, “is thinking things over.” Philosophy is in 
large part a clarification, systematization, articulation, relating and deepening of pre-
philosophical opinion.” Philosophy is analysis (clarification, systematization, 
articulation). This can roughly be regarded as the method of the Anglo-American 
tradition of analytical philosophy. In the words of Wittgenstein philosophy is an 
activity that aims at the “logical clarification of thoughts”.320 Plantinga goes one step 
further: “We come to philosophy with a range of opinions about the world and 
humankind and the place of the latter in the former; and in philosophy we think about 
these matters, systematically articulate our views, put together and relate our views on 
diverse topics, and deepen our views by finding unexpected interconnections and by 
discovering and answering unanticipated questions. Of course we may come to 
change our minds by virtue of philosophical endeavour; we may discover 
incompatibilities or other infelicities. But we come to philosophy with pre-
philosophical opinions; we can do no other.”321 Philosophy is closely connected to 
and preceded by pre-philosophical opinion. This is an important element in 
Plantinga’s thought, because of his conception of belief as ‘properly basic’. He 
continues: “[T]he Christian has as much right to his pre-philosophical opinions, as 
others have to theirs. He needn’t try first to ‘prove’ them from propositions accepted 
by, say, the bulk of the non-Christian philosophical community; and if they are widely 
rejected as naive, or pre-scientific, or primitive, or unworthy of “man come of age,” 
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that is nothing whatever against them.” That does not mean that there is given room to 
all beliefs, whatever irrational they may be. “Of course if there were genuine and 
substantial arguments against them from premises that have some legitimate claim on 
the Christian philosopher, then he would have a problem; he would have to make 
some kind of change somewhere. But in the absence of such arguments – and the 
absence of such arguments is evident – the Christian philosophical community, quite 
properly starts, in philosophy, from what it believes.”322 
 
Because no one can philosophize without pre-philosophical opinions, a Christian 
philosopher cannot do so without his Christian beliefs. He also legitimately enters 
philosophy with his beliefs. Philosophy is indeed an arena for our ‘commitments’, as 
Plantinga writes: “Philosophy is many things. I said earlier that it is a matter of 
systematizing, developing and deepening one’s pre-philosophical opinions. It is that; 
but it is also an arena for the articulation and interplay of commitments and 
allegiances fundamentally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep and 
fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing ourselves and the world and God. Among 
its most important and pressing projects are systematizing, deepening, exploring, 
articulating this perspective, and exploring its bearing on the rest of what we think and 
do.”323 Philosophy is analysis (clarification, systematization, articulation), that is also 
closely connected to and preceded by pre-philosophical opinion. 
 
It is noteworthy that Plantinga almost always speaks of a ‘Christian philosopher’, not 
for example of a ‘Reformed philosopher’ or a ‘Calvinistic Philosopher’. On some 
occasions he speaks of ‘theistic philosophy’. When writing about belief in God he 
writes about God as he is conceived in the “Hebrew-Christian tradition” or about God 
as he is conceived in traditional Christianity, Judaism, and Islam: “an almighty, all-
knowing wholly good and living person who has created the world and presently 
upholds it in being.”324 These differences sometimes are relevant, for example, when 
Plantinga is trying to argue for the rationality of belief in God – in general theistic 
sense – or specifically, for the Christian God as he is conceived in the Reformed 
tradition. 
 
6.8 Christian philosophy 
According to Plantinga, a Christian philosopher will consider all the philosophical 
problems that exist. He – or ‘she’, as Plantinga prefers – will sometimes appeal to 
what she knows or beliefs as a Christian and she is fully justified in doing so. “She is 
under no obligation to appeal only to beliefs shared by nearly everyone – what 
common sense and contemporary science dictate, for example. Nor is she obliged first 
to try to prove to the satisfaction of other philosophers that Christianity is true before 
setting out on this enterprise of Christian philosophy. Instead, she is entirely within 
her rights in starting from het Christian beliefs in addressing the philosophical 
problems in question.”325 This does not mean however that Christian faith itself 
defines what is truth in a specific inquiry, because “Christianity does not contain a 
                                               
322 Plantinga, ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’, p. 267-268. 
323 Plantinga, ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’, p. 271. 
324 Plantinga, God and Other Minds, p. xv; Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reformed Epistemology’, in: Philip L. 
Quinn & Charles Taliferro, A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Malden/Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers 2000, 383-389: p. 385. 
325 Plantinga, ‘On Christian philosophy’, p. 618. 
 74 
philosophical account of truth”.326 Neither does it mean that Christian philosophers 
have the aim to reject any belief, procedure or technique that is used by non-
Christians.327 “Where the Christian philosopher will want to differ from her non-
Christian counterpart is with respect to assumptions that guide philosophical inquiry, 
where those assumptions run counter to Christianity – are either directly inconsistent 
with some tenet of Christianity, or inconsistent with some broader set of propositions 
that includes both tenets of Christianity and other propositions that seem very 
probable.”328 A Christian philosopher, according to Plantinga, will not for example 
reduce mind states to only material processes or belief that properties or states of 
affairs only exist when they’re thought of by human minds or belief that love, 
morality or beauty can only be understood in evolutionary terms.329 Finally, “[A] 
Christian philosopher is first of all a Christian and only secondarily a philosopher. Her 
philosophy is her specific way of working out her vocation as a Christian (…).”330 
 
6.9 Augustinian Christian Philosophy 
In the article Augustinian Christian Philosophy Plantinga wants to “make a suggestion 
as to how we should think about Christian philosophy now; but this way of thinking 
of the matter grows out of Augustinian roots.”331 According to Plantinga “there are at 
present three main competitors vying for spiritual supremacy in the West: three 
fundamental perspectives or ways of thought about what the world is like, what we 
ourselves are like, what is most important about the world, what our place in it is, and 
what we must do to live the good life.” These three dominant Weltanschauungen or 
world views of our time are perennial naturalism, creative antirealism and Christian 
theism. Perennial naturalism, ranging form Epicurus and Democritus to Russell and 
Quine, claims that there is only nature, i.e. there is no reality outside natural (material) 
reality; morality, faith and aesthetics can be reduced to material states and only 
‘scientific’ knowledge is true knowledge. Creative antirealism (with its attendant 
relativism) views humans as ‘architects of the universe’. It can also be called 
Enlightenment humanism or subjectivism. Antirealism breeds relativism and nihilism.  
 
These perspectives – explicitly or implicitly – play a central role in all of Plantinga’s 
work. Regarding the three world views he writes that “it is wholly clear that 
philosophy is not neutral with respect to the struggle between these three 
Weltanschauungen. Indeed, from one point of view, philosophy just is at bottom an 
effort to understand the world and ourselves from the vantage point or perspective of 
one or another of these ways of looking at the world.” There is no philosophy without 
a world view, nor is philosophy neutral concerning world views, because it springs 
itself from a world view. Plantinga goed one step further: “Philosophy – philosophy 
that is clear and deep at any rate – is fundamentally an effort to work out the 
implications of a world view – one of these or another – with respect to the sorts of 
questions philosophers ask and answer. This is what philosophers do, though with 
varying degrees of selfconsciousness and clarity.” What is the consequence of this? 
“Vast stretches of contemporary philosophy, therefore, will have spiritual or religious 
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roots – and spiritual and religious fruits.”332 Plantinga himself draws the unavoidable 
historical lines when, in another article, he states that an idea of Augustine “flowered 
much later in the work of Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, Harry Jellema and others: 
scholarship, intellectual endeavor, science in the sense of Wetenschap is inevitably 
involved in these perspectives. Intellectual activity has religious roots.”333 
 
Christian philosophy has four tasks. The first is philosophical theology: reflecting on 
the Christian teaching and dogma’s (God, man, incarnation, reconciliation etc.). The 
second is apologetics, to be distinguished in positive and negative apologetics: 
developing arguments in favour of the Christian faith and defending the faith against 
intellectual attacks. The third is positive Christian philosophy: thinking about 
philosophical questions from a Christian point of view. The fourth is Christian 
philosophical criticism. Here the Augustinian element emerges most clearly.  
 
Plantinga adopts the Augustinian distinction between two opposing forces in human 
history, namely the City of God (Civitas Dei) and the Earthly City or City of the 
World (Civitas Mundi). As I sketched earlier, Abraham Kuyper called this distinction 
an antithesis between belief and unbelief. Plantinga writes: “Augustine and Kuyper 
are right; and the contemporary Western intellectual world, like the worlds of their 
times, is a battleground or arena in which rages a battle for men’s souls.”334 Christian 
philosophers have to battle against naturalism, subjectivism, nihilism and relativism. 
In this battles “the Christian philosophical community has its own agenda; it need not 
and should not automatically take its projects from the list of those currently in favor 
at the leading contemporary centers of philosophy.”335 
 
6.10 Philosophy and theology 
Plantinga distinguishes the Augustinian approach to philosophy from the Thomist 
one.336 Thomists think that philosophy (like other non-theological sciences) is the 
province of natural reason, unaided by faith or special revelation. When a scholar 
starts from what he knows by faith, the result will be theology. In Plantinga’s words: 
“Theology in, theology out, as the computer literati say.”337 In the Augustinian 
approach the fundamentally religious nature of philosophical activity is recognized.  
 
There is no neutral domain for the natural reason, not in theology, not in philosophy, 
not in any science. Therefore a fundamental difference between theology and 
philosophy does not exist. In an interview Plantinga makes this clear. First he sketches 
the position of theistic philosophy: “We think of theistic philosophy as asking 
questions that philosophers think about and then asking, ‘How should we think about 
this area from the perspective of theism? Given that I believe in God, how should I 
think about the past, or mathematics, causality or whatever?’ When you start to think 
philosophically about some topic, of course, you always start by assuming a number 
of things in that inquiry. So you might take God’s existence for granted in asking 
about causality or about whether materialism with respect to human beings is true. 
And very often you’ll wind up with some interesting things, things you might not 
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have thought of at all, otherwise.” When the interviewer asks him “And how would 
that be different from theology?” he answers: “Well, I would say that there isn’t any – 
in principle – difference between theology and philosophy. It’s rather that theology 
addresses one set of questions and philosophy addresses another set of questions, 
[such as] the nature of causality, or the nature of numbers or the nature of time. 
Theologians don’t typically ask those questions; they ask questions more directly 
about the nature of God and about what the Bible teaches. But, as I say, there’s no 
difference in principle between Christian philosophy and theology.”338 (I will 
explicate my position on this point in par. 8.3.) 
 
It is noteworthy that Plantinga wants to use the same analytical methodology in both 
philosophy and theology. Modal logic is of a central importance for his way of 
philosophizing. He writes: “I think, that a working knowledge of these modal matters 
is absolutely essential to clear thinking on most philosophical topics; nearly all 
philosophical topics, if pushed far enough, wind up crucially involving matters of 
modality. What is less obvious but equally true is that the same goes for theology; a 
certain amount of modal logic and of the lore and distinctions that go with it is 
essential for decent work on many of the main topics of theology.”339 An interesting 
application of this methodology can be found in Plantinga’s book God, Freedom, and 
Evil (1974) in which he discusses the claim that the existence of a good, omnipotent 
and all-knowing God can not go together with the existence of evil in the world.340 
Using modal logic he shows that this claim is not sustainable. In The Nature of 
Necessity (1974) Plantinga also discusses, at a more technical level, the ‘metaphysics 
of freedom’ in connection with evil and God’s being omnipotent, omniscient and 
wholly good (chapter 9) and the ontological argument concerning the necessary 
existence of God (chapter 10).341 Another interesting application is his lecture Does 
God Have a Nature? (1980), which will be discussed below. 
 
6.11 Metaphysics 
In apparent deviation from the mainstream of the Reformed tradition Plantinga is 
involved with metaphysics, especially in the aforementioned books (this point will be 
further discussed in the next chapter). In his lecture Does God Have a Nature? 
Plantinga discusses the possibility of knowledge of God.342 According to Plantinga a 
lot of theologians and philosophers after Kant – including Dooyeweerd, I suppose – 
have said that our concepts do not apply to God because God transcends human 
experience. However, the person who uses this argument supposes to know first, that 
God transcends human experience, and second, what it is to transcend human 
experience. Even the concept “being such that none of our concepts applies to it” is a 
concept that – apparently – applies to God.343 Plantinga quite strongly reacts against 
the post-Kantian line of thought: “This way of thinking begins in a pious and 
commendable concern for God’s greatness and majesty and augustness; but it ends in 
agnosticism and in incoherence.” Plantinga does not want to follow Kant in his 
distinction between the Ding an Sich (the noumenal) and the realm of appearances. 
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According to Kant, when we try to transcend our ‘temporal horizon’ we fall victim to 
Tranzendentaler Schein. This is also the distinction made by the (post-Kantian) 
theologian Gordon D. Kaufman who distinguishes between God as “the real referent” 
and God as “the available referent”.344 According to Plantinga however this leads to 
incoherence and absurdity, because “if none of our concepts apply to God, then there 
is nothing we know or truly believe of him – not even what is affirmed in the creeds 
or affirmed in the Scriptures. And if there is nothing we can know or truly believe of 
him, then, of course, we cannot know or truly believe that none of our concepts apply 
to him. The view that our concepts don’t apply to God is fatally ensnarled in self-
referential absurdity.”345 
According to Plantinga God has a nature that is not identical with him. He has at least 
the following properties: he does not know that he does not exist, he has existence 
essentially, he cannot fail to exist, he has necessary existence and he is such that he 
exists in every possible world. Actually, as Plantinga shows, the question whether 
God has a nature is the same as whether there are any necessary truths. Plantinga goes 
even further when stating that “each possible world is such that God affirms its 
existence” and “exploring the realm of abstract objects can be seen as exploring the 
nature of God” and “each theorem of logic (…) is such that affirming it is part of 
God’s nature.”346 When we regard a proposition A equivalent to B we actually regard 
God’s nature such as believing both A and B or neither A nor B.347 
 
According to Plantinga we cannot know how God knows, although there are analogies 
and similarities between God’s knowledge and ours. Still, we know “that his 
knowledge doesn’t proceed via the causal channels by which our knowledge 
proceeds; we know further that it doesn’t proceed by way of any other causal channel 
either.”348 He is however omniscient and necessarily existent. We can further say that 
necessarily, “for any proposition p, p is true if and only if God believes it.”349 
 
6.12 Realism 
Plantinga’s ontology and metaphysics stand in the tradition that can roughly be 
characterized as ‘Platonic realism’ or ‘modal realism’, though in a version that can be 
called ‘Augustinian realism’, although Plantinga himself gives it still another name. I 
will try to explain this. When he was president of the American Philosophical 
Association (1982) he devoted his Presidential Address How to be an anti-realist to 
this theme. He describes Platonism (i.e. Platonic realism) as “the view that among the 
furniture of the universe there are such abstract objects as propositions, possible 
worlds, numbers and properties”, and further that these objects “exist independently of 
everything else”, i.e. “independently of minds and their noetic activity; they aren’t in 
any way dependent upon the mind.”350 Anti-realism, specifically in the version of 
creative anti-realism, is “the claim that truth is not independent of mind.”351 Plantinga 
argues that both realism (Plato, Frege) and anti-realism (Kant, Rorty, Putnam) are 
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incoherent or otherwise objectionable. To escape from this antinomy he turns to a 
synthesis suggested by Augustine. According to Augustine, on the one side, there 
cannot be truth independent of noetic activity. On the other side, there can be truth 
independent of our noetic activity. The synthesis is, according to Augustine, that there 
is no truth outside God’s intellect. This was stated by Thomas Aquinas as follows: 
“Even if there were no human intellects, there could be truths because of their relation 
to the divine intellect. But if, per impossible, there were no intellects at all, but things 
continued to exist, then there would be no such reality as truth.”352 Therefore, 
according to Plantinga, a proposition p can be true if and only if it is believed by 
God.353 He calls this thesis ‘divine creative anti-realism’, i.e. “the view that truth is 
not independent of God’s noetic activity.”354 Plantinga further rejects the views that 
being true just is being believed by God or that something is true because God beliefs 
it. “It is thus not the case that a proposition is true because God believes it. On the 
other hand it is the case, I think, that a proposition exists because God thinks or 
conceives it. For propositions, as I see it, are best thought of as the thoughts of God.” 
This does not mean that propositions therefore exist necessarily, because “God is a 
necessary being who has essentially the property of thinking just the thoughts he does 
think; these thoughts, then are conceived or thought by God in every possible world 
and hence exist necessarily.” Plantinga concludes: “So how can we sensibly be anti-
realists? Easily enough: by being theists.”355 I think this position can best be 
characterized as ‘Augustinian realism’. 
 
Concerning religious language Plantinga is also a realist. The proposition “God 
exists” means that there is a being ‘God’ outside of us and outside of our language. 
This is the common sense meaning of existence. Religious beliefs, like “God exists” 
are cognitive claims that are either true or false. 
 
6.13 Natural theology 
Plantinga distinguishes natural theology from natural atheology. Natural theology is 
the enterprise to try to “give successful arguments or proofs for the existence of God”, 
while natural atheology is the attempt to show that “belief in God is demonstrably 
irrational or unreasonable.”356 Neither the projects of natural theology nor natural 
atheology can be regarded as successful. The most plausible arguments to support 
these projects fail. Plantinga’s relationship to natural theology however is somewhat 
diffuse. On the one side he agrees unqualified with the Reformed tradition that natural 
theology cannot be an independent, self-sufficient source of knowledge about God. 
Man is dependent on God and faith is a gift, not the conclusion of an argument. On 
the other side he has increasingly shown interest in natural theology during the years 
and frequently uses theistic argumentation. Interestingly, he was invented twice to 
deliver the prestigious Gifford Lectures on natural theology. 
 
In his chapter ‘Reason and Belief in God’ Plantinga has argued that natural theology 
is not necessary for rational belief in God’s existence.357 In God, Freedom and Evil 
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and The Nature of Necessity however Plantinga has developed a ‘triumphant’ 
ontological argument for the existence of God, in order to show the ‘rational 
acceptability’ of such a belief. “What I claim for this argument (…) is that it 
establishes, not the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability. And hence it 
accomplishes at least one of the aims of the tradition of natural theology.”358 Belief in 
God may be properly basic, this doesn’t mean it is groundless.359 The problem with 
traditional theistic arguments however is that they don’t meet the standards that are 
applied to them, such as the demand for self-evident premisses or a self-evident 
argument leading to the conclusion. There isn’t any philosophical argument that meets 
these standards. That doesn’t mean that there are no philosophical arguments for 
theistic belief. According to Plantinga there are at least “two dozen (or so)” good 
theistic arguments.360  
 
Natural theology in Plantinga’s new conception is not a way of proving the existence 
of God independent form revelation. It rather is an attempt to reasonable articulation 
of the properly basic beliefs of the believers. His point is that natural theology has to 
play a different role than it has done before. Even when the arguments of natural 
theology neither proof the existence of God nor are needed to warrant theistic belief, 
they can “play the role of increasing warrant, and significantly increasing warrant.”361 
To belief in God is not the same as to believe that God exists, but the strengthening of 
the latter belief can support the former.362 
 
6.14 Rationality 
What are Plantinga’s thoughts about the Calvinistic doctrine of the corruption of 
reason by sin? Is there any room for philosophy? In an interview Plantinga first states 
that although reason is affected by evil, it is not destroyed by it. Secondly, there is a 
distinction between the different disciplines on this point. There is hardly any effect in 
the disciplines of mathematics, physics or logic, but there is when the questions of 
ultimate meaning are concerned.363 Besides, the Holy Spirit repairs the cognitive and 
affective effects of sin in order to let us have faith. 
 
Although faith is the starting point for a theistic philosopher, this does not make him a 
fideist. Plantinga notes that fideism can be defined as an “exclusive or basic reliance 
upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized 
especially in the pursuit of philosophical or religious truth”.364 Correspondingly, 
Plantinga writes, a fideist is someone who “urges reliance on faith rather than reason, 
in matters philosophical and religious” and who “may go on to disparage and 
denigrate reason”.365 Plantinga does not regard faith as an irrational element. He only 
                                               
358 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, p. 112. 
359 Graham Oppy, ‘Natural theology’, in: Deane-Peter Baker, Alvin Plantinga, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2007, 15-47: 26. 
360 I will not go into detail here, but simply refer to Alvin Plantinga, ‘Appendix: Two Dozen (or so) 
Theistic Arguments’, in: Deane-Peter Baker, Alvin Plantinga, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2007, 203-227. 
361 Alvin Plantinga, ‘The Prospects for Natural Theology’, in: James Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical 
Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, Atascadero: Ridgeview Press 1991, 287-316: p. 311. 
362 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, p. 1-2. 
363 Ger Groot, ‘God is Hamlet niet. Gesprek met Alvin Plantinga’, in: Twee zielen. Gesprekken met 
hedendaagse filosofen, Nijmegen: Sun 1999, 176-193: p. 184. 
364 Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, p. 87. 
365 Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, p. 87. 
 80 
states that faith itself is ‘properly basic’. The growth and subsistence of faith do not 
need any additional evidence or argumentation to be reasonable. 
 
More specifically then, what is Plantinga’s conception of reason? As has been shown 
above, he stresses the divine design and creation of the cognitive faculties and their 
properly functioning (in accord with their design plan) in an appropriate epistemic 
environment. Important here is the religious dimension, in which Plantinga gives 
some insight when comparing different conceptions of reason among theists and 
nontheists. He writes: “A former professor of mine for whom I had and have 
enormous respect once said that theists and nontheists have different conceptions of 
reason. At the time I did not know what he meant, but now I think I do.”366 This 
former professor is W.H. Jellema. According to Plantinga the (Reformed) theist and 
the nontheist disagree about the deliverances of reason, because “[o]n the Reformed 
view I have been urging, the deliverances of reason include the existence of God just 
as much as perceptual truths, self-evident truths, memory truths, and the like.”367 The 
theist and nontheist simply do not agree as to what reason delivers. According to the 
theist the existence of God is a deliverance of reason. This doesn’t make him a fideist 
(see par. 8.3). 
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7 Dooyeweerd and Plantinga: A Comparison 
 
 
After the introduction to different elements in the Reformed tradition (chapters 2, 3 
and 4), two of the most important contemporary philosophers in the Reformed 
tradition have been introduced in chapters 5 and 6. In the present chapter a 
comparison will be made between these thinkers, in which both similarities and 
differences will be emphasized. 
 
7.1 Philosophical orientation 
The differences in the philosophies of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga cannot be rightly 
understood when no attention is paid to the differences in intellectual climate in which 
they developed their philosophy. In the twenties and thirties of the twentieth century 
in which Dooyeweerd developed his philosophy, philosophy in the Netherlands was 
characterized by relatively separated schools of thought, like neo-Hegelianism, neo-
Kantianism, Spinozism and phenomenology.368 Many philosophy chairs at the 
universities in the Netherlands were occupied by neo-Kantian philosophers. Dutch 
philosophy was to a high extent oriented on German philosophy. Besides, philosophy 
was often closely connected to theology, though the two universities on a religious 
basis were very young. The neo-Calvinistic Free University in Amsterdam started in 
1880 and the Catholic University of Nijmegen in 1923. In the cultural pessimism in 
the twenties and thirties of the twentieth century intellectuals were searching for new 
foundations for science and culture. Dooyeweerd intended to contribute to the re-
launch of philosophical discussion in the Occident. The books he started to publish in 
the thirties however, in the first place need to be regarded as a philosophical 
elaboration of the neo-Calvinistic movement. 
 
The situation in American philosophy in the fifties and sixties of the twentieth 
century, in which Plantinga developed his philosophy, was very different. The 
professionalization of American philosophy rose to high levels in the thirties and 
forties of the twentieth century. These were the heydays of logical positivism and 
analytical philosophy, with Harvard as its center. In this ‘philosophy for the 
philosophers’ (Ryle) religion was no topic for philosophy anymore. For example, in 
1967 the article ‘American Philosophy’ in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) 
ended with the characteristic words: “Metaphysics in the sense of speculation about 
some transcendent reality is no longer fashionable”.369 It was in this climate that 
Plantinga started to study philosophy at Harvard in 1950 and published his first books 
in the sixties. It was in the spring of 1980 that Time magazine reported the 
revolutionairy ‘comeback’ of God “in the crisp, intellectual circles of academic 
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philosophers”.370 Plantinga’s book God and Other Minds (1967) characterizes a new 
phase in the professionalization of Christian philosophy.371 
 
Dooyeweerd was, especially in the years before WWII, closely connected to one (sub) 
pillar in the Dutch ‘pillarized’ (verzuilde) society, namely neo-Calvinistic subculture. 
Therefore, his philosophy has for a long time been the philosophy of this specific 
subculture. Actually it has never completely lost this connection, although after WWII 
he increasingly looked for the philosophical debate with other schools of thought. He 
remained at the Free University of Amsterdam. Plantinga’s position is different. 
Although he was closely connected to the Reformed Calvin College for a long time, 
he was and is much more a professional philosopher, who publishes in professional 
journals and is credited by his collegian-philosophers. He has a much larger 
intellectual arena than Dooyeweerd had.372 He also did what Dooyeweerd, in his 
times, probably never would have done: he joined the philosophy department of a 
Catholic university. 
 
The differences in the philosophies of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga can also be 
explained by their different orientation in philosophy. As previously stated, 
Dooyeweerd’s philosophical orientation is on Kantian epistemology, focusing on the 
human, knowing subject (the ‘I’).373 His philosophy is framed by Continental idealist 
concepts and terminology. Dooyeweerd’s books are thick and often hard to read 
because of their terminology. Plantinga’s orientation however is on Plato’s realism, 
specifically as set forth in his Theatetus, seeing knowledge as the mind’s direct touch 
with reality.374 Plantinga works in the analytical tradition in philosophy. He is 
interested in analytical details and formalized arguments, and makes extensive use of 
advanced modal logic. Plantinga’s books are partly highly specialistic and technical, 
though clearly written and structured. Other books are written for a wider audience, 
being very clearly written, sometimes somewhat light-footed and humorous. Whoever 
reads Dooyeweerd’s and Plantinga’s book just seems to enter different ‘symbolic 
universes’. 
 
7.2 Mutual criticism 
It is unknown whether Dooyeweerd, who died in 1977, has read any of Plantinga’s 
works. Plantinga’s first article (1958) was about Dooyeweerd’s philosophy; his first 
books appeared in 1967 (God and Other Minds) and 1974 (The Nature of Necessity 
and God, Freedom, and Evil). Anyway, Dooyeweerd never published a comment on 
Plantinga’s thought. Plantinga in turn has commented on a few occasions on 
Dooyeweerd’s thought. Plantinga criticizes Dooyeweerd’s philosophy because its 
transcendental orientation is too much indebted to Kant’s philosophy. According to 
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Plantinga this leads to subjectivism (‘creative anti-realism’), because knowledge is 
regarded as a human construction. Another point of criticism is Dooyeweerd’s 
rejection of the body-soul dualism, which has not been discussed in this book.375 
 
From Dooyeweerd’s perspective a few remarks can be made. Dooyeweerd probably 
would have thought that Plantinga’s connection of philosophy to religious 
commitments stays ‘external’. Plantinga does not argue how they are connected. Nor 
does he discuss what makes philosophy possible, or, in Dooyeweerd’s terms, he does 
not offer a transcendental critique of theoretical thought. Plantinga’s philosophy is 
‘uncritical’, because it does not criticize theoretical thought as such. Besides, 
Plantinga runs the risk of absolutizing the logical-analytical function when 
emphasizing logical-analytical clarity, for example when writing about God’s nature. 
From Plantinga’s perspective the argumentation in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy 
frequently remains unclear. Dooyeweerd often – though not always – tries to make his 
position plausible, but does not use the clear-cut analytical argumentation Plantinga 
uses. 
 
7.3 Clarity 
These differences can perhaps be made clear by using the example of Plantinga’s 
comment on Dooyeweerd in his article ‘Dooyeweerd on Meaning and Being’. 
Although the article is written early in Plantinga’s career – 1958, the year he started at 
Wayne – it already characterizes his later style of thought. The article shows a very 
close reading of Dooyeweerd’s A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Plantinga 
starts with praising Dooyeweerd. “There is much to admire in Professor 
Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea. This system is rich and 
variegated, suggestive and stimulating. Adventurous and bold in the quest for a more 
profound understanding of the philosophical implications of Christianity, Professor 
Doooyeweerd does not shrink from criticizing and revising traditional Reformed ways 
of thinking where it seems to him that they are strayed from the path of truth. And this 
is as it should be.”376  
 
After this praise comes the sharp, though sympathetic criticism. Plantinga sketches 
Dooyeweerd’s thoughts about creation’s referring, expressing and meaning. As 
previously cited (see par. 5.6), Dooyeweerd writes: “This universal character of 
referring and expressing, which is proper to our entire created cosmos, stamps created 
reality as meaning, in accordance with its dependent non-self-sufficient nature. 
Meaning is the being of all that has been created and the nature even of our selfhood. 
It has a religious root and a divine origin.”377 Plantinga explains that Dooyeweerd 
wants to state that ‘being’ is only applicable to God, while dependent creation only 
has ‘meaning’. Referring to created reality as ‘being’ would be a deification of 
creation. Plantinga then wants to ‘elucidate’ this view. He uses the methodology of 
analytical philosophy by sharply analysing what could be meant by the words ‘being’ 
and ‘meaning’, thereby using examples and counter-examples, and discovering 
ambiguities. He concludes that Dooyeweerd neither simply means that creation is 
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dependent upon God, because that would be a truism for a Christian, nor means that 
created reality has both meaning and being, nor some other possible interpretations. 
An “intelligible and non-truistic explication” is, according to Plantinga, that 
Dooyeweerd rejects the philosophical doctrine of substance, because it is a  
Thomistic-Aristotelian concept, i.e. “a unit of being, a relatively independent and 
persisting entity which may have attributes but is not itself an attribute of any other 
being”.378 Plantinga then sketches different arguments that Dooyeweerd might have, 
such as the argument that the doctrine of substance is, in Dooyeweerd’s terminology, 
based on the Greek ground-motive of form and matter.  
 
Next, Plantinga argues why these arguments are not convincing. For example, “To 
chide Thomas for using a concept arising in pagan Greek thought might be like 
excoriating St. Augustine for writing in a language developed in pagan Rome.”379 
Plantinga gives some other counterarguments, such as difficulties with Dooyeweerd’s 
doctrine when accounting for action, movement, causation, and memory. Finally, the 
doctrine that meaning is the mode of being of created reality according to Plantinga 
“seems to jeopardize the doctrine of creation. For it suggests that the relation between 
God and creation is like the relation between a mind and the meanings it 
entertains.”380  
 
According to Plantinga, Dooyeweerd “rightly rejects any dictation to philosophy on 
the part of theology” and rightly suggests revisions of Reformed thinking where 
necessary. “Still, however, if the total result is to be called a Christian philosophy and 
in particular a Reformed philosophy, it must be consistent with the spirit and the main 
doctrines of the Reformed and Christian tradition.” If Dooyeweerd’s doctrine implies 
that the relation between God and creation can be compared to the relation between a 
thinker and the meanings he entertains, then he would significantly depart from the 
Reformed and Christian tradition. “For then created reality becomes constitutive of 
God’s mind and thus of God. And this is clearly to controvert the Christian conception 
of creation with its ontological chasm between God and created reality.” Plantinga 
then continues to state that this chasm seems to presuppose the being of both God and 
creation. A meaning, for example, cannot sin; only evil being can. “The Christian 
philosopher must steer a nice course between the Scylla of giving finite reality too 
much self-sufficiency and power”, which threatens God’s uniqueness and sovereignty, 
and “the Charybdis of altogether divesting creation of distinctness and “over-
againstness” with respect to God”, which leads to pantheism. Dooyeweerd, by trying 
to avoid Scylla, comes close to Charybdis, because “the very attempt to emphasize 
God's transcendent uniqueness and sovereignty may end by making him the author of 
evil in a very intimate sense and by denying an ontological distinction between 
Creator and creation altogether.”381  
 
Finally, Plantinga assures that ‘Professor Dooyeweerd’ will be “entirely aware” of the 
danger. “But in the absence of further elucidation, the dictum that meaning is the 
mode of being of created reality makes it hard to see how God and creation are to be 
kept distinct. The difficulty, of course, is with the dictum itself. For so long as we 
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cannot discover more precisely what that dictum means, so long we shall remain in 
the dark about its precise implications for important Christian doctrines.”382  
 
In my interpretation, especially in the last sentences the difference in philosophical 
methodology between Dooyeweerd and Plantinga is made clear. Based on the neo-
Calvinist theological doctrine of the boundary between Creator and creation, 
Dooyeweerd is very cautious not to deificate creation. He emphasizes the mystery, 
other-sidedness and ‘over-againstness’ of the Creator, perhaps at the cost of 
philosophical clarity. Plantinga on the other side is mainly focused on the clear use of 
language when speaking about Creator and creation. In his approach this clarity is the 
basis for further discussion, perhaps at the cost of theological distance and caution. 
Part of this difference has to do with the difference between Continental and 
analytical philosophy, but there is also a difference in the conception of reason and 
metaphysics, as will be discussed below. 
 
7.4 Philosophy 
Dooyeweerd’s and Plantinga’s philosophies were not only developed in a different 
intellectual climate and philosophical orientation, they also tried to answer different 
questions. While Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is mainly an analysis of the structures of 
reality, Plantinga’s philosophy is mainly a defence of theistic belief. Dooyeweerd 
tried to develop a philosophical foundation for (neo-Calvinistic) science, and wanted 
to build on scientific discoveries in turn. He had to develop his own terminology or 
adapt existing neo-Kantian and neo-Calvinistic terminology. Plantinga tried (and 
tries) to be a Christian in philosophy, i.e. he uses philosophical methodology to 
practice philosophical theology, positive and negative apologetics, positive Christian 
philosophy and philosophical criticism.383 In Dooyeweerd’s conception of philosophy 
there is no place for a philosophical theology, at least not to be practiced by a 
philosopher. Theology is the scholarship of the faith aspect of reality; philosophy is 
aimed at the totality of the cosmos. I suppose that Dooyeweerd also would regard 
apologetics as at least partly a theological doctrine. He probably would regard positive 
Christian philosophy and philosophical criticism as true philosophical tasks. 
 
In Dooyeweerd’s view it is the task of philosophy to study the totality of meaning. 
Philosophy must direct the theoretical view of totality over our cosmos and, within the 
limits of its possibility, answer the question, “Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt”. In 
Plantinga’s view philosophy is analysis, clarification, systematization, and 
articulation. Dooyeweerd would probably agree with Plantinga’s view that, as 
previously stated, philosophy is a matter of systematizing, developing and deepening 
one’s pre-philosophical opinions, and an arena for the articulation and interplay of 
commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in nature. He would probably 
also agree that it is an expression of deep and fundamental perspectives, ways of 
viewing ourselves and the world, and God, and a systematizing, deepening, exploring, 
articulating of this perspective, and exploring its bearing on the rest of what we think 
and do.  
 
Both Dooyeweerd and Plantinga claim to have developed a Christian philosophy, not 
a theology, although the distinction between philosophy and theology is more clear in 
Dooyeweerd’s thought than in Plantinga’s. According to Plantinga there is in 
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principle no difference between theology and philosophy insofar as methodology is 
concerned. The disciplines just ask different questions. According to Dooyeweerd, the 
task of philosophy is to study the totality of meaning, while theology is the 
scholarship of the faith aspect of reality, as stated previously. Both Dooyeweerd and 
Plantinga want to stay away from Biblicism and fideism. (I will explicate my position 
on this point in par. 8.3.) 
 
Finally, neither Dooyeweerd nor Plantinga speaks in contempt about the ‘naïve’ 
experience of everyday reality. In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy this is an important 
theme in regard to the theoretical attitude of science which is always derived from 
naïve experience and does not lead to a higher level of knowledge. In Plantinga’s 
philosophy this theme especially emerges in regard to the proper basicality of belief in 
God. The philosophical articulation of faith is not a higher level of faith then the 
direct experience of God. Both philosophers agree that a (Christian) philosopher 
legitimately enters philosophy with his pre-philosophical and naïve beliefs.  
 
7.5 Rationality 
Dooyeweerd and Plantinga agree that reason should not be depreciated. Plantinga 
stresses the divine design and creation of the cognitive faculties and their properly 
functioning (in accord with their design plan) in an appropriate epistemic 
environment. The theist and nontheist though do not agree as to what reason delivers, 
because according to the theist the existence of God is a deliverance of reason.  
 
An important notion in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, relevant for his conception of 
reason, is the non-self-sufficiency of reality. The whole of reality, in all its modal 
aspects, refers to and is an expression of its origin. This includes the logical-analytical 
function of man. Reason is not self-complacent, but should be put in its right place. 
Rationality is limited to creation, i.e. the earthly cosmos. Rationality is regarded as a 
modal aspect, the logical-analytical one. The logical-analytical function of man is 
only one function, not the highest one. 
 
I think a crucial difference between Dooyeweerd and Plantinga exists regarding the 
status of reason. Plantinga seems to regard reason as a more or less ‘neutral’ 
instrument – though created according to God’s design plan – that is only ‘coloured’ 
by the pre-philosophical assumptions of the philosopher using his reason. According 
to Plantinga, Christian philosophers do not aim to reject any belief, procedure or 
technique that is used by non-Christians, but may differ in assumptions that guide 
philosophical inquiry. The inquiry as such is more or less neutral. This is probably 
related to Plantinga’s philosophical realism. Reality is accessible for everyone in the 
same way. This also results in a different view on metaphysics, as will be discussed 
below. 
 
Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on the transcendental condition of theoretical thought and 
the transcendent condition as a starting-point for philosophy’s transcendental 
direction leads to a completely different conception of the status of reason. In this 
view no ‘neutral’ reason can exist. Theoretical truth is “in every respect dependent on 
the full super-temporal Truth”, because “[w]e cannot truthfully know the cosmos 
outside of the true knowledge of God.”384 Even the proposition “2 x 2 = 4” is only a 
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“partial truth”, because a theoretical interpretation needs to take place regarding the 
totality of meaning. The proposition is not “true in itself”, but only in the context of 
logical laws and laws of thought that can only exist in the order of a totality of 
meaning. Likewise, common grace does not create an autonomous sphere for human 
thought. For example, the logical laws of thought or the modal structural law of the 
logical aspect may not as such be affected by sin, but that doesn’t mean that reason 
has a ‘neutral’ access to them. Man wants to set apart the logical aspect from its 
coherent order with the other modal aspects, thereby not appreciating the boundaries 
of the modal aspects. Thus meaning is absolutized to the level of God’s Being. This 
goes further than only a difference in the pre-philosophical assumptions. 
 
In general, Plantinga has been in most of his writings a less overtly neo-Calvinistic 
philosopher than Dooyeweerd was. Especially the noetic effects of sin were less 
emphasized in most of Plantinga’s work and perhaps he has a more optimistic 
conception of reason.385 
 
7.6 Metaphysics 
The most noteworthy difference between Dooyeweerd and Plantinga regards their 
conception of metaphysics. There is no place for metaphysics in Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy, because there can be no transgression of the boundary between God and 
cosmos from the created cosmos. Philosophy is made possible by, but also limited to 
our temporal horizon. It has to limit itself to this temporal order; otherwise it 
necessarily falls into speculative metaphysics, thereby absolutizing temporal modal 
functions such as the theoretical-logical function of thought. Because God is not 
subjected to creational law, we should not speculate about his characteristics, insofar 
they have not been revealed to us in Scripture. God has set limits to human reason in 
his temporal world-order; therefore philosophy can only point beyond and above the 
boundary between God and cosmos to what it pre-supposes. According to 
Dooyeweerd, there can be no transgression of the boundary between God and cosmos 
from the created cosmos. According to Plantinga however it is too easy to state that 
our concepts do not apply to God because God transcends human experience. As 
previously cited, Plantinga writes: “This way of thinking begins in a pious and 
commendable concern for God’s greatness and majesty and augustness; but it ends in 
agnosticism and in incoherence.”386  
 
According to Dooyeweerd however, a “speculative metaphysical character” belongs 
to the application of modal laws, like laws of logic or categories of cause, effect and 
necessity to God.387 Man cannot reach beyond his modal horizon. There is no eternal 
rational order to which God is bound. The speculative theories are consequently 
uncritical because they cross the immanent limits of philosophical thought, 
absolutizing modal aspects by abstracting them from the temporal coherence of 
meaning.388 God has set limits to human reason in his temporal world order, therefore 
philosophy can only point beyond and above the boundary between God and cosmos 
to what it pre-supposes. We should not “elevate human reason to the throne of God.” 
Because God is not subjected to the law, we should not speculate about his 
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characteristics, insofar they have not been revealed to us in Scripture. Man as a 
creature is not capable of rising to God through thinking. Philosophy, like theology, is 
limited to the created reality. Man should not and cannot intrude upon the “deep 
mystery” of God’s majesty or the essentiae Dei, but should listen to the revelation in 
the Word of God.389 Calvin rightly warned against vacua et meteorica speculatio.390 
 
Plantinga however is convinced that “if none of our concepts apply to God, then there 
is nothing we know or truly believe of him – not even what is affirmed in the creeds 
or affirmed in the Scriptures. And if there is nothing we can know or truly believe of 
him, then, of course, we cannot know or truly believe that none of our concepts apply 
to him. The view that our concepts don’t apply to God is fatally ensnarled in self-
referential absurdity.”391 
 
7.7 Natural theology 
Dooyeweerd resolutely rejects natural theology. Nature is corrupted by the fall and 
can only be renewed by grace. In distinction to grace there can be no speculative 
philosophia et theologia naturalis. As previously stated, Plantinga has a more 
nuanced view. Although natural theology is not necessary for rational belief in God’s 
existence, arguments can be used to show the ‘rational acceptability’ of such a belief. 
These arguments do not show the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability, and 
this was one of the aims of the tradition of natural theology (like it was in Kant’s 
philosophy of religion). Belief in God may be properly basic, this doesn’t mean it is 
groundless. According to Plantinga there are at least “two dozen (or so)” good theistic 
arguments.392 Natural theology in Plantinga’s new conception is not a way of proving 
the existence of God independent form revelation, but an attempt to reasonable 
articulation of the properly basic beliefs of the believers.  
 
7.8 The law-theme 
As previously stated, the law-theme is important in the neo-Calvinistic tradition. 
Against ‘creative anti-realism’ (as Plantinga calls it), including Nietzschean and 
postmodern perspectivism and constructivism, Reformed thinkers place a law-like 
structure of reality. Although neo-Calvinism also knows a religious perpectivism, it 
differs from the postmodern or Nietzschean ones, because God is a law-giver and 
creation is structured by his temporal laws. In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy the law-
theme gets emphasized in the law-spheres of the modal aspects and in the boundary 
between Creator and creation. Interestingly, the law-theme gets a different emphasis 
in Plantinga’s philosophy than it had in Dooyeweerd’s. Plantinga does not study the 
cosmos as Dooyeweerd understands it, i.e. with its different modal aspects and law 
spheres. Plantinga emphasizes the laws of logic and logical order. It is noteworthy that 
he applies them also to God, for example regarding the problem of evil. According to 
Plantinga God could have wanted a certain amount of evil in the world in order to 
make possible certain good states of affairs that need evil as a prerequisite.  When this 
evil is indeed a logically necessary condition for the existence of the good, even God 
could not will the ends without willing the means.393 This metaphysical use of the law 
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may be a new phenomenon in the Reformed tradition; it still is thinking in law-
terminology. God is not arbitrary. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
 
My aim in this book was to investigate the characteristics of the Reformed tradition in 
philosophy and its Augustinian-Calvinian roots. Different questions arose, like: How 
does the thought of Augustine and Calvin influence contemporary philosophers in this 
tradition? What are its central philosophical claims? What makes this multicoloured 
tradition one? This comprehensive theme was limited to the central question: What 
are the conceptions of philosophy and rationality in the Reformed tradition? The 
philosophies of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga were used as examples. In this concluding 
chapter the book will be summarized, whereby the central question will be answered. 
Attention will also be paid to the other questions that were asked. 
 
8.1 The Reformed tradition in philosophy: a summary 
In chapter 2 some main lines in the work of the fourth- and fifth-century church father 
Augustine were discussed, because he is often regarded by the sixteenth-century 
Reformers and their followers as their forerunner on important issues. Special 
attention was paid to those elements that are picked up in the Reformation by Calvin, 
and in the neo-Calvinistic movement by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Plantinga. In 
Augustine’s thought Christian doctrine, true philosophy and wisdom are one and the 
same. In Augustine’s epistemology faith and reason are in harmony. When knowledge 
of the highest truth and good are concerned, faith takes an epistemological precedence 
over understanding, but it also enlightens understanding (credo ut intelligam). Other 
important Augustinian elements from a Reformational perspective are the ‘inward 
turn’ (the heart), the knowledge of God and the self, the transformation of philosophy, 
God’s creational laws as a boundary between Creator and creation, and the doctrine of 
the struggle between the two cities.  
 
In chapter 3 the thought of the sixteenth-century French church-Reformer John Calvin 
was discussed, because the Reformed tradition in philosophy developed from the 
Calvinian branch of the Reformation. The focus was on those aspects that 
significantly influenced Calvin’s philosophical legacy in the Reformed tradition. 
Calvin adopts important elements of Augustine’s thought, especially concerning 
man’s heart (the inward turn), the transformation of philosophy, God as creator and 
lawgiver. He also regards reason as an important human faculty, although it is not the 
final foundation of knowledge, not a true guide in matters of religion and not self-
sufficient. Christian philosophy has to be obedient philosophy and Scripture is the 
best starting point for a philosopher in order to have a solid foundation for thought. 
Christian philosophy is humble, renewing, converting, and transformational 
philosophy. Scripture is the best source of truth concerning what is most important in 
live, but given this framework of truth, there is certainly a place for philosophy. This 
doesn’t make Scriptural philosophy theology. Christians have to live in the service of 
the Lord. Therefore they have to ‘empty their mind’ and direct it to God’s Spirit. 
Believing in God, like believing in the truth of Scripture, is not based on rational 
proof, but on the ‘testimony of the Spirit’ in our hearts. Every person has an 
‘awareness of divinity’ (sensus divinitatis). Man can experience God within himself, 
which is the best form of knowledge. Creation is regarded by Calvin as a boundary 
between God and men. Philosophy cannot and should not go behind God’s act of 
creation in speculation that will only lead to idolatry and superstition. Speculation 
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about God outside his revelation is unwarranted, irreligious, distracting and impious. 
There is no place for a metaphysics that goes beyond Scripture. 
 
In chapter 4 the cultural movement of neo-Calvinism in the Netherlands was 
discussed, being especially the influence of Abraham Kuyper’s thought. It was shown 
how some elements of Calvin’s thought were adopted, but also modified. Important 
elements are God as Creator and law-giver, the doctrine of creation, sin and 
redemption, and the doctrine of the knowledge of God and knowledge of the self (the 
heart). A central notion in neo-Calvinism is the law-like character of creation, through 
which God creates and sustains the cosmos. Within the earthly cosmos there is a 
developmental potential, a distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘direction’. There is 
also a distinction between God and creation, between God’s creational ordinances and 
what is subject to these ordinances. However, Neo-Calvinists have a rather optimistic 
conception of the redeemed mind. Another typical element in neo-Calvinism is the 
antithesis between belief and unbelief. The Augustinian notion of the heart as a 
religious point in man where life is still undivided plays a central role in neo-Calvinist 
thought. Every thought should be brought into captivity to God. All of life is guided 
by a religious principle, therefore there is no ‘neutral’ domain that is not influenced by 
the world view a person has. Likewise, a ‘neutral’ philosophy does not exist. 
Rationality is created, therefore it is good as such. It is however subject to the 
boundary between God and his creation. There is no continuity between God and man 
on the basis of rationality. Therefore, there is no place for a natural theology. 
According to the neo-Calvinists an integral Calvinistic philosophy had not been 
developed until then.  
 
In chapter 5 the thought of Herman Dooyeweerd was introduced as a philosophical 
elaboration of the neo-Calvinistic world view, building on some elements of 
Augustine’s and Calvin’s thought. He develops a Christian philosophy, not a 
theology. Neither does his philosophy imply Biblicism. An important notion in this 
philosophy is the non-self-sufficiency of reality. The whole of reality, in all its modal 
aspects, refers to and is an expression of its origin. This includes the logical-analytical 
function of man. Dooyeweerd opposes the autonomous self-complacency of human 
reason, as he finds it among many modern philosophers. With his transcendental 
critique he wants to reveal the religious starting point of any philosophy. Dooyeweerd 
agrees with Augustine and Calvin that all knowledge of the cosmos is dependent upon 
self-knowledge, and our self-knowledge is dependent upon our knowledge of God. It 
is the task of philosophy to study the totality of meaning. Philosophy must direct the 
theoretical view of totality over our cosmos and, within the limits of its possibility, 
answer the question, “Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt”. Philosophy pre-supposes the 
transcendent condition as a starting-point for its transcendental direction. It cannot 
find this starting-point in itself. Immanence-philosophy is rejected. Philosophy, 
although it has a transcendent religious pre-supposition (the Archimedean point), is 
limited to our temporal horizon. Because God is not subjected to the law, we should 
not speculate about his characteristics, insofar they have not been revealed to us in 
Scripture. God has set limits to human reason in his temporal world-order, therefore 
philosophy can only point beyond and above the boundary between God and cosmos 
to what it pre-supposes. There is no place for metaphysics in Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy, because there can be no transgression of the boundary between God and 
cosmos from the created cosmos. Reason should not be depreciated, but put in its 
right place. Rationality is limited to creation, i.e. the earthly cosmos. It is not 
 93 
religiously neutral. Rationality is regarded as a modal aspect, the logical-analytical 
one. The logical-analytical function of man is only one function, not the highest one.  
 
In chapter 6 the influence of neo-Calvinism and Dooyeweerd’s philosophy in North-
America was discussed first. After that special attention was given to the work of 
Alvin Plantinga, one of the leading thinkers in the contemporary philosophy in the 
Reformed tradition. According to Plantinga, a Christian philosopher legitimately 
enters philosophy with his beliefs. Philosophy is a matter of systematizing, developing 
and deepening one’s pre-philosophical opinions, but it is also an arena for the 
articulation and interplay of commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in 
nature. It is an expression of deep and fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing 
ourselves and the world and God. Among its most important and pressing projects are 
systematizing, deepening, exploring, articulating this perspective, and exploring its 
bearing on the rest of what we think and do. Philosophy is analysis (clarification, 
systematization, articulation), that is also closely connected to and preceded by pre-
philosophical opinion. Christian philosophers do not aim to reject any belief, 
procedure or technique that is used by non-Christians, but may differ in assumptions 
that guide philosophical inquiry. There is no philosophy without a world view, nor is 
philosophy neutral concerning world views, because it springs itself from a world 
view. Vast stretches of contemporary philosophy even have spiritual or religious roots 
and fruits. There is in principle no difference between theology and philosophy 
insofar as methodology is concerned. The disciplines just ask different questions. In 
apparent deviation from the mainstream of the Reformed tradition Plantinga is 
involved with metaphysics. He also has a new conception of natural theology. 
Concerning rationality Plantinga stresses the divine design and creation of the 
cognitive faculties and their properly functioning (in accord with their design plan) in 
an appropriate epistemic environment. There is a religious dimension here, because 
the theist and nontheist simply do not agree as to what reason delivers. According to 
the theist the existence of God is a deliverance of reason.  
 
In chapter 7 a comparison was made of central elements in the philosophies of 
Dooyeweerd and Plantinga. Although Dooyeweerd and Plantinga claim to stand in the 
same Reformed tradition in philosophy, their philosophies were developed in a 
different intellectual climate and from a different philosophical orientation. They also 
asked different questions. This leads to significant differences, for example regarding 
the place and limits of reason and the possibilities of metaphysics. There is however 
agreement regarding the religious foundation of every philosophy, the distinction 
between Creator and creation, the appreciation of naïve experience and the law-theme. 
Nevertheless, these elements are filled in rather differently.  
 
8.2 Philosophy and rationality in the Reformed tradition: conclusions 
What is a philosophy in the Reformed tradition? Before trying to answer this question, 
some elements of Calvin’s conception of philosophy and rationality need to be 
recalled. Although Calvin is no systematic philosopher himself, he does not reject a 
systematic use of philosophy at all. He also leaves room for reason, although he 
regards it as corrupted. Because the Spirit of God is the only source of truth the fruits 
of the ‘natural light’ of reason should not be denied. This is also the line of thought of 
the Reformed tradition. An important first conclusion of this book therefore is: In 
Calvin’s thought and in the Reformed tradition, philosophy – negatively formulated – 
is not rejected. It is possible to have a philosophy in the Reformed tradition. However, 
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reason is not the final foundation of knowledge, not always a true guide and not self-
sufficient. Calvin criticizes philosophers who trust in the self-sufficiency of reason. 
Their thought has to be – and can be – transformed. Therefore, a second conclusion is: 
Reformed philosophy is renewing, converting, transformational philosophy. It is also 
obedient philosophy. Scripture is the best source of truth concerning what is most 
important in live, but given this framework of truth, there is certainly a place for 
philosophy. In this sense – and only in this sense – philosophy is based on faith. This 
doesn’t make Reformed philosophy theology. When faith is concerned, revelation is 
not auxiliary to reason, but non-speculative and humble reason is auxiliary to faith.394 
Here, revelation is indispensable to come to truth. In other, earthly topics reason can 
be regarded as a valuable gift and an instrument for philosophy. This is also the line of 
thought of the Reformed tradition. A third conclusion therefore is: Reason according 
to Calvin and the Reformed tradition is a natural gift, but should know its proper 
place in the framework of the truth of revelation.  
 
Calvin did not develop a philosophical system or a world view. What is now called a 
Reformed philosophy or a Calvinists world view is evidently a modification of 
Calvin’s thought. Nevertheless, traditions change over time. There is no reason to say 
that what is not exactly the same as Calvin’s thought does not belong to the Reformed 
tradition. What then is a philosophy in the Reformed tradition? I think this question 
can be answered as follows: a philosophy in the Reformed tradition is a philosophy – 
not a theology – which gives a philosophical expression to the religious motives of the 
Calvinian Reformation.395 This doesn’t mean that a Reformed philosophy is a slavish 
imitation of Calvin’s thought. Calvin is not the pater angelicus of Reformed 
philosophy, although his thought is a point of orientation.396 I have introduced the 
philosophies of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga, who both claim to stand in the Reformed 
tradition. They both take Calvin’s legacy very seriously in their philosophy, including 
the Augustinian elements, although they lay different emphases. It may be helpful at 
this point to introduce the difference between world-view and philosophy as two 
levels. The differences between Plantinga and Dooyeweerd are not differences in 
(neo-)Calvinistic world-view, but in philosophy.397 Despite their different 
philosophies, Dooyeweerd and Plantinga both build a philosophy on a Reformed 
foundation. A philosophy in the Reformed tradition is not only possible, it has also 
been actualized. Therefore, a fourth conclusion is: It is possible to formulate and 
systematically work out a philosophy in the Reformed tradition.  
 
From a historical perspective Plantinga’s metaphysical involvement seems to be a 
deviation from the mainstream of the Reformed tradition. Still, Plantinga has some 
good arguments why he does not hesitate to philosophize about God’s nature. This 
can be regarded as an example of a modification in a living tradition, because 
Plantinga argues that this element is defensible, while still in line with the tradition. 
Given the fact that the Reformed tradition is not a closed system of thought but a 
living thing, there is, in my opinion, no reason to doubt both Dooyeweerd’s and 
                                               
394 Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, 4. 
395 William Young, Toward a Reformed Philosophy, Grand Rapids: Piet Hein Publishers 1952, p.11. 
396 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought I, p. 522. 
397 Albert Wolters, ‘Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophy and Rationality’, in: H. Hart, J. van 
der Hoeven & N. Wolterstorff (Eds.), Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition, Toronto: UPA 1983, 113-
131, p. 129. 
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Plantinga’s claim to stand in the Reformed tradition. Therefore I have chosen to 
present their philosophies as they are, simply because of their claim. 
 
From a historical-philosophical perspective there has never been an integral 
Reformed philosophy and there has never been one Reformed philosophy. Although 
Dooyeweerd claimed to develop one, it is clear that his philosophy is heavily 
influence by neo-Kantian thought. Historically, Calvinism has been combined with 
completely different philosophical systems. Contemporary philosophers in the 
Reformed tradition, like Dooyeweerd and Plantinga, also have presented fairly 
different philosophies. A fifth conclusion therefore is: Significantly different 
philosophies can develop within the Reformed tradition.  
 
Despite their different emphases, Dooyeweerd and Plantinga agree on important 
points, as was sketched in chapter 7. One can of course replicate that the philosophies 
of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga are specifically neo-Calvinistic philosophies and 
perhaps not representative for the Reformed tradition at large. In my opinion, this is 
only true in the sense that a part of their intellectual framework – Dooyeweerd’s more 
than Plantinga’s – is neo-Calvinistic. However, it can not be denied that large parts of 
their philosophies are composed of Calvinian (instead of specifically neo-Calvinistic) 
elements or can be characterized as Christian in general, the most explicitly in 
Plantinga’s case. Central elements of Calvinian thought are the religious roots of 
thought, the non-self-sufficience of reality, and the distinction between Creator and 
creation. A less explicitly Calvinian elements is the appreciation of naïve experience, 
although it is certainly in line with Calvins approach in the Institutes. Important neo-
Calvinistic elements are the doctrine of antithesis and the law-theme. Therefore, a 
sixth conclusion is: Characteristic elements in contemporary Reformed philosophy 
are the religious roots of thought, the non-self-sufficience of reality, the distinction 
between Creator and creation, the appreciation of naïve experience, the doctrine of 
antithesis, and the law-theme. 
 
Finally, it has be emphasized that philosophy in the Reformed tradition is not a dead 
thing. Especially Plantinga’s philosophy today shows that Reformed philosophy still 
has the potential to deliver a significant contribution to contemporary philosophy. 
Therefore, a seventh and final conclusion is: Reformed philosophy is a living thing 
today. 
 
Summarizing the conclusions of this book and answering its central question: (1) In 
Calvin’s thought and in the Reformed tradition, philosophy – negatively formulated – 
is not rejected. It is possible to have one. (2) Further, Reformed philosophy is 
renewing, converting, transformational philosophy. (3) Reason according to Calvin 
and the Reformed tradition is a natural gift, but should know its proper place in the 
framework of the truth of revelation. (4) Furthermore, it is possible to actually 
formulate and systematically work out a philosophy in the Reformed tradition. (5) 
Even significantly different philosophies can develop within the Reformed tradition. 
In Dooyeweerd’s view philosophy must direct the theoretical view of totality over our 
cosmos and, within the limits of its possibility, answer the question, “Wie alles sich 
zum Ganzen webt”, while in Plantinga’s view philosophy is analysis (clarification, 
systematization, articulation), that is also closely connected to and preceded by pre-
philosophical opinion.. (6) Shared characteristic elements in contemporary Reformed 
philosophy are the religious roots of thought, the doctrine of antithesis, the non-self-
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sufficience of reality, the distinction between Creator and creation, the appreciation of 
naïve experience, and the law-theme. (7) Finally, Reformed philosophy is a living 
thing. 
 
8.3 A sketch of my preliminary position 
An important theme in this book has been the relationship between philosophy and 
theology. I have emphasized that Dooyeweerd and Plantinga have developed a 
philosophy, not a theology. The difference between these disciplines is more clear in 
Dooyeweerd’s thought than in Plantinga’s. Still, Plantinga too regards himself as a 
philosopher, not a theologian. At this point in the book I want to sketch my – still very 
preliminary – position in this debate, focusing on the thought of Dooyeweerd and 
Plantinga. I have to limit myself significantly, because the discussion about the 
relationship between philosophy and theology has a very long history (dating back to 
the first century) and raises a lot of questions. Besides, this book is already 
voluminous. In order to legitimate the thought of Dooyeweerd and Plantinga as being 
philosophy, two questions need to be answered. The most important one is whether 
the fundamental place of their religious world view in their philosophy can be 
philosophically legitimated. The second question is about the difference between 
philosophy and theology. An encyclopedical discussion about the exact borders 
between philosophy and theology doesn’t seem fruitful to me. Personally I prefer an 
Augustinian merging of theology and philosophy, i.e. a merging of natural reason and 
biblical revelation. However, I will use the contemporary distinction between the two 
disciplines as a practical starting point. 
 
Dooyeweerd and Plantinga have a different conception of philosophy, as has been 
sketched (par. 8.1). According to Plantinga philosophy is analysis (clarification, 
systematization, articulation), that is also closely connected to and preceded by pre-
philosophical opinion. There is in principle no difference between theology and 
philosophy insofar as methodology is concerned. The disciplines just ask different 
questions. In my view, Plantinga’s somewhat inaccurate merging of philosophy and 
theology is not satisfying. When theologians use philosophical methodology but only 
ask different questions, there is no independent place for the discipline. When 
philosophy doesn’t have any distinctive features apart from its methodology and when 
theology doesn’t have any distinctive features apart from the questions it asks, then 
theology is reduced to philosophy, simply because it uses the philosophical 
methodology. There is however more difference between the (contemporary) 
disciplines than only asking different questions. For example, theology is oriented and 
building on Biblical exegesis (and church history), while philosophy is not. Still, it 
may be certainly true that theologians use natural reason, like philosophers do.  
 
According to Dooyeweerd it is the task of philosophy to study the totality of meaning; 
philosophy must direct the theoretical view of totality over our cosmos and, within the 
limits of its possibility, answer the question, “Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt”. In 
this conception philosophy is not only conceptual analysis, but also tries to answer 
questions of meaning. I think this conception of philosophy has the potential to 
become a quasi-theology, especially when meaning becomes closely associated with 
one interpretation of Christian theology. This is the weak point in Dooyeweerd’s 
thought. Philosophy then can be regarded as – in Karl Barth’s words – bad theology. 
Besides, Dooyeweerd does not reflect on this religious foundation as such. By 
claiming to have a clear view on the Christian (‘biblical’) ground motive he rejects 
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other interpretations of the Christian tradition. Christian philosophy is at risk to 
become a dogmatic framework for the interpretation of reality. However, even 
without this theological tendency Dooyeweerd’s analysis of reality as a cosmos with 
modal aspects and his analysis of theoretical thought are valuable as philosophy. 
Philosophy at this level can be regarded as an analysis of reality, including religious 
experience, without the need for a specific theology. I also agree with Dooyeweerd 
that philosophy and theology are both influenced by pre-philosophical opinion of a 
religious nature. They both study reality and both use natural reason, but they differ in 
method and scope, although the philosophical methodology of conceptual analysis is 
sometimes used in both disciplines. Philosophy studies all aspects of reality, including 
religious experience, while theology is primarily oriented on Biblical revelation. 
 
The interesting thing is that both Dooyeweerd and Plantinga recognize the importance 
of pre-philosophical opinion which is religious in nature. Dooyeweerd emphasizes the 
importance of the Christain ground motive (par. 5.8), while Plantinga, when 
discussing his conception of Augustinian Christian philosophy (par. 6.9-6.10), claims 
that we (legitimately) come to philosophy with pre-philosophical opinion, 
fundamentally religious in nature. Maybe Plantinga is not so far away from 
Dooyeweerd’s conception of a (pre-philosophical) religious world view 
(Weltanschauung) and its close connection to philosophy as he seems to be.398 I do 
not agree with Dooyeweerd’s claim that all theoretical thought – whether philosophy 
or theology – necessarily has a religious root. When using natural reason philosophers 
can do a lot of proper work using the methodology of conceptual analysis. However, 
when systematically building on these concepts, philosophy very soon becomes – in 
Plantinga’s words – “an arena for the articulation and interplay of commitments and 
allegiances fundamentally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep and 
fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing ourselves and the world and God.”399 This 
is actually what makes philosophy both valuable and fascinating. 
 
A Weltanschauung (or: religious world view) is more fundamental than a specific 
theology or philosophy. Philosophers use their natural reason, but this is not a reason 
that can be isolated from their system of basic, pre-theoretical beliefs. Of course this 
fundamental claim is hard – if not impossible – to proof. If proofs are necessary for 
this fundamental starting point, the burden of proof is also on those who claim not to 
be influenced by a pre-philosophical perspective in their philosophical work.400 The 
fundamental claim can only be made plausible. A religious world view has to do with 
the existence as a religious person in the world, including judgments about what really 
matters, about good and evil, about the coherence of the world, and about past and 
future. Theology (and philosophy) can only be a limited articulation of this existence. 
For example, the existential feelings of love, coherence, and justice can never be fully 
articulated in theological (or philosophical) terms. Perhaps they even are the 
necessary preconditions of theological or philosophical wonder. If the claim that 
every philosopher has a pre-philosophical perspective (fundamentally religious in 
                                               
398 I use the concept of Weltanschauung meaning a pre-philosophical world view, being fundamentally 
religious in nature, not as a more or less coherent, articulated, theoretical system of a philosophical or 
theological nature. 
399 Plantinga, ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’, p. 271. 
400 Of course these claims also refer back to the person who formulates them. Besides, when the 
philosopher has this pre-philosophical perspective, the same is true for the theologian. On this point 
there is no difference between philosophy and theology. 
 98 
nature) is true, then a Christian philosopher can be a full-scale philosopher even when 
theological knowledge functions in his philosophy, preferably formulated in 
philosophical terminology. In my view Plantinga’s epistemological work gives a 
convincing, purely philosophical legitimation for the functioning of religious 
knowledge (or Weltanschauung) in philosophy. Nonetheless, neither Dooyeweerd nor 
Plantinga is very clear about the influence of this pre-philosophical opinion on 
philosophy. Dooyeweerd has a more or less mystical view on the heart as the religious 
root of our entire existence, including philosophy. Plantinga’s epistemological 
approach ‘simply’ introduces religious claims as properly basic into philosophy. Both 
approaches seem unsatisfactory to me as a view on the connection between 
Weltanschauung and philosophy. I think this connection is quite loose. A 
Weltanschauung in my view functions as an orientation for the direction of thought of 
a philosopher, not as a determining framework. 
 
Dooyeweerd (probably) wouldn’t agree with Plantinga’s indistinctive conception of 
theology, because according to Dooyeweerd theology is the scholarship of the faith 
aspect of reality. Dooyeweerd sharply distinguishes between faith and religion (par. 
5.13).401 According to Dooyeweerd, faith is concerned in the modal aspect of faith 
and is studied in theology; while religion is the root of all thought. The religious 
origin of reality works through all modal aspects and therefore in all scientific and 
scholarly fields, not only in theology. I don’t think that Dooyeweerd’s distinction is 
fruitful. Theology more or less becomes the discipline of religious studies, i.e. the 
study of religion from the perspective of the social sciences (and of philosophy). 
When faith, as studied by theology, is separated from religion, as found in the heart of 
man, religion as such stays unreflected. This is unsatisfying for a Christian 
philosopher. It is certainly true that religion as a psychical process can do without 
theological reflection. Still, when a Christian philosopher claims to build a Christian 
philosophy he cannot do without some theological input. However, this theological 
input has to be translated into philosophical terms and should also be available for 
conceptual analysis. The philosophical reflection on religion in a Dooyeweerdian 
sense needs further study. Possible directions can be found in Dooyeweerd’s 
conception of the (necessity of the) religious fullness of truth, which alone makes all 
truth within the temporal horizon possible, or in Cornelius van Til’s 
presuppositionalism (par. 6.1), or in Martin Heidegger’s concept of the Existentiale. 
 
Theology in my view is the construction of a coherent account of the Christian faith. 
It uses natural reason to systematically work out Biblical revelation, which is – in the 
classical reformed conception – its primary source of knowledge. Still, theology is not 
the same as revelation. I reject the Thomistic distinction between nature and grace 
when this means claiming for theology a higher ranking form of knowledge. 
Theologians use their deficient natural reason, like philosophers do. Therefore, their 
theology is deficient too. Plantinga may be perfectly right in his opinion that “a 
certain amount of modal logic and of the lore and distinctions that go with it is 
essential for decent work on many of the main topics of theology.”402  
 
Christian philosophers have no less access to Biblical revelation than theologians 
have, but philosophers should not directly introduce revelation or theological dogmas 
into their philosophy. They should at least translate them into philosophical terms, 
                                               
401 Dooyeweerd’s distinction should not be confused with Barth’s. 
402 Plantinga, ‘Self-profile’, p. 25. 
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because philosophy, maybe more than theology, is aimed at discussion and a choc des 
opinions, which needs a common language. Plantinga’s use of natural reason in 
philosophy of religion – a discipline in the border area between theology and 
philosophy – is a good example. Still, philosophy covers a wider area than what is 
suitable for conceptual analysis. Therefore, the use of Plantinga’s methodology is 
limited. There are also large areas of philosophy that are not covered by theology, like 
social and political philosophy, aesthetics, epistemology, and logic. In my view, 
philosophy has to ask questions about every aspect of reality, although not every 
question can be answered. Humility is essential for a Christian philosopher. 
Therefore, a Christian philosophy should not be developed as a metaphysical system. 
Christian philosophers certainly do not have philosophical truth ready-at-hand, but 
nonetheless they differ from non-Christian philosophers because Christians know in 
which direction they can look for truth. The classical-Augustinian notion that the 
fullness of truth, goodness and beauty can be found in God, is important here. The 
notion of the illumination of reason by God is also important. For theologians it would 
be wise if they use philosophical methodology when systematically building on 
Biblical exegesis, because philosophy has a long tradition in the use of natural reason. 
For a Christian thinker philosophy and theology are closely connected. They are 
neither ancillae nor reginae, but collegae.403 
 
Regarding the question about the difference between theology and philosophy I 
conclude that philosophy can be regarded as an analysis of reality, including religious 
experience, using natural reason, without the need for a specific theology. (Christian) 
theology is the construction of a coherent account of the Christian faith, using natural 
reason to systematically work out Biblical revelation, which is its primary source of 
knowledge. Besides, philosophy and theology differ not only in method, but also in 
scope. In these conceptions of philosophy and theology both Plantinga and 
Dooyeweerd are philosophers, although parts of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy have the 
potential to become a quasi-theology. Regarding the question about the philosophical 
legitimation for the functioning of religious knowledge in philosophy I refer to 
Plantinga’s epistemological work. Although his work is convincing me from an 
epistemological point of view, I still don’t believe in the direct connection between 
pre-philosophical religious world view and philosophy that can also be found in 
Dooyeweerd’s work. I prefer to think of this connection as a quite loose one, as an 
orientation for the direction of thought. 
  
Finally, both Dooyeweerd and Plantinga want to stay away from Biblicism and 
fideism. Biblicism is the alleged unproblematic ‘litteral’ reading and application of 
the Bible. Fideism is, in Plantinga’s cited words, the “exclusive or basic reliance upon 
faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized 
especially in the pursuit of philosophical or religious truth”.404 Thus, staying away 
from both Biblicism and fideism means neither rejecting natural reason, nor 
absolutizing our interpretation of Biblical truth. When combining this with the 
doctrine of corruptio totalis, it also means that the Christian philosophy or theology 
do not exist, because they cannot be directly derived from the Bible, nor infallably 
known by a corrupted reason. Nonetheless, natural reason and (the explanation of) 
                                               
403 G. van den Brink, ‘Communicatie tussen christelijke filosofie en theologie’, in: G. van den Brink 
a.o., Filosofie en theologie. Een gesprek tussen christen-filosofen en theologen, Amsterdam Buijten & 
Schipperheijn 1997, p. 31-47: 44. 
404 Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, p. 87. 
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Biblical revelation at least cannot do without each other. Christian philosophy as a 
metaphysical system cannot exist, although Christian philosophers cannot and should 
not deny what they know through biblical revelation.  
 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
In the introduction to this book Étienne Gilson was introduced, who stated that no 
philosophy as a substantive discipline can exist in Calvinism, because, according to 
Gilson, the depraved reason of man as sketched by the Reformers cannot attain truth. 
He appears to be wrong. Reformed philosophy exists, and it is neither theology, nor 
fideism, nor Biblicism. Although the whole of life is affected by sin, Reformed 
thinkers regard reason as a natural gift that is capable of philosophizing. However, 
reason is not self-sufficient and, when faith is concerned, cannot do without 
revelation. Gilson writes: “I call Christian, every philosophy which, although keeping 
the two orders formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an 
indispensable auxiliary to reason.”405 The Reformed philosophers presented in this 
book will certainly subscribe this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
405 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 
1991 (1936), p. 37. 
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